Reed v Town of Gilbert, Arizona
Gilbert, Arizona (Town), has a comprehensive code (Sign Code or Code)
that prohibits the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but exempts
23 categories of signs, including three relevant here. “Ideological
Signs,” defined as signs “communicating a message or ideas” that
do not fit in any other Sign Code category, may be up to 20 square
feet and have no placement or time restrictions. “Political Signs,” defined
as signs “designed to influence the outcome of an election,” may
be up to 32 square feet and may only be displayed during an election
season. “Temporary Directional Signs,” defined as signs directing the
public to a church or other “qualifying event,” have even greater restrictions:
No more than four of the signs, limited to six square feet,
may be on a single property at any time, and signs may be displayed
no more than 12 hours before the “qualifying event” and 1 hour after.
Petitioners, Good News Community Church (Church) and its pastor,
Clyde Reed, whose Sunday church services are held at various
temporary locations in and near the Town, posted signs early each
Saturday bearing the Church name and the time and location of the
next service and did not remove the signs until around midday Sunday.
The Church was cited for exceeding the time limits for displaying
temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event
date on the signs. Unable to reach an accommodation with the Town,
petitioners filed suit, claiming that the Code abridged their freedom
of speech. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary
injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ultimately concluding
that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral, and that the
Code satisfied the intermediate scrutiny accorded to content-neutral
regulations of speech.
Held: The Sign Code’s provisions are content-based regulations of speech that do not survive strict scrutiny. Pp. 6–17.
(a) Because content-based laws target speech based on its communicative
content, they are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests. E.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul,
505 U. S. 377, 395. Speech regulation is content based if a law applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U. S. ___,
___–___. And courts are required to consider whether a regulation of
speech “on its face” draws distinctions based on the message a speaker
conveys. Id., at ___. Whether laws define regulated speech by particular
subject matter or by its function or purpose, they are subject
to strict scrutiny. The same is true for laws that, though facially content
neutral, cannot be “ ‘justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech,’ ” or were adopted by the government “because
of disagreement with the message” conveyed. Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791. Pp. 6–7.
(b) The Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines the categories
of temporary, political, and ideological signs on the basis of
their messages and then subjects each category to different restrictions.
The restrictions applied thus depend entirely on the sign’s
communicative content. Because the Code, on its face, is a contentbased
regulation of speech, there is no need to consider the government’s
justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine
whether it is subject to strict scrutiny. Pp. 7.
(c) None of the Ninth Circuit’s theories for its contrary holding is
persuasive.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-502_9olb.pdf
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