from the Supremes today, 4 of 6.

Brumfield v. Cain

Held: Because Brumfield satisfied §2254(d)(2)’s requirements, he was
entitled to have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal
court. Pp. 6–19.
(a) The two underlying factual determinations on which the state
trial court’s decision was premised—that Brumfield’s IQ score was
inconsistent with a diagnosis of intellectual disability and that he
presented no evidence of adaptive impairment—were unreasonable
under §2254(d)(2). Because that standard is satisfied, the Court need
not address §2254(d)(1). Pp. 6–17.
(1) Expert trial testimony that Brumfield scored a 75 on an IQ
test is entirely consistent with intellectual disability. Every IQ score
has a margin of error. Accounting for that margin of error, the
sources on which the Williams court relied in defining subaverage intelligence
describe a score of 75 as consistent with an intellectual disability
diagnosis. There was no evidence presented to the trial court
of any other IQ test that was sufficiently rigorous to preclude the
possibility that Brumfield possessed subaverage intelligence. Pp. 8–
11.
(2) The state-court record contains sufficient evidence to suggest
that Brumfield would meet the criteria for adaptive impairment.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1433_bpm1.pdf

Davis, acting warden, v. Ayala

During jury selection in respondent Ayala’s murder trial, Ayala, who is
Hispanic, objected that seven of the prosecution’s peremptory challenges
were impermissibly race-based under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U. S. 79. The judge permitted the prosecution to disclose its reasons
for the strikes outside the presence of the defense and concluded that
the prosecution had valid, race-neutral reasons for the strikes. Ayala
was eventually convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, the
California Supreme Court analyzed Ayala’s challenge under both
Batson and its state-law analogue, concluding that it was error, as a
matter of state law, to exclude Ayala from the hearings. The court
held, however, that the error was harmless under state law and that,
if a federal error occurred, it too was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18. Ayala subsequently
pressed his claims in federal court. There, the District Court held
that even if the ex parte proceedings violated federal law, the state
court’s harmlessness finding could not be overturned because it was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit disagreed and granted Ayala habeas relief. The panel majority
held that the ex parte proceedings violated Ayala’s federal constitutional
rights and that the error was not harmless under Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, as to at least three of the seven prospective
jurors.
Held: Any federal constitutional error that may have occurred by excluding
Ayala’s attorney from part of the Batson hearing was harmless.
Pp. 9–29.
(a) Even assuming that Ayala’s federal rights were violated, he is
entitled to habeas relief only if the prosecution cannot demonstrate harmlessness. Glebe v. Frost, 574 U. S. ___, ___. Under Brecht, federal
habeas petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial
error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’
” 507 U. S., at 637. Because Ayala seeks federal habeas corpus
relief, he must meet the Brecht standard, but that does not mean, as
the Ninth Circuit thought, that a state court’s harmlessness determination
has no significance under Brecht. The Brecht standard subsumes
the requirements that §2254(d) imposes when a federal habeas
petitioner contests a state court’s determination that a
constitutional error was harmless under Chapman.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1428_n64o.pdf

Reed v Town of Gilbert, Arizona

Gilbert, Arizona (Town), has a comprehensive code (Sign Code or Code)
that prohibits the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but exempts
23 categories of signs, including three relevant here. “Ideological
Signs,” defined as signs “communicating a message or ideas” that
do not fit in any other Sign Code category, may be up to 20 square
feet and have no placement or time restrictions. “Political Signs,” defined
as signs “designed to influence the outcome of an election,” may
be up to 32 square feet and may only be displayed during an election
season. “Temporary Directional Signs,” defined as signs directing the
public to a church or other “qualifying event,” have even greater restrictions:
No more than four of the signs, limited to six square feet,
may be on a single property at any time, and signs may be displayed
no more than 12 hours before the “qualifying event” and 1 hour after.
Petitioners, Good News Community Church (Church) and its pastor,
Clyde Reed, whose Sunday church services are held at various
temporary locations in and near the Town, posted signs early each
Saturday bearing the Church name and the time and location of the
next service and did not remove the signs until around midday Sunday.
The Church was cited for exceeding the time limits for displaying
temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event
date on the signs. Unable to reach an accommodation with the Town,
petitioners filed suit, claiming that the Code abridged their freedom
of speech. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary
injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ultimately concluding
that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral, and that the
Code satisfied the intermediate scrutiny accorded to content-neutral
regulations of speech.
Held: The Sign Code’s provisions are content-based regulations of speech that do not survive strict scrutiny. Pp. 6–17.
(a) Because content-based laws target speech based on its communicative
content, they are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests. E.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul,
505 U. S. 377, 395. Speech regulation is content based if a law applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U. S. ___,
___–___. And courts are required to consider whether a regulation of
speech “on its face” draws distinctions based on the message a speaker
conveys. Id., at ___. Whether laws define regulated speech by particular
subject matter or by its function or purpose, they are subject
to strict scrutiny. The same is true for laws that, though facially content
neutral, cannot be “ ‘justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech,’ ” or were adopted by the government “because
of disagreement with the message” conveyed. Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791. Pp. 6–7.
(b) The Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines the categories
of temporary, political, and ideological signs on the basis of
their messages and then subjects each category to different restrictions.
The restrictions applied thus depend entirely on the sign’s
communicative content. Because the Code, on its face, is a contentbased
regulation of speech, there is no need to consider the government’s
justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine
whether it is subject to strict scrutiny. Pp. 7.
(c) None of the Ninth Circuit’s theories for its contrary holding is
persuasive.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-502_9olb.pdf

McFadden v U.S.

Petitioner McFadden was arrested and charged with distributing controlled
substance analogues in violation of the federal Controlled
Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 (Analogue Act), which
identifies a category of substances substantially similar to those
listed on the federal controlled substances schedules, 21 U. S. C.
§802(32)(A), and instructs courts to treat those analogues as schedule
I controlled substances if they are intended for human consumption,
§813. Arguing that he did not know the “bath salts” he was distributing
were regulated as controlled substance analogues, McFadden
sought an instruction that would have prevented the jury from finding
him guilty unless it found that he knew the substances he distributed
had chemical structures and effects on the central nervous
system substantially similar to those of controlled substances. Instead,
the District Court instructed the jury that it need only find
that McFadden knowingly and intentionally distributed a substance
with substantially similar effects on the central nervous system as a
controlled substance and that he intended that substance to be consumed
by humans. McFadden was convicted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the Analogue Act’s intent element required only
proof that McFadden intended the substance to be consumed by humans.

Held: When a controlled substance is an analogue, §841(a)(1) requires
the Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing
with a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act or
Analogue Act. Pp. 4–11.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-378_k537.pdf