MOSCOW, June 9. /TASS/. The Russian Defense Ministry has requested explanations from the Pentagon over recent statements by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, to the effect the United States might deploy in Europe and Asia its cruise and ballistic missiles that might be targeted against Russia, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said.

"The Russian Defense Ministry is conducting scrupulous analysis of information regarding compliance with the INF treaty coming from different sources. Certainly, we took note of these publications in the Western press. In order to obtain official reaction from the American side we have dispatched a request through military-diplomatic channels for explanations of the Pentagon’s positions regarding statements reportedly made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey.

"The measures mentioned by US sources would be tantamount to the United States’ walkout from the INF treaty," he added.

"We believe that the return of US intermediate and shorter range missiles to Europe and their deployment in other regions from where they might threaten Russia and other countries reluctant to follow instructions from Washington would cause a drastically negative impact on global security and stability. We cannot but feel worried about such prospects," Antonov said.

http://tass.ru/en/russia/799671

April 7, 2014

The Real Trouble With Russia

...

In the wake of the tests, some observers, including at the Heritage Foundation, have been calling for the United States to do just that. And terminating the INF would certainly send a strong message. But, at this stage, it would be rash and ill-advised.

That is because the United States still benefits from the treaty. Despite Moscow’s apparent recent bad-faith activities, the agreement nonetheless constrains Russia. The pact, after all, prohibits one of the world’s largest land powers from deploying land-based missiles that could reach key American allies in Europe and East Asia, as well as a host of other countries in the band between 500 and 5,500 kilometers from Russia’s borders. This is an onerous restraint for a country that has become increasingly reliant on missiles for its military striking power. The United States, in contrast, has traditionally relied much more on aerial and naval power for its strike capabilities, and was content in the 1980s to give up its ground-based INF-range missiles. In fact, the “zero option” that eventually became INF was originally proposed as a poisoned pill to kill any arms control pact because it was thought to be totally unacceptable to Moscow.

Thus, thanks to INF, for the past quarter century the United States has not had to deal with Russian INF-accountable systems -- a great boon to the United States and its allies. But, of course, this benefit has come because Russia has mostly complied with the treaty. If Russia has started ignoring it, it won’t do the United States much good.

So these are the benefits. But what are the costs to the United States of INF? If it meaningfully and painfully constrains the United States, this should make Washington more skeptical about sticking with it in the face of Russian violations. Unfortunately, it is impossible to derive a full picture of the costs, in large part because the Defense Department does not make its analysis of this point public. Nevertheless, we do know a few things that bear on the question. On the one hand, INF does not endanger the United States’ current military effectiveness; U.S. forces can launch accurate strikes from air and sea and can operate drones as needed. On the other hand, INF does prohibit the United States from exploiting at least some attractive options to fill holes in its military posture. Some experts, including Jim Thomas, the vice president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, argue that such systems would fill a rather large gap in the United States’ ability to strike quickly with accurate and effective conventional weapons. Likewise, the Department of Defense has reportedly identified a number of major unmet requirements in the prompt conventional strike mission that at least some in DOD think could best be met through INF-prohibited systems

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-04-07/real-trouble-russia