US MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM "OPERATIONAL" (OH BOY!)

The United States has activated its missile defense system to deal with a possible North Korean missile test, Kyodo News agency reported Tuesday, citing a report.

The U.S. is considering intercepting the missile if North Korea goes ahead with the test , Kyodo said, quoting The Washington Times.

<http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20060606-032551-3961r>

'Operational' missile defense undefined

WASHINGTON, June 6 (UPI) -- The Pentagon has still not determined the criteria the national missile defense system must meet before it can be declared "operational," a new (GAO) report states.(*L1) That declaration has been pending since 2004, when the first ground-based interceptor missiles were deployed in Alaska, following U.S. President George W. Bush's 2002 decision to deploy a system with limited operational ability.

But in January 2005 -- shortly after an interceptor missile had failed to lift off when cued to its target in a test -- Pentagon spokesman Larry Di Rita said the system may never be declared operational. It would just continue to be developed and added on to. (*L2)

"I don't think that the goal was ever that we would declare it was operational. I think the goal was that there would be an operational capability by the end of 2004," DiRita said.(*L3) The ground-based interceptors are meant to launch soon after a long-range enemy ballistic missile is fired at the United States, racing out to space to smash into and destroy the warhead while it is still outside the atmosphere.

Traditionally weapons programs proceed along a linear path, from the identification of a requirement...

...The ground-based missile defense system, however, is following a different track known as spiral development - the system is built in stages, tested as it goes, and then added on to, with no specific end-state defined.

(more at link above)

(More links below this GAO Abstract)

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile

Defense, GAO-06-473, May 31, 2006
Highlights-PDFPDFAccessible Text

The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the September 11 attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of defensive ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.

DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance requirements.

DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate planning and operational support, and conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security, training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements guidance.

Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized.

(more at link) <http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-06-473>