If you lack such intelligence, then all you have is people who are killing other people in the Middle of the night (That is considered Murder in most Cultures).
For such "Hunting Teams" to be successful (if you define success as reducing the effectiveness of the Taliban as opposed to just killing people) whoever they kill MUST downgrade the Taliban's ability to wage war more then that person's death inflames others to join the Taliban (Or confirm people to stay with the Taliban). Given what I have read about the Taliban, Bin Laden and Omar (the leader of the Taliban) none of the leadership is going to be known to other members of the Taliban except on a need to know basis. That means any knowledge is kept within a very tight group. Thus it is almost impossible to get at the top leadership for by the time we know where they are, they are long gone.
Thus the key to success for such Hit Teams is to hit members of this group who are the messengers from Omar to his local troops. If you kill enough of such messengers you break up the command structure. The problem is making sure you are hitting such messengers NOT just a local leader (A local leader being someone who is the local political/Tribal leader who probably has connections with the Taliban but NOT a messengers from Omar). Who is a local leaders and who is a messenger the Taliban will take efforts to hide (and to confuse, i.e. have "false" Messengers to detract any hit team).
Now, the above requires HUMAN INTELLIGENCE not just High Tech Intelligence from Satellites, drones, planes, intercepted radio communications etc. Such Human Intelligence is the weak point of the US intelligence when it comes to Afghanistan. We may know where every rock in the Country is, but we can NOT tell if the people around that rock will use it to build a house or throw it at an American Soldier. This weakness makes the Hits by the Hit Teams NOT worth the effort.
Afghanistan is tribal based society and as such to kill off a Tribal Leader who supports the Taliban may be helpful in getting that tribe to switch side, but also can inflame the members of that tribe to comment further to the Taliban. Human Intelligence is the key to know who to "remove" and who to leave in place.
People tend to forget that the Operation Phoenix program in Vietnam was viewed as a success by the number of local village leaders killed off by the program and IGNORING who replaced those leaders once the leaders were "removed". Please be careful on the net, the net tends to be dominated by people who justify Operation Phoenix as a success for the 1972 and 1975 Offensives were conventional attacks aided by Guerrillas NOT Guerrilla lead attacks. Logical in a sense, but the Viet Cong were committed to a Mao type rural Guerrilla fight, Mao always believed that sooner or later the Guerrilla will have to convert to a Conventional attack to do the final take over. Thus the 1972 and 1975 offensive follows Mao teaching on how to fight and win a Guerrilla War. Mao concepts are ignored by most writers on the net, so they say Operation Phoenix was a success for it destroyed the Viet Cong Cadre and thus North Vietnam had to use conventional tactics in 1972 and 1975 for the Guerrillas no longer had the leadership to do an attack (But this also ignores the fact that the head of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam was based in Saigon, right under the noses of South Vietnamese and American intelligence officers). The people killed under Operation Phoenix was the local Village Mayor (When the Village had less then 200 people in it) NOT the local Viet Cong Commander who did his rounds on his own schedule to all of the Villages AND who reported to the higher command of the Viet Cong.
Just an observation, more hit teams does NOT mean more success UNLESS we get better Human Intelligence, and Human Intelligence is where the Soviets failed in the 1980s and 1990s and where we are failing today.
More on Operation Phoenix:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoenix_Programhttp://www.counterpunch.org/valentine.htmlhttp://www.douglasvalentine.com/the_phoenix_program_11712.htmIn Afghanistan:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13999