Saturday, May 1, 2004; Page A01
Facing a deadline of just two months for returning some political power to Iraqis, the Bush administration is squeezed between quelling the insurgency and the search for any idea that reduces the chances of a violent confrontation. But it's uncertain whether some of its new tactics will resolve problems quickly enough for the administration's self-imposed timetable.
The decision to turn to former Iraqi army generals to help regain control of Fallujah, for instance, took place under confusing circumstances, with military officials in Iraq announcing terms that officials in Washington had yet to review. It also came against the backdrop of rising Iraqi anger at the U.S.-led occupation and televised images of possible psychological and sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers.
To some analysts, the administration left the impression it was grasping at alternatives, with little sense of how this new tactic fit into the larger strategy or of its possible pitfalls. In much of the world, in fact, the agreement was first described as a retreat by Americans in the face of stubborn resistance by insurgent forces.
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A senior administration official, briefing reporters yesterday on the condition on anonymity, said the administration was trying to "find the least possible violent outcome to this situation in Fallujah." He said Marines had suspended offensive operations for three weeks, and during this period Iraqis -- "city fathers," sheiks, and now military officers -- had offered assistance in an effort to avoid a bloody military conflict.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57850-2004Apr30.html
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