Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside

older article but it is a no wonder we were able to invade so successfully.


http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2006/3.html

Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside
Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray
From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006

Summary: EDITOR'S NOTE: The fall of Baghdad in April 2003 opened one of the most secretive and brutal governments in history to outside scrutiny. For the first time since the end of World War II, American analysts did not have to guess what had happened on the other side of a conflict but could actually read the defeated enemy's documents and interrogate its leading figures. To make the most of this unique opportunity, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) commissioned a comprehensive study of the inner workings and behavior of Saddam Hussein's regime based on previously inaccessible primary sources. Drawing on interviews with dozens of captured senior Iraqi military and political leaders and hundreds of thousands of official Iraqi documents (hundreds of them fully translated), this two-year project has changed our understanding of the war from the ground up. The study was partially declassified in late February; its key findings are presented here.

........(segment about the authors)

Throughout the years of relative external peace for Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, in 1991, Saddam Hussein continued to receive and give credence to optimistic assessments of his regime's prospects dished up by his top military officers. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz described the dictator as having been "very confident" that the United States would not dare to attack Iraq, and that if it did, it would be defeated. What was the source of Saddam's confidence?

Judging from his private statements, the single most important element in Saddam's strategic calculus was his faith that France and Russia would prevent an invasion by the United States. According to Aziz, Saddam's confidence was firmly rooted in his belief in the nexus between the economic interests of France and Russia and his own strategic goals: "France and Russia each secured millions of dollars worth of trade and service contracts in Iraq, with the implied understanding that their political posture with regard to sanctions on Iraq would be pro-Iraqi. In addition, the French wanted sanctions lifted to safeguard their trade and service contracts in Iraq. Moreover, they wanted to prove their importance in the world as members of the Security Council -- that they could use their veto to show they still had power."

Ibrahim Ahmad Abd al-Sattar, the Iraqi army and armed forces chief of staff, claimed that Saddam believed that even if his international supporters failed him and the United States did launch a ground invasion, Washington would rapidly bow to international pressure to halt the war. According to his personal interpreter, Saddam also thought his "superior" forces would put up "a heroic resistance and . . . inflict such enormous losses on the Americans that they would stop their advance." Saddam remained convinced that, in his own words, "Iraq will not, in any way, be like Afghanistan. We will not let the war become a picnic for the American or the British soldiers. No way!".........

France hadn't secured "million of dollars worth" contracts. Iraq was under EMBARGO and what is true is that Saddam had given promises (more or less vague) of future deals if the situation changed. France imported only 4% of its oil from Iraq while the US 1998 imported PRACTICALLY ALL IRAQUI OIL through the oil for food program.

A lot of people in Europe and not only in France wanted the sanctions lifted because of the suffering they caused to the Iraqui people. There was nothing to "safeguard", because nothing was conclusive.

If France had been after the Iraqui oil and contracts, it had been easier to join the coalition. Same applies to most European countries.


That kind of BS put the whole article in another light, it sounds to me as a lot of neocon propaganda. I don't deny that Saddam's army was a mess (the first Gulf War showed it) and that it was no match for plenty of reasons.
But I'd be very, very careful with details in that story.