The U.S. government's unique system of Inspectors General — an elite but underappreciated slice of the federal civil service — is arguably the best spent taxpayer money in Washington. At their best, these quasi-independent ombudsmen save the country billions, many multiples of what it costs to employ close to 12,000 staff in 64 IG offices, while doing their best to ensure the efficient and impartial functioning of their respective agencies.
But with such lofty mandates — and powerful offices — their failures can be equally crucial, helping to shield the worst excesses of powerful government bureaucracies. And almost 30 years since its landmark creation, many critics say the IG system has never been in more dire need of reform as it is under the Bush administration. An unusually high number of Bush IGs, such as Janet Rehnquist at Health and Human Services and Joseph Schmitz at the Pentagon, have been forced to resign under a cloud as a result of bipartisan pressure, often because of bald incompetence or gross interference with the IG mission. At the same time, a number of good IGs have felt undermined or even been forced out by their political superiors after uncovering major problems; Clark Kent Irvin, for one, encountered resistance from Tom Ridge at Homeland Security after highlighting porous weapons detection at airports, the lack of consolidated terrorist lists, and pre-Katrina inadequacies at FEMA. More than 60% of IGs appointed by Bush had prior political experience — either at the White House or as Republican Congressional staff — while fewer than 20% had prior audit experience, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform reported in 2005. During the Clinton years, by contrast, more than 60% of IGs appointees had a relevant oversight background.
"Over the past seven years they
have systematically worked to undermine IG authority and chill audit and investigatory range," says Paul C. Light, a recognized IG authority who teaches about public service at New York University. "This has been a sustained effort and it has taken its toll...so I would say they are the worst; they would make the Reagan Administration proud."
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(CIA Hayden) Hitz views Hayden's investigation of his IG as a dangerous precedent that contains an implicit message to "call off the dogs" or go easier on his reporting. Helgerson has already rankled senior CIA staff, particularly with his examination of the agency's pre-9/11 intelligence failures, which broke with tradition by naming names, including CIA director George Tenet. Hayden fiercely resisted releasing even the executive summary of that report but was finally compelled to when Congress passed a law ordering it.
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1681265,00.html