The preemptive-war doctrine has met an early death in Iraq
By Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay
Ivo H. Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and James M. Lindsay, vice president and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, are coauthors of "America Unbound: The B
May 30, 2004
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Bush's radical departure from past practice was based on two assumptions, both of which our experience in Iraq has shown to be flawed. The first was the belief that Washington would have access to reliable intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries. An enemy's society might be closed, but our modern spy technologies could pry it open. We could peer into secret weapons sites from on high and listen to conversations and other communications without being detected. Our intelligence would be good enough to warn us of impending danger.
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The second assumption that drove Bush's willingness to launch a preventive war was the belief that the technological edge held by the U.S. made the costs of war, if not cheap, then at least acceptable.
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With the Iraqi threat having turned out to be far less than advertised and the cost of occupying Iraq far higher, it is hardly surprising that preemption suddenly looks far less attractive. Earlier this year, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Washington Post that had he known then what he knows now about Iraq's weapons capabilities, it would have changed "the political calculus; it changes the answer you get" when asking whether to go to war or not.
Many Americans now agree. Polls show that a majority now believes that the war in Iraq was not worth fighting. Persuading them, much less the rest of the world, to launch another preventive war elsewhere in the world would be a tough sell.
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http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op-daalder30may30,1,837327.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinionsBush Administration Transition Team