based upon the quote in this interview with Chalmers Johnson, from his book, The Sorrows of Empire, isn't this proof that what the six generals, a couple of ambassadors, and various intel people testified to before the Iraq invasion...i.e. that an invasion of Iraq and the subsequent "perpetual war" that is the Bush Doctrine would create, not stop terrorism..proof that, yet again, they were right and Bush (and every Congressperson who supports this idea) is wrong?
http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/04/03/int04013.html"Secretary Rumsfeld, in his long, hard slog memo of October, said that we lack a method, he calls it -- a measure of our progress in the war on terrorism. I think he's just wrong. Between 1993 and 2001, including the attacks of Sept. 11, Al Qaeda managed to execute about five major bombing incidents worldwide over a period of eight years. In the two years since then, down to and including the suicide attack on Istanbul on the British Consulate and the HSBC Bank, they've carried out 17.
We know with precision from numerous historical examples that the use of a high-tech armed force like ours in trying to combat terrorism is the wrong strategy. In fact, military over-reaction is one of the things the terrorists anticipate in resorting to terrorism, in the belief that that then will generate more activists and increase the movement, which so far you'd have to say Al Qaeda has succeeded beyond its wildest imagination."
Chalmers Johnson
Is a "war on terror" sound policy when successful terror attacks have INCREASED under Bush's watch?
Not to mention the amount of money Bush is spending on the sort of military hardware and other things which have to do with conventional warfare, not terrorism?
...and here we are, yet again, with an incompetent policy toward guerilla warfare/terrorism led by people who brand anyone who disagrees with them as soft on terror?
It burns me to no end that we cannot have an honest discussion of this issue...never on any talking head show, never in congress, when political opportunists play to fear rather than look at events and tactics and wonder if, perhaps, they need to "refine" or more to the point, "redefine" what the risk is, and how to face it?