like washington was the first president.
The Rise of american fascism
http://www.rationalrevolution.net/articles/rise_of_american_fascism.htmPearl harbor
http://www.straighttalkers.com/pearl_harbor.htmhere is an older file i had on my comp
The "Peace" Initiatives of 1945
Part I
In July of 1944, Saipan fell, and the Tojo government with it. The military had begun to fear Tojo. Japan's major problem was its chronically divided society which prevented the government from gaining control over its various entities. In answer to this, Tojo attempted to become a dictator, slowing concentrating all the ministerial power into his own hands. At one point he was head of 18 different ministries and agencies....
Needless to say, by 1943 it was obvious to many younger officers that the war was lost, though not to the government, which had no idea how the war was going. The military was split between the Army and Navy, which were fought each other as hard as they fought the Americans. Cooperation between the two had sunk so low that the Navy did not tell the Army (or the government) that it lost four carriers at Midway, while the Army built its own Navy so it could carry on operations without the other arm. In aircraft factories where the two had contracts, screens were built down the middle to wall off one sides planes from the other....the Army, the more dominant of the two in Japanese society, was split in scores of factions, which prior to war murdered each other and leading politicians in a period known as "government by assassination."
Nevertheless, no official movements to end the war were made until after the fall of Tojo, which brought the Koiso government to power. The Koiso government was hamstrung from the start. Koiso had been picked as a compromise candidate because the various centers of power --the civilian government, the military, the jushin (an informal but powerful council of former prime ministers that sat in on high-level decisions) and the Emperor could not agree on a candidate. "Purposely installed as an interim premier" as Toland put it.
There are no known peace overtures by anyone in Japan or out during the Koiso cabinet, with one exception. In January of 1945 Koiso contacted the rogue Chinese Miao Pin, a notorious intriguer, and attempted to use him to reach an understanding with the Chinese. Other Japanese found Pin disgusting, and the whole project was killed after Pin met with Prince Higashikuni. Pin was later executed by Chiang Kai-shek (Toland, p844).
The Koiso government was to fall in April of 1945, but the opening moves of Japanese diplomacy actually sounded in February. In that month, Shigemitsu, the foreign minister, contacted Naotoke Sato, who had the crucial post of Ambassador to Russia, and who, more than anyone, was to come to understand Japan's predicament and what the country had to do. Shigemitsu asked Sato to sound out the USSR about its intentions toward the nuetrality pact the two countries had, which was due for renewal in April of 1945. Sato fired off a blistering reply on Feb 12, asking how the government could have him undertake such a task without telling him what its own position was. For the next two months Sato reported periodically on this task, while Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, famous for his stone-faced negotiating stance, put him off. This was to form the pattern of all subsequent dealings between Tokyo and Moscow, with Tokyo living in a dream that it had power and influence while the Soviets toyed with them, and Sato pleaded with Tokyo to embrace reality and surrender unconditionally. "My first responsibility," he wrote in July, "is to prevent the harboring of illusions which are at variance with the reality."
The 5th of April, 1945, was one of the most portentious days in Japanese history. The Koiso government collapsed and in swept Suzuki, still with bullets in his body from an assassination attempt in the 1930s. Toland regards Suzuki as a peacemonger from the start, but as Frank points out, all the evidence for this came to light after the war. At each crucial juncture during the war, Suzuki opted to continue the conflict rather than support the peace moves. Thus, Suzuki occupies one of the most ambiguous positions throughout these critical months. That same day the Soviets formally notified Japan that the Nuetrality Agreement would not be renewed. Any other country would have instantly recognized that it would be the natural next target (with Soviet tanks on the Elbe, and Germany due to be knocked out of the war), but Tokyo still floated in its dream world. The government, insulated by the military from the actual progress of the war, still considered itself master of Asia. After all, was not the map red with Japanese conquests? Didn't Japan still control all that territory, so useful as bargaining chips? Meanwhile, on hundreds of islands throughout the Pacific, Japanese troops starved....
A series of peace moves, all initiated outside Tokyo's control, began. Although they were initiated independently by widely separated individuals, they all had several things in common:
(1) they were all informal.
(2) they were all initiated by outsiders. The government in Tokyo was never involved.
(2) they were all vague, no conditions envisioned, no plans made
(3) they were all killed by Tokyo.
Throughout these discussions it is important to keep in mind that the US was reading all diplomatic traffic (MAGIC) and much military traffic (ULTRA). Thus, whenever a Japanese representative overseas contacted, or was contacted by, Tokyo, the US read the cable. Sometimes the decrypted cable reached Truman and the five others permitted to read the material before it reached its intended recipient in the Japanese government!
The Swedish Initiatives
On April 7, then-acting foreign minister Shigemitsu, without the knowledge of his superiors, asked W. Bagge, the Swedish representative in Japan, to have Sweden intercede on Japan's behalf with the US. Shigemitsu rejected unconditional surrender, and stated that any agreement must preserve the Emperor. This move was killed by the next Foreign Minister Togo, who felt that Sweden did not have the kind of influence Japan needed, and was already looking toward the Russian initiative (see below) (Toland, p915, Frank, p94).
A few days later, the Swedes moved independently of the Japanese offer. Prince Carl Bernadotte, and Eric Erickson, a business man with ties to Japan, approached the Japanese military attache in Stockholm, Maj. Gen. Makoto Onodera. The Prince said he would advise the King to send a letter to Japan suggesting that peace negotiations take place.
In one of the more nearsighted and childish acts of the war, the idiotic Swedish Foriegn minister, peeved that proper channels were being bypassed, protested to his Japanese counterpart in Stockholm, who in turn protested to Tokyo. On June 24 the wires were scorched with the following message to the hapless General Onodera from the Vice Chief of the Imperial General staff in Tokyo bent on stamping out any detestable peacemongering political intrigue:
As we have said before, Japan is firmly determined to prosecute the Greater East Asia war to the very end. There is a report, however, to the effect that some Japanese official stationed in Sweden is making peace overtures to America. That is demogoguery pure and simple, and if you have any idea as to the source of these reports, please inform us.(quoted in Frank p114 and Toland, p916)
Thus died the Swedish initiatives, both killed by Tokyo. Interested readers may wonder what effect the comment "As we have said before, Japan is firmly determined to prosecute the Greater East Asia war to the very end" had on Americans who had access to this data.
The Vatican Moves
In early June the Japanese representative to the Vatican was contacted by Monsignor Vagnozzi, who considered himself to have good contacts with the US. This move was also brushed off by Tokyo, which considered the Vatican to be too weak to effect a peace initiative. In fact, this attempt died stillborn and is usually left out of the standard references. I put it here merely for completeness.
Things light up in Switzerland
The final two initiatives came from individuals in Switzerland. In May of 1945 the former Naval Attache in Berlin, now in Bern, Yoshiro Fujimura, initiated his own one-man peace effort. Fujimura is one of history's more admirable men. In addition to attempting to end the war, he saved a handful of Jews in Berlin by trading imported food to the SS and obtaining visas for them. Along with a German Japanophile by the name of Hack, he approached the OSS men in Bern, whom Fujimura knew to be reliable from their work with Germans, and chatted them up. The conversation was amiable, and few days later they contacted him again.
On May 3, Hack dropped off a fateful note to two men he knew only as Mr. White and Mr. Blum, saying that Fujimura was interested in direct negotiations with the US. One of the OSS men was Allen Dulles, brother to the famous John Dulles. The State Department gave Dulles the go-ahead to continue the discussions. Interested readers will note that the US did not brush this off.
On May 8 Fujimura contacted Tokyo (remember that the US is reading his messages). Since he did not have Tokyo's backing, he presented the contacts as being initiated by Dulles. Thus, the Americans knew from the start that he did not have the backing of his government.
Days passed. No answer from Tokyo. Meanwhile the meetings with Dulles continued. In all thirteen days flew by, with Fujimura bombarding his navy superiors in Tokyo with descriptions of Germany in ruins, and veteran US infantry boarding ships bound for the Pacific. Finally, on the 21st, Tokyo responded. The telgram admitted that "the principle point of your negotiations with the OSS was fully understood," but added that "there are certain points indicative of an enemy plot; therefore we advise you to be very cautious."
Fujimura was crushed, but soldiered on, finally telling Dulles that since Tokyo was uncooperative, he would have to go there himself. Dulles gave him a counteroffer. The US would provide a plane, and fly out any Japanese official with the power to negotiate, with a guarantee of safety. Interested readers will note that the US actively pursued this even though it knew Tokyo was not supporting this offer.
May turned to June, and still nothing happened. The Navy Minister, Adm. Yonai, sent only one additional telegram. As Craig, who interviewed Fujimura, notes (p36), Yonai knew that anyone who attempted to get on that plane would almost certainly die before it left Tokyo. Instead, he let the initiative die. After the war, Yonai apologized to Fujimura. "I assume all responsibility for our failure successfully to guide the preparations for peace and peace negotiations with the Dulles agency."
Of all the various independent peace moves, this one showed most promise.
At the same time, but independently of Fujimura, the Japanese military attache in Zurich and Basel, Lt. Gen. Seigo Okamoto, launched his own independent effort to end the war. This was based on his close personal friendship with Imp. Army Chief of Staff Umezu. Nevertheless, he also failed to garner any support in Tokyo. Sadly, all of the independent efforts were killed by Tokyo...
To Russia, with Hope
On May 21, 1945, the new foreign minister, Togo, sent two fateful messages. First, cabled all his diplomatic posts in a circular, flatly denying that "Japan has ever made peace proposals to America and England." In his second message to Sato in Moscow, he directed the latter to sound out the glacial Molotov on Russia's intentions toward Japan. Sato met with Molotov, and then responded to Tokyo, Cassandra to Troy. "We are facing future trouble with Russia," he bluntly said, saying that it was imperative that the government clearly determine how far it would go with the Russians. It would never do that
Part II
Japanese policy during the war was set by the Supreme War Council, consisting of six members. The Big Six from April 5 on were PM Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, Navy Minister Yonai, Army Minister Anami, Chief of the Naval General Staff Oikawa (quickly replaced by Toyoda in May) and Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu. At the time the only known advocate of peace was the redoubtable Togo, though after the war claims were made on behalf of Toyoda and Suzuki. Nothing in the record at the time supports this contention.
There are several things that must be noted at this juncture, for they formed the background to all "peace" discussions held by the Big Six and other officials. First, the law stipulated that the Army Minister must be a serving officer. Since the government could not function without all the ministerial posts filled, this meant that if the military did not like a governmental decision, it could bring down the government simply by having the Army Minister resign (which is exactly what happened when Japan surrendered). Thus, no peace agreement could take place without the military's say-so. Since Anami did not support peace -- even after two A-Bombs and Soviet entry, he still argued that the war was not necessarily lost -- there was no question of any peace agreement being made. It could not have been made without his approval, and there was no hint that any such thing would ever occur.
The second vital problem faced by peace advocates (and war advocates as well) was "government by assassination." Japanese politics was restrained by fear of assassination by rightist junior military officers. Anyone who openly advocated peace was in danger. In fact, there was little discussion of it until May, when Togo prevailed upon the Big Six to meet without their staff, so that no military underlings would be present to make implicit threats. Assassination attempts were common throughout the war; Tojo was the object of several plots, including one by more than 50 officers.
The third problem was that Japan was a totalitarian state in which thought and information were strictly controlled. This meant that discussions that sought ways to end the war could only take place in secret, and much communication consisted of circumlocutions, euphemisms, and unspoken agreements, to avoid discovery by the secret police. Most high officials did not have a clear idea of the progress of the war, nor did they understand how completely the Japanese military had been overwhelmed by superior US numbers, equipment, tactics, firepower, and technology. Many Japanese leaders argued that the Japanese possessed sufficient resources in territory and troops (about 4 million men under arms) that the US could be brought to the negotiating table. They did not conceive of Japan as a nation totally outclassed by its opponents. Thus, the thinking among Japanese leaders was founded on fantasies of Japanese strength. Those men who had realistic appraisals of the situation, such as staff officers in Imperial General HQ in Tokyo, or Kase and Sato in their embassies abroad, either had no clout or were ignored.
The ultimate fantasy of Imperial Japan was the Russian "peace" initiative of the summer of 1945. This was an attempt to get the Russians to mediate an end to the war that would leave Japan and most of its holdings intact, forestall a forced disarmament, and enable Japan to continue its adventure in China, while using Russia to compel the US to the negotiating table. Sato, Japan's man in Moscow, put this entire initiative into perspective with a series of telegrams fired off in July and read by the US. Responding to Togo's suggestion that as a bargaining counter, Japan would give up territories it had taken since the beginning of the war, Sato scathingly replied:
How much of an effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on Soviet authorities?
As you are well aware, the Soviet authorities are extremely realistic and it is extremely difficult to persuade them with abstract arguments. We certainly will not convince them with pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality.
If the Japanese Empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our own minds to terminate the war. Unless we make up our own minds, there is absolutely no point in sounding out the views of the Soviet Government.
Sato urged the government to end the war, saying that Japan would have to accept "virtually the equivalent of unconditional surrender."
The Russian "peace" initiative began in May. Togo gradually realized that the Army would never negotiate directly with the US. The Army had long envisioned war against Russia, however, a sound whipping at Nomohan prior to WWII in what was probably history's first true combined arms battle resulted in hasty revisions to this plan, as it was obvious Japan's army would never be able to face a real opponent (as WWII revealed). The focus on Russia remained (few top Army leaders knew anything about the US), and Togo, who was the only one among the Big Six who advocated an end to the war, finally realized that the Army would only negotiate through Russia.
On May 14, 1945, Togo drafted a memorandum outlining the proposed plan in the vaguest terms imaginable, after Suzuki gave his blessing in meetings held from May 11 to the 14th. He wrote, fantastically:
It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained nuetral, and that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United States as an enemy in the future.
The memorandum warned that Russia might demand a high price for this, and said that Japan might have to give up Port Arthur, Dairen, railways in Manchuria, and the northern portions of the Kuriles. Stalin had been promised much of this at Yalta anyway.
The draft was approved by all six of the Big Six, and Togo sent an experienced Russian specialist, Koki Hirota, to sound out Yakov Malik, the Russian ambassador. The devastating May 25 firebombing of Tokyo delayed his mission, and it was not until June 3 that he finally reached Malik in his home two hours from Tokyo. Preliminary talks yielded nothing but vague friendly comments.
Meanwhile, the military had not been idle. On June 6 there was another meeting of the Big Six. Far from seeking peace, in a new document from Supreme Command entitled The Fundamental Policy to be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War, the military demanded an official confirmation of:
With a faith born of eternal loyalty as our inspiration, we shall -- thanks to the advatnages of our terrain and the unity of our nation, prosecute the war to the bitter end in order to uphold our national essence, protect the Imperial land and achieve our goals of conquest.
A list of steps followed, including preparations for homeland defence and the formation of a national volunteer army. It called for the "honorable death of the hundred million" -- national suicide. The resolution passed over Togo's horrified objections. The resolution was then forwarded to the emperor for approval. In meeting with a number of top leaders, the motion was approved without objections.
Kido, as shocked by this as Togo was, memorialized His Majesty on the Ninth, arguing that Japan must begin negotiations with an intermediary power to get the US to end the war before Japan was destroyed. Kido, like all Japanese statesman, knew that "the enemy's main object is the overthrow of the so-called military clique" and that if Japan threw down its weapons and withdrew from occupied areas in the Pacific (no one was willing to contemplate withdrawal from China) then perhaps it could end the war. Disarmament would also have to be accepted. On the 13th Suzuki made a speech to the Diet calling for peace, and was shouted down.
Finally, on June 22 the Emperor abruptly summoned the Big Six to his side. "This is not an imperial command," he said, "but merely a discussion." There he broached the idea of sending a special envoy to Russia to negotiate for peace. Togo had been keeping the Emperor informed of progress with Malik, and the Emperor asked when an envoy could be sent. "Probably mid-July," Togo estimated. Togo warned that Japan would have to give up much.
Hirota went back to Malik and bluntly asked Russia to renew the Nuetrality Pact (it was set to expire in April of 1946; the Russians had given one year notice as the Treaty stipulated; when they invaded in August they did so by breaking this Treaty). Malik was evasive. Hirota offered Japan's resources from the South Pacific, rubber, tin, lead, tungsten. "if the Soviet Army and the Japanese Navy joined forces," he argued, "Japan and the USSR would become the strong force in the world!" Inasmuch as the Japanese Navy rested on the ocean bottom, Malik was not impressed by this offer. He replied that a concrete plan would be necessary, echoing language Sato would later use.
In less than a week, Hirota came back. In return for a new non-aggression treaty and oil, Japan would give Manchuria her independence (which it already nominally had!) and fishing concessions in Japanese waters. This was wired to Molotov through Sato in Moscow.
A week passed with no reply from Moscow to this generous offers (during this time the Okamoto affair in Switzerland began). On July 7 the Emperor lost patience and sent for Suzuki. Why not dispatch a special envoy with a personal message from the Throne?
The obvious choice for this was Konoye, and he was summoned on July 12. Recall that, as background, US planes are bombing Japan everyday, the Imperial Japanese Navy is almost gone, civilians are suffering from starvation, Japan is cut off from its garrisons and possessions, and interested readers may wonder at the absurd lack of urgency in these affairs. Yet there is was. Weeks went by with no progress. The Soviets also informed the US of these manuevers, keeping us abreast of developments, and of course, the diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Tokyo is being read by the US. Finally, ULTRA was revealing the extent of the Japanese build-up in Kyushu.
Sato was informed by telegram to expect an envoy and to ask the Russians to smooth his place. With his usual bluntness, he replied with wonder how the USSR would profit from an early end to the war. Familiar with the real situation (unlike Tokyo) Sato watched troop trains transferring troops to the Far East and knew that Russia would move against Manchuria and the Japanese Far East. He also noted that Russia had shown no interest in the Hirota-Malik talks, so why would they now accept an envoy? Common sense, however, was out of fashion in Tokyo.
On July 11 Togo notified Sato that he was to find out the intent of the Russia government toward Japan and whether it could be used to end the war. On the 12th he cabled Sato again, notifying him of Konoye's expected arrival and asking for the conference to place after Potsdam (the Japanese were aware that the Big Three were meeting there). Togo again cabled Sato on the 17th, a famous cable often deliberately misquoted by revisionist propagandists. After describing the Russia initiative, Togo noted:
The Emperor himself has deigned to express his determination and we have therefore made this request of the Russians. Please bear particularly in mind, however that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like unconditional surrender.
Although it looks to the ignorant western reader that the Emperor has given an order and all are leaping to obey, in fact it was the opposite. Sato had already sent a telegram to Togo the previous day, asking for clarification on a vital issue:
I would like to point out that even on the basis of your various messages I have obtained no clear idea of the recent situation. Nor am I clear about the views of the Government and Military with regard to the termination of the war.
Sato had, in polite diplomatic language, asked the 64 thousand dollar question: did the military and other government leaders support ending the war? Togo had cabled him back an evasive no, saying with elaborate circumlocution, that only the Emperor suported this initiative. Togo could not say that there was broad support because no such support existed. As both Toyoda and Suzuki said after the war (Anami killed himself), there was no agreement on terms or even on the initiative itself from the Big Six. Indeed on the 14th they had a heated confrontation in which Anami, speaking for the military, said bluntly that he would never accept any document which concluded peace on terms of Japan's defeat. Togo's message, far from establishing that the government wanted peace, in fact establishes that there was no agreement among top leaders.
The use of this cable by revisionists highlights the extent to which the revisionist argument hinges on the ignorance of westerners of the realities of Japanese politics, and why revisionist writers spend so little time on what was going on in Tokyo. The only reason that anyone could think Japan was willing to surrender is if they didn't know anything about Japanese politics or the situation in 1945. In order to support their claim, revisionists must keep the audience in ignorance.
On July 19 Sato again cabled Tokyo. He said that the Soviets had challenged the purpose of the envoy, and warned that it was hard for him to "deny that Japanese authorities are out of touch with the prevailing atmosphere here."
On July 21 Togo summarized the situation in a cable back, saying that Sato believed that unconditional surrender with the sole proviso of the preservation of the Emperor would be acceptable to the Allies (as it later proved to be). Togo explained:
With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, which is not so-called unconditional surrender, through the good offices of Russia.
Togo ended by saying that this was the Cabinet's will. In other words, in black and white, Togo completely rejected the position that Sato was arguing for -- an offer of unconditional surrender with retention of the Emperor -- and said that this would never be acceptable. US leaders, reading this, had Togo's assurance that Japan would never surrender on terms acceptable to the US. The US had monitored many messages from Japanese abroad asking the government to accept unconditional surrender, but none from Tokyo going out. as US intelligence analyzed it, "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion cannot be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies."
On July 25 Sato met again with USSR rep Alexander Lozovsky, but having no concrete plans to show the Russians, danced diplomatically and promised that Konoye would have such plans when he replied. Interested readers may note that the month of July passed without any results, yet Japan showed no urgency on the peace score. The Soviets, who had informed the US that they had no interest in such negotiations, were simply spinning things out while they got their forces ready to invade Manchuria.
In sum, the Japanese move for "peace" through Russia was simply a fantasy born of desperation. It was never a real peace initiative, never contained concrete offers, and never went anywhere. It certainly was not a move to end the war on terms acceptable to the US and its allies