Black Box: Response to Diebold records request: Sorry, it's secret

In response to Jim March's request for records in Alameda County, California pertaining to Diebold:
http://www.equalccw.com/alamedaprarresponse.pdf

"Please be advised that the county will not provide the information you requested...

"The County will not allow access or disclose any information regarding the Diebold election system as any information relating to that system is exempted from the PRA (Public Records Act)...The system provided by Diebold Election Systems Inc. ("DESI") is a proprietary system that is recognized as such in the contract between the County and DESI...

"...The County contends that the official information privelege in section 1040 of the Evidence Code is applicable because the information requested was acquired by the County in confidence and the County is required to maintain its confidentiality. Any copying or disclosing of such information would violate the license agreements..."

# # # # #
Original Public Records Act request: http://www.equalccw.com/voteprar.html

Thanks very much to Jim March, a Republican, who just signed up at DU (with a bit of trepidation -- I told him we very much value his input here) at DU to post information about this. He has more comments that are of interest on this thread:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=104&topic_id=132675&mesg_id=132675

Bev Harris
http://www.blackboxvoting.org

We could really raise a stink if Alameda County contained a really activist city like, say, Berkeley. :)

/disengage sarcasm

Seriously, don't you think that the liberal, activist communities in the East Bay would be very receptive to this issue? I would think so.

For what it's worth...

once you explain that their vote is being stolen.

Bev needs to get on KPFA and Pacifica also.

But would gladly go on again.

county's activities......re certifying or, as the case may be, not certifying the software.

Amazing........

Thank Ashcroft for that. He sent out a memo ordering all gov't agencies to drag their feet and try to find legal justification to deny any FOIA requests, way back in '01.

http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm

Nice how they order limiting scope of FOIA requests while claiming that it'll help the Average Joe, and that it specifically mentions commercial interests.

No doubt his order has trckled down to state and local levels among those who share his passion for secrecy.

-as

For the record, Ashcroft scares the hell out of me too.

The good news is, Ashcroft's directive re: the FOIA doesn't apply to the California Public Records Act. It's a different, state-level law that is "cloned from" the Federal FOIA, but was "extended" in some significant ways.

Anyhow. I'll be filing a follow-up request Monday. First, we're going to find out what that contract actually says. Second, we can get a lot done without looking at ANY Diebold code, just by analyzing old vote data from 2002 with MS-Access at the county offices. Diebold was stupid enough to encode a lot of the worst issues right into the database structure :). Then, if we can print out a detailed directory tree listing on the central vote-collection box, we'll be able to look for hacked-up Windows code, funky DLLs and the exact revision of Diebold code in use, all without ever firing up any Diebold code at all.

Then do a very basic security analysis of that central box (modem present, does the modem answer when you call it with a handset phone, TCP/IP or other comm protocols present, etc.) and we'll have enough "smoking gun" to cast doubt not just on Diebold, but the Federal agency/lab that supposedly "certified" this piece o' crap. That in turn effectively proves that NONE of these systems are safe, if the cert process was so screwed up.

They exempted the entire RFP and certification documents from the Open Records Act.

Jim, you may find this as interesting as I did when researching the Georgia law. These paragraphs apply to the "de-certification" process in Georgia but note the TWO differing versions of these chapters:

21-2-324.
(a) Any person or organization owning, manufacturing, or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any voting machine may request the Secretary of State to examine the machine. Any ten or more electors of this state may, at any time, request the Secretary of State to reexamine any voting machine previously examined and approved by him or her. Before any such examination or reexamination, the person, persons, or organization requesting such examination or reexamination shall pay to the Secretary of State the reasonable expenses of such examination; provided, however, that in the case of a request by ten or more electors the examination fee shall be $250.00. The Secretary of State may, at any time, in his or her discretion, reexamine any voting machine.

(b) The Secretary of State shall thereupon require such machine to be examined or reexamined by three examiners whom he or she shall appoint for the purpose, of whom one shall be an expert in patent law and the other two shall be experts in mechanics, and shall require of them a written report on such machine, attested by their signatures; and the Secretary of State shall examine the machine and shall make and file, together with the reports of the appointed examiners, his or her own report, attested by his or her signature and the seal of his or her office, stating whether, in his or her opinion and in consideration of the reports of the examiners aforesaid, the kind of machine so examined can be safely and accurately used by electors at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter. If his or her report states that the machine can be so used, the machine shall be deemed approved; and machines of its kind may be adopted for use at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter.
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2003_04/gacode/21-2-324.html

21-2-353.
(a) Any person or organization owning, manufacturing, or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any vote recorder or tabulating machine may request the Secretary of State to examine the vote recorder or tabulating machine. Any ten or more electors of this state may, at any time, request the Secretary of State to reexamine any vote recorder or tabulating machine previously examined and approved by him or her. Before any such examination or reexamination, the person, persons, or organization requesting such examination or reexamination shall pay to the Secretary of State the reasonable expenses of such examination. The Secretary of State may, at any time, in his or her discretion, reexamine any vote recorder or tabulating machine.

(b) The Secretary of State shall thereupon examine or reexamine such vote recorder or tabulating machine and shall make and file in his or her office a report, attested by his or her signature and the seal of his or her office, stating whether, in his or her opinion, the kind of vote recorder or tabulating machine so examined can be safely and accurately used by electors at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter. If this report states that the vote recorder or tabulating machine can be so used, the recorder or tabulating machine shall be deemed approved; and vote recorders and tabulating machines of its kind may be adopted for use at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter.
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2003_04/gacode/21-2-353.html

---

Note how they tried to change the two chapters and cut out the (pathetically defined) "experts" and leave the certifications in the hand of no one but the SoS. Plus setting the fees to "reasonable" vs. $250.00.

Georgia actually passed and signed BOTH of these paragraphs and had to repeal 353 when the conflicting paragraphs were discovered. Paragraph 353 was repealed on April 1, 2003.

Look carefully at the laws which have been written especially FOR these machines. Our SoS was busily changing election law during this entire process to accomodate the "proprietary" vendors.

While Georgia exempted the bidding process from the Open Records laws, they did not exempt the vote tabulation. And, frankly, I don't believe even California can do this either.

You should investigate whether or not the 2 major parties can get voting tabulation data after an election. In Georgia, this information is GIVEN (free) to the parties. Voting data, histories and trends are a part of the public record and can't be exempted from Open Records. Push for your requests from that angle.

We really need to get the pressure on our reps out here.. I used to be concerned about the 2004 elections, but we're voting for a new Governor in 2 months now!

There is a Bay Area DU gathering this evening, and I know I for one will be endorsing the "back to the streets" plan :evilgrin:

I'm glad there are people like you and Bev who are knowledgable about the tech, and passionate about its mis-use. Otherwise we the people would just be sitting here clueless.

:toast:

investigation into voter fraud because it is against the license agreement.

What are they hiding?

Ask for a copy of the License agreement.

Understand that when the California task force asked the national ITA certifiers to come and meet with them, they declined. Then, Dr. Dill and associates asked for a phone conference with the ITA -- they declined. Then, Dill et. al sent a list of questions to be answered: They declined.

Records request: declined.

Interview requests to any certifier: declined.

Requests for independent review of software: declined.

Susan Marie Weber, a Libertarian I believe, filed a lawsuit against the use of the no-paper-trail machines in California. Their discovery attempts were blocked, pointing to the national ITA certifiers.

Everyone, every step of the way, is declining to answer or allow examination. I have a very simple question:

If these officials cannot prove they were elected, are we required to follow their laws?

===========================================

Here is an excerpt from Black Box Voting

"Trust is the element that keeps us from taking to the streets every time we disagree with something our government does. As long as we feel our representatives are deciding most things, and the very important things, the way we would ask them to, we are content. If we elected them in an election that all agreed was fair, but they make an egregious choice, one that many of us feel we cannot live with, our governmental system sanctions our protest. We reserve such behavior for unusual circumstances, knowing that when the next election rolls around, we can always vote them out.

"Perceived lack of integrity in the voting system is guaranteed to produce shouts of indignation, but because most elections are believed to be fair, we can still show some patience with the situation.

"If, however, we come to perceive that most elections cannot be trusted, we’ve got a huge problem. Suddenly, these people don’t have our permission to do anything. Why follow laws that they passed, if we don’t believe they were fairly elected? Why should we accept anything they do? Why should we follow the law if they didn’t? Why should we cooperate with our government at all?

“'That love of order and obedience to the laws, which so remarkably characterize the citizens of the United States, are sure pledges of internal tranquility; and the elective franchise, if guarded as the ark of our safety, will peaceably dissipate all combinations to subvert a Constitution, dictated by the wisdom, and resting on the will of the people.'
— Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waring, 1801

"As you can see, Thomas Jefferson understood what really makes the system tick. But take away trust in the voting system, and all bets are off. This is what the architects of the new unauditable voting systems have never understood: The vote is the underpinning for our authorization of every law, every government expenditure, every tax, every elected person. But if we don’t trust the voting system, we will never accept that those votes represent our voice, and that kind of thing can cause a whole society to quit cooperating!"

Bev Harris
http://www.blackboxvoting.org

...was the first thing that occurred to me :D.

:kick:

:kick:

Eloriel

Take a look; all comments on this VERY welcome, barring suggested changes this gets filed Monday (it's very early Sunday as I write this).

Since the formatting is rather critical to understanding it, here's links to the Acrobat PDF version:

http://www.equalccw.com/alamedafollowup.pdf

...and the same in HTML:

http://www.equalccw.com/alamedafollowup.html

Again: criticism or suggestions for other things to look for welcome.

Note that the request for the purchase orders *should* include the hardware listings, including modems. Not guaranteed though.

If the results of this query show problems, hopefully we can force even more digging. At some point, we need to physically inspect the vote-count system; I'll try and do that on 8/11 when I'm dropping the revised PRAR off at both the county attorney's office and the registrar's office.

My "voteprar" page in my tagline has been updated with links to the above, and a link to the county's initial response.

Other than to keep the pressure on--a worthy goal in itself--there is simply no way this approach will succeed in the end.

Ultimately proprietary interests will be upheld. Proprietary code will be deemed sacrosanct.

Further--and even more important--even if we get access to the code we can never be sure a portal has not been created on these machines allowing access to them in the same way hackers get access right through fire walls today.

The solution? I say again, we must insist on a "Proofing Box" at every single voting location into which the voter deposits his or her paper ballot or printout. That box is kept sealed but is available for recount purposes, just as today.

As a techie, I know it just is not possible to safeguard the code and the machines themselves. They will be under the control of Diebold, and whatever we do one minute can be undone in the blind of an eye the next, then redone to eliminate any trace. Proofing Boxes are the only viable, practical solution.

...is far more POLITICAL than it is TECHNICAL.

Follow?

OK, we're trying to "win" this issue. I define "winning" as banning non-open-source vote systems, requiring a paper trail (printout from the terminal which you check, and drop in a box as you say), and similar.

We can't win without popular support, just like with any issue.

The key to popular support is the mainstream media.

The key to the media: prove MASSIVE problems. (Don't believe me? I've got a reporter from KGO News Radio sniffing around and checking every update. I've been doing gun-rights activism for a LONG time, and I've never gotten as much media reaction as quickly as this PRAR drive has done.)

So that's the basics of the gameplan - "dirt digging" is just the start, it's what we DO with the dirt that matters.

It almost looks like someone with a strong vested interest in Diebold is defending the company on Yahoo's boards.

http://messages.yahoo.com/?action=q&board=DBD