BBV is failing to provide solutions. None will be in place by November!

How can it be that a movement involving so many intelligent minds and even a few driven publicists like DU's own Bev Harris can so totally fail to come up with a viable solution that can be put in place in time to stop the most important election in US history from being stolen?

It is tragic but true.

How should we deal with the problem of easily gamed, impossible to verify electronic voting machines? Don't ask the BBV people. Because they don't have the answer.

In fairness, they do have all the questions. They can give you chapter and verse--correctly--about why "certification" of software won't work, on how often Diebold has submitted flawed software, on every devious, plotting cabal that is out there right now working on stealing the '04 election for W.

But after all this time, they have NO solution.

They've advanced a couple of "ideas" that are so tepid they pale in comparison to the realistic, cold hearted, calculating deceit we know is being practiced by their adversaries, the right wing owned system vendors themselves. Bev Harris has an answer, sort of, on her web site. Here it is: Post the polling-place tallies in public, before the electronic votes are sent to central count, and match polling-place reports with the central count. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2001918663_bevharris04.html

That's IT? That solves the problem? No it doesn't. What if the the polling-place tallies are invalid to begin with? Of course this solves only a tiny part of the problem, as any neophyte can clearly see.

But does she intend that this is only one aspect of several steps which--when combined--WILL solve the problem conclusively? Beats me. You have to do a lot of digging around her website to find descriptions of solutions. But you'll find a million worthy descriptions of problems.

This is not to berate Bev Harris or other participants in this effort for their hard work. It is rather to suggest that it's long past time to hear about solutions--not just problems. In fact, we are probably past time when any solution can be put in place to save the numerous states who have adopted electronic voting from a repeat of the '00 and '02 calumnies.

My message to these folks is a simple one:
We need answers. And we need them NOW!

If this seems a bit too harsh, too bad. There is, after all, way too much at stake for sentimentality.

that can be implemented in time for the Nov. election.

Paper and pencils.


edit: I suppose instead of pencils, permenant makers would be more appropriate.

and even then might be counted on corruptible electronic equipment.

People suggest absentee ballots but they are not a solution and might even make matters worse in that some may think they come close to solving a problem.

I don't know where that misnomer came from but ALL absentee ballots are supposed to be counted no matter how close the race, period! There is nothing that I've found in any State's election code. (Most of which can be found here. Scroll down to the Elections Code section.) I see from your profile that you're from N.Y. (I was born and raised in Queens and have lived in Bayshore and Brentwood in Suffolk County. :hi:) Chapter 17 of the New York State Consolidated Laws covers Elections. Article 8, Conduct of Elections, Title IV covers Absentee voting and in Article 8-412.2 it says,

2. Absentee ballots received by the board of elections before the close of the polls on election day from voters whose applications were received by such board at least seven days before election day may be delivered to the inspectors of election in the manner prescribed by this chapter or retained at the board of elections and cast and canvassed pursuant to the provisions of section 9-209 of this chapter as such board shall, in its discretion, determine by resolution adopted at least thirty days before election day. All ballots received by the board of elections from voters whose applications were received by such board later than seven days before election day, all ballots received by such board between election day and the seventh day after election day, and all federal write-in ballots received from absentee voters, shall be retained at the board and shall be cast and canvassed in the same manner as other ballots retained by such board.

Absentee ballots must be counted.

But in some areas, they don't count Provisional ballots unless the race is close, I think that is where the confusion may be.

Not counting provisional ballots is disgusting. Once the voter is checked as legit, their vote should be counted, no matter what the outcome of the race. Seems to me voting rights are being denied if their ballots are not counted.

.....on a civil rights basis! :evilgrin:

I don't remember if Bev posted it or someone else associated with the BBV issue. It was to vote by marking on paper ballots, have them publicly hand counted with counting open to viewing by anyone who wants to watch, post the precinct totals at the polling place, then post the precinct totals and the tallies in the newspaper and on state and county websites.

Open, public, auditable. Yes, it requires people to pull an all nighter, but I think it's worth it.

One of the arguments against manual counts of paper ballots is that they take too long. So what? It's the news media who demands instant results. I don't think the American people wouldn't mind even waiting a week or two if they were assured that we would have a fair and free election as a result?

The folks working this have suggested a solution from the start: print a paper receipt that can be read by a human and a machine to verify the votes and provide recount capability.

The machine makers have made all sorts of nonsense claims about the infeasibility of such a solution, all of which are utterly ridiculous.

I've argued for Proofing Boxes in which voters fold an deposit a printout of their electronic vote, after of course they verify that it shows their vote correctly.

I've suggested these Proofing Boxes remain locked unless a recount is ordered. In that way they serve as a foolproof audit device; a tangible, countable result of electronic votes.

I received an objection to this from BH saying:

So, if I want to rig an election, why would I rig it in a way that would trigger a recount?

Ok, fair enough. But there's a simple solution to that too:

Require routine recounts on a random basis on random machines in random precincts on key races.

Such required recounts will serve to validate both the accuracy of the machine and the integrity of the software. The fact that it is random means it is able to potentially expose any fraud or system failure.

It requires very little additional cost to do this, and it CAN be implemented by Nov.

So please tell me why it isn't being promoted as a solution?
I'd really, really, really like to know.

Because damit we need a real solution but fast.

Bev and just about everyone else have been pushing for Voter Verified Paper Ballots (or records) AND the mandatory surprise random counting of those ballots or records in a percentage of precincts as an audit of machine reliability in ALL elections regardless of the closeness of the outcome. That has been proposed for codification in both the House version, (H.R. 2239) AND the Senate companion bill (S. 1980) with the following language,

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY RECOUNTS.

The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records of each election for Federal office (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office) in .5 percent of the jurisdictions in each State and .5 percent of the overseas jurisdictions in which voter-verified records are preserved in accordance with this section immediately following each general election for Federal office, and shall promptly publish the results of those recounts. The treatment of the results of the recount shall be governed by applicable Federal, State, or local law, except that any individual who is a citizen of the jurisdiction involved may file an appeal with the Commission if the individual believes that such law does not provide a fair remedy.

One year ago very few people were even aware that a problem existed and the press was totally ignoring the potential for problems. Bev and the good folks at Black Box Voting.org had everything to do with changing that. The two bills above in all likelihood would not exist if not for Bev taking the time to research the issue, finding the Diebold software on line and getting the computer experts to look at it and prove that it's flawed beyond belief. All of the studies that were conducted, from the initial Johns Hopkins study, the RABA report, the SIAC study and many others would not have happened had it not been for the valiant work of Bev that started the real public outcry about the security issues.

Many really good people who got involved with Bev and BBV.org have put their lives on hold to tackle this issue, myself included. Andy Stephenson went to the extraordinary length to sell his business and actually run for the highest office an election official can hold in his state. Jim March designed a very persuasive demonstration disk to show our elected officials and the media just how easy it is to hack an election, RedEagle, gristy, GregD, John Gideon, nostamj, symbolman, and dozens of other DUers have done more to research and publicize the problem than I can even list! Each and every day the problems with black box voting are being discussed on every program on AA and have at one time or another reached just about every news program and radio talk show I can think of. The April issue of Vanity Fair magazine had a 10,000 word article featuring Bev called 'Hack the Vote'. The May 3rd issue of TIME magazine has another article featuring Bev titled 'The Vexations of Voting Machines'. Week in and week out Bev is out there on the front lines in the press raising awareness of the problems and trying to get the paper ballot / mandatory audit solution accepted by the public and our representatives.

The results of all of that effort are undeniable. Everyone involved who has gone to the public hearings to make their feelings known, called, faxed, e-mailed and written to their representatives and asked them to back the two laws mentioned above or author legislation at the State level or have donated to help further the effort deserve nothing but praise and respect.

Now I ask YOU Merlin, honestly, have YOU even written ONE letter, e-mail or fax or made even a single phone call to ANY of YOUR Federal, State or County representatives or elections officials? Have YOU donated a single dime to the cause? Have YOU signed up to help out as a poll watcher for the November election? If not, why not?

You state, "So please tell me why it isn't being promoted as a solution? I'd really, really, really like to know. Because damit we need a real solution but fast. What are YOU doing about it other than bitching about it?

So far Bev and company have joined with other activist organizations to get these machines banned from California for the next election and have filed lawsuits in other states. We've gotten the attention of many in the House and Senate and helped get legislation that offers the solution you mention. It's been out there for a while now and has been discussed here at length on many, many occasions. Where've you been?

Now it's YOUR turn. DO SOMETHING! Don't get ANGRY, get ACTIVE! (damit! ;-) ) :evilgrin:

he is part of the problem!

How in the hell do you expect somebody like me who HAS contributed and HAS written letters and HAS made posts and is EXTREMELY well informed generally to find out the obscure arcane language in a damn bill that isn't even law yet?

I thought Bev was a PR specialist?

I give you the fact that many people have devoted a lot of effort to making people aware of the PROBLEM.

But it's been a real half-hearted effort making anybody aware of any proposed SOLUTION.

And since the proposed solution hidden deep within HR2239 (see * below) is so similar to my Proofing Box idea, why in the hell didn't BH tell me that to begin with?

My point in the beginning was that VVPBs do NOT solve the problem in and of themselves, and that is EXACTLY why they are being dissed.

But you have evidently proposed a two-fold manner in which they CAN solve the problem: (1) By requiring they be retained by the voting agency, and (2) that routine, random audits be made using them.

Those three elements (the third being the VVPBs themselves) are the lynch pin of a solution. I wholly agree.

What is needed now is SIMPLICITY. Nobody had time to read dissertations on this subject. I submit that nearly all politicians are capable of grasping the simple 3-point plan we both agree on, PROVIDED IT IS PRESENTED IN A SIMPLE WAY.

There is no reason this has to be submitted to Congress. We all know it'll never get through at this stage. Instead, it should be pushed within every state that has electronic voting.

I'll help. PM me.



* Text of key provision of HR 2239:

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record, each individual paper record of which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved within the polling place in the manner in which all other paper ballots are preserved within the polling place on Election Day for later use in any manual audit.

`(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error made by the system before the permanent record is preserved for use in any manual audit.

`(iii) The voter verified paper record produced under subparagraph (A) and this subparagraph shall be available as an official record and shall be the official record used for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is used.

Hell I even tried to get legislation passed in the last session here that would have put the protections in place. It was killed by my Democratic opponent...Ms Ruderman in favor of our current Secretary of States bill. SO don't complain about not having solutions...we have submitted them...they have not been heeded.

There has been a great pr job done on the problem. I salute you all for that.

But the solution is so obscure, even I didn't know about it. Furthermore, despite posting several times on this subject, this is the first time anybody in the BBV movement has had the courtesy to inform me that what I'm pressing for is what's being proposed.

The PR effort must be redoubled. It must incorporate both the problem AND the solution.

With adequate PR this issue CAN be won. The public will demand it.

Sadly, I don't know how much can be done by Nov.

I'd normally just try to set the writer straight, but Merlin posted on another thread with the same stuff and got lots of responses about why parts of his idea wouldn't fly.

So why start a new thread like we haven't explained this before?


"Actually all they've argued for is the paper receipt. No recount cap."


"I've argued for Proofing Boxes in which voters fold an deposit a printout of their electronic vote, after of course they verify that it shows their vote correctly."

"I've suggested these Proofing Boxes remain locked unless a recount is ordered. In that way they serve as a foolproof audit device; a tangible, countable result of electronic votes."

(You've posted before about 'proofing boxes." What, exactly,is the difference between your 'proofing box' and a secure ballot box? Why are you trying to change the vernacular? At least this time, you left out the part about the voter getting a receipt too, a sure way to get election officials yelling about vote selling.
More importantly, we've been asking not just for voter verified paper ballots, or recounts, but for random, mandatory, manual audits. You will note that's a much greater check and balance than an occasional recount)

"I received an objection to this from BH saying:

So, if I want to rig an election, why would I rig it in a way that would trigger a recount?

Ok, fair enough. But there's a simple solution to that too:

Require routine recounts on a random basis on random machines in random precincts on key races."

(The Holt and Graham bills ask for random, madatory audits. Some state legislators are catching on, here and there and asking for more. When Bev wrote about posting the tallies at the polls, she was writing about a simple, first step that is not done many places, even when the law requires it. Just one of many steps in a process that has to be done to secure the vote. "...one of the most important procedures..." What part of "one of" and "procedures" don't you understand? If Velusia County in Florida had followed this procedure, they might have discovered the 16,022 negative votes for Gore earlier, but more importantly, they would have a figure to look back at as to exactly what should have been on that card. Someone else did a study of the 2000 election and found that the certified count by the counties in Florida did not match the states record of those counts. There may be some variation but it was certainly suspicious- and I'll bet that record has already been "corrected." If counties had to justify the polling place totals with what their machines recorded, and so on up the line, then you have some protection from one of the most simple frauds- inaccurate transference of polling place totals. THIS IS NOT CHECKED IN MANY, MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS A SIMPLE PART,ONE PART, OF THE PROCEDURES BEV ALLUDED TOO IN THAT OPINION PIECE. SHE WANTED TO GET ONE POINT ACROSS, MAKE AN EFFORT TO GET AT LEAST GET ONE PART OF THE AUDITING PROCESS IN PLACE. )

"Such required recounts will serve to validate both the accuracy of the machine and the integrity of the software. The fact that it is random means it is able to potentially expose any fraud or system failure."

(FYI, if you only use the term recounts, you'll only get the piddly things called for in most state laws, which will only recount if a race is really, really close. We also want AUDITS. Audits of the entire race, of all voting systems used. You suggested an audit of certain machines and that just won't cut it. You need to audit a random number of precincts in each county- completely. All ballots cast, all races, by hand. If you only call for recounts, you only support the current, ineffectual, status quo)

It requires very little additional cost to do this, and it CAN be implemented by Nov.

So please tell me why it isn't being promoted as a solution?
I'd really, really, really like to know.

Because damit we need a real solution but fast.

(Hello, where have you been? We've been promoting this for over a year, myself, for 16 months, at least.
Why don't we appear to be making progress? Well, refer to Paranoid Pat's first post. We have come a long way. Talk to your local election officials, talk to your Secretary of State. They have been marketed, for over 10 years, and "educated," with the idea that they don't need or want paper. Try convincing your congressmen, who have been lobbied by the big money interests who want to see paper go, about the need for paper ballots. See how many "pat" answers you get from them.
Ask Mitch MConnell, Chris Dodd, Bob Ney, and Steny Hoyer how such an abysmal piece of legislation as the HAVA Act was even written. HAVA totally focuses on VOTER fraud, leaving INSIDER and CORPORATE fraud, the real threats, a wide open door. In fact, it enables them.
Why don't you take on The Election Center, purveyor of paperless voting, the certification landlord, funded, as we recently found out, by the vendors they are supposed to be regulating.
Have you sat down with your state's election laws to come up with a bill to make them better? Have you slogged your way from being called conspiracy theorists and fear mongers, to activists with legitimate, proven concerns about our voting systems? Have you countered the misinformation, at every opportunity, spewn by election officials and organizations who only listen to the vendors?
If you haven't, you don't understand why we are not "there" yet.
We've been promoting voter verified paper ballots since we began and the obvious- auditing. That's what the voter verified paper ballot is for.
Just try selling "proofing box" to an election official. I'm sure they'll be ecstatic to learn another term for ballot box.
Just try to get the voter verified paper ballot, let alone audit requirements. It's not that they aren't being asked for, it's that election officials and the media focus on one thing. And when they do give in, they may only mandate one part of the fix, leaving you with the rest of the fight still to go.

If you want that fast solution, you're going to have to convince the states and congress that we have an emergency. We do. If you can get that across to them in less than the 16 months I've been at it, my hat's off to you, you're much more pursuasive than I.

But don't tell people we haven't been asking for these things because we have- over and over and over)

again...Problem is they aren't listening to us.

I have now been insulted by virtually everybody active in this effort for WHAT? For proposing the very same thing you are apparently already proposing.

Sadly not one of you had the decency to point me in an objective way to the language you've proposed in HR 2239, until this thread.

Not one of you had the decency to itemize your opposition to my proposal until this thread.

It turns out there is NO DIFFERENCE between Proofing Boxes and what you're proposing. I could care less about terminology; I just want a solution NOW. But your PR on this SOLUTION has been lame as hell. If you can't see that, then you've lost all your objectivity.

I would venture to say that fully half of all Americans have by now been made aware of the problems involved in BBV.

I would say that less than 1% have been made aware of this proposed solution. And I was not in that group. And I READ ARDENTLY.

The solution is a printed paper ballot and a rubber stamp. The counting process should be open to the public.

and manual counts by hand, with people from both parties looking over their shoulders, and several video cameras in the room to record every step of the vote counting process.

Such safeguards should be required by law.

.....at the local (County), State and Federal level to let them know that that's what YOU want? After all, they're there to represent your interests! The more of us that do it the better the chances that we get what we want!

Let me know where you live and I'll give you their names and contact information. :)

With an emphasis on the cameras, both visible AND hidden.

Call me paranoid, but it would be just common sense to require them (if they aren't already).

.....It's not whether you're paranoid or not, it's, 'are you paranoid enough'! :evilgrin:

Ok, so I've learned there is a proposed solution that parallels my proposal. It's in HR 2239. (see * below) That's great, and I'm very relieved to hear it.

Unfortunately, while many people have heard of the PROBLEM, few have heard of the SOLUTION.

Let's simplify the solution, and put it out there in the same breath with the problem.

Let's get the public worked up on this. Let's DO IT!


http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.2239:

* Key elements of HR 2239

SEC. 4. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT RECORD OR HARD COPY.
...
`(A) VOTER-VERIFICATION IN GENERAL- The voting system shall produce a voter-verified paper record suitable for a manual audit equivalent or superior to that of a paper ballot box system, as further specified in subparagraph (B).

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record, each individual paper record of which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved within the polling place in the manner in which all other paper ballots are preserved within the polling place on Election Day for later use in any manual audit.
...
`(iii) The voter verified paper record produced under subparagraph (A) and this subparagraph shall be available as an official record and shall be the official record used for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is used.

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY RECOUNTS.

The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records of each election for Federal office (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office) in .5 percent of the jurisdictions in each State and .5 percent of the overseas jurisdictions in which voter-verified records are preserved in accordance with this section immediately following each general election for Federal office, and shall promptly publish the results of those recounts. The treatment of the results of the recount shall be governed by applicable Federal, State, or local law, except that any individual who is a citizen of the jurisdiction involved may file an appeal with the Commission if the individual believes that such law does not provide a fair remedy.

...there's a guy named Eric who promotes those bills who posts to this board almost every day.

People on this board and elswhere got over 120 representatives to sign on to Holt's bill by persisting, persisting, persisting.

Those bills and the links to them were here for people to read if they wanted to.

Links to blackboxvoting.org and the activisim site have been available for a long time. On that site, you will find my piece questioning HAVA. On that site, you will find my call for a congressional investigation into what appears to be racketeering in the election industry.

There are many pieces to the solution.

Every radio show, TV inteview, and newspaper that hasn't been edited out of context and/or allowed the time, Bev talks about solutions.

Rubin talks about solutions.

Dill talks about solutions.

Simons talks about solutions.

We push two things that are critical right now-

Voter verified paper ballots

Audit process

Why isn't it out there more? We've had coverage in just about every media going. But not the big, in depth coverage necessary. Keep in mind the difficulty in getting the truth out these days, just as with other issues, this administration in particular, doesn't want you to know about.

Go head to head with local and state officials, who still tell you that HAVA demands DRE's, even after the proof has been put in front of their faces for the past year. Local officials depend on state officials who are dependent on the National Association of State Election Directors and the National Association of Secretaries of State. Both of those organizations have been heavily influenced and lobbied by The Election Center and the voting vendors for years and years. Witness the number of election officials who go to work for the voting industry after a nice, big sale they helped engineer. Then they lobby other officials they know. If it's still on the NASS website, take a look at their corporate sponsorship. At a past NASED conference, you can read about a presentation by Brit Williams and Linda Lamone on state, group purchases. Both just happened to be involved in state, group purchases of Diebold. I'd like to find out who sponsored that, but I don't have the time, money, or resources.

The Election Center is not a federal organization. We can't find out who started it or where all of its funding comes from, although a mistake by the IRS let slip that Sequoia had been donating $10,000 a year for some time. Who's investigating the Center?

PR takes more than time. It takes money and people. So far, this is a citizen fueled endeavor. I'm sure you know that money talks and if you don't have it, it's hard to be as effective. But the other side has money, tons of it, even in the face of the fact that they don't always seem to make as much on the machines as they spend selling them.

Explain to me the election offcials who turn a blind eye to the evidence. Explain the officials who say a computer expert can't know what he knows, that somehow, computer programs in election systems are so much different that what PhD's in computer science are saying just can't be true?

I apologize for my earlier post. Some of us have been at this for a long time now and to be accused of not trying to get the solution out there strikes a raw chord.

Why don't you hear about solutions? Well, for one thing, it's not the headline grabbing stuff. Solutions are complicated and don't make good sound bytes. Our press does not want to go into the mundane stuff, give'em headlines or forget it.

On the local level, we fight an uphill battle because for every five words we can get into a news story the local and state offcials get three paragraphs. Who does the press listen to? Those officials. Who do the people listen to? Those officials. Who has access to the media? Those officials.

Where we are now is due to the tenacity of people like Bev, Andy, and Paranoid Pat. They got there without the money and influence I've described above. It's a downright miracle.

Who's working on law suits? Pro bono lawyers.

If you can come up with a war chest, we can come up with a campaign.

Rush Holt said after coming back from one congressional recess that the next thing on congress's mind, after Iraq, was the voting machine issue. But that issue is easily lobbied against by big money, the ITAA, which represents vendors and the defense industry. And congress just passed HAVA. They don't want to go back and review that, they don't want to know that they made a huge mistake, they just don't want to deal with it.

But we are gaining ground. As fast as we'd like? No, but we aren't giving up. Something is happening here, a grassroots movement that gets the "people" back in government. The people will get involved in ways that election officials don't want. It's easy to deal with a machine, just turn it on. To manage people, well, that's another story.

Unfortunately for offcials, democracy is an institution of people. Time we got back to people and not machines.

Thanks for your help and efforts for the cause. Sorry if we jumped on you. Try and understand that from our point of view, if you've been on this board for any time, it's hard to imagine how you could not know.

I have been keeping an eye on the BBV threads. No, I don't read each of them in detail, because the posts are way too long and complex and do not offer a clear solution. I hate to keep coming back to this, but if you want people to adopt a specific solution, you have to be clear what that solution is. Fair enough?

Let me give you an example. The last interesting thread I found on this was the one titled: "BBV: Why a VVPB will NOT save the day..." dated 5/9/04. http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=1563329 . My post was met with derision without pointing out any similarity to what is being proposed, but that's beside the point.

The point is NOWHERE on that thread was this solution mentioned. Oh, sure, you talked about VVPBs. But VVPBs alone are not the solution. Wasn't that the very point of the thread title? And why call them VVPBs? Aren't they just--as you say--PRINTOUTS? Can't voters and public officials understand Printouts better than VVPBs?

And where in that thread does it say Printouts That Are Locked And Saved For Recounts or some such phraze that succinctly states the entire solution not just a part of it?

I respect all that you say, and I do understand how a movement like this can get locked into its own myopia and lose focus, which I think is what's happened. Part of the cause is no doubt because everybody's overburdened. But this effort needs focus and direction. I am certain that if those are restored this effort WILL succeed. Eventually, after all, it must succeed -- because eventually this message WILL seep through to the average voter. But eventually is not soon enough.

Another brief point, please show me where on the BBV web sites a succinct statement of the solution exists? I don't think you'll find it.

OK, I'm wired. Let's get rolling. I suggest the LWV convention is an excellent start. But let's get to them BEFORE the convention and make them our friends. Who's in charge here?

.....you raise a very valid point about promoting the solution! :evilgrin:

Early on in this fight Bev started a few posts asking for input on how to best quantify a very complex subject into 'sound bites' that the public at large could comprehend to understand the scope of the problem. In that regard, she has been most successful in getting this issue into the national spotlight without the multi million dollar budget that the voting machine manufacturers have invested in their PR firm to hawk their wares on a trusting and unsuspecting public. Now that the issue is out there for everyone to consider, it's time to move on to the next phase of promoting the solutions in a non partisan way for maximum effect.

Perhaps a new brainstorming thread is in order to solicit input for a series of posters or web graphics that can be downloaded for use on web sites, for printing or ordered at minimal cost pre-printed. If you can help organize in that regard, your help would be greatly appreciated. Maybe even a few 'banner ads' like "Voting is Patriotic!" that link to various voting activism web sites for registering to vote or contacting elected representatives to back the bills.
As far as simple graphics are concerned, what about a "Paper NOT Plastic" campaign featuring a picture of a paper ballot and marker vs. a plastic memory module. :)

"I have been keeping an eye on the BBV threads. No, I don't read each of them in detail, because the posts are way too long and complex and do not offer a clear solution. I hate to keep coming back to this, but if you want people to adopt a specific solution, you have to be clear what that solution is. Fair enough?"

(That's fair enough, but let me give you some feedback from a voice of experience- you cannot go in to election officials asking for things without qualifying them up the iddywaa. To tell people what to ask for is a complicated issue. When you are dealing with the opposition, they darn well know what you mean, but if you don't get it in writing the proper way, it get's twisted beyond your good intentions. For example, we can't just say 'print out.' The DRE's can print out, AFTER the elections, a report. If you do not specify voter verified paper ballots- you won't get them.

I'd love to get this down to a 10 word sound bite. I guarantee that if people ask for print outs and auditing, without being specific, you won't get what you asked for. I've dealt with these officials at the level of working on state law and it's amazing what they will do to make your work ineffective- just by twisting a few words.

Simplistic is best, you won't get an argument from me on that one. Will it get you want you need? Nope. This is where there can be no room for wiggle room. When you have to be that specific, a 10 word sentence is blown out of the water.)

"Let me give you an example. The last interesting thread I found on this was the one titled: "BBV: Why a VVPB will NOT save the day..." dated 5/9/04. http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic

The point is NOWHERE on that thread was this solution mentioned. Oh, sure, you talked about VVPBs. But VVPBs alone are not the solution. Wasn't that the very point of the thread title? And why call them VVPBs? Aren't they just--as you say--PRINTOUTS? Can't voters and public officials understand Printouts better than VVPBs?"

(VVPB's- see above. That thread was about the fact that the machines don't work, above and beyond the VVPB issue. I will grant the thread could be construed inaccurately, but I have talked with those people, people who have been working hard on the issue, and their ADDITIONAL point was that when the machines won't even boot up, VVPB can't save your right to vote. VVPB can save your right to have your vote counted as cast- but when you can't even cast a vote due to equipment malfunction.....

And for the record, all of those systems that failed do not produce voter verified paper ballots. In instances where they come up with cockeyed results, a VVPB would have saved the day. We don't know how the VVPB DRE's would work, because they are purposely kept OUT of the market by the paperless vendors and the election officials they have brainwashed or bought off. So we really have no clue if Avante, Accupoll, TruVote, or Vogue are going to be more reliable. My guess would be yes, since they went to the trouble of VVPB. But that's a guess. All the abysmal failures have been of paperless systems. In cases where results were fishy, VVPB would save the day. In cases where they simply wouldn't work at all, then nothing helps. That is the point made in that posting. The point made in the "Myth" report is that problems beyond those that can be solved by VVPB are also rampant in the machines.

And I'll say it again. You cannot go in and ask for printouts and get VVPB from officials. You have to be nitpicking specific or they find a way out. Sorry, that's the truth of the matter. If you don't say "Verified by the Voter," you won't get verification)

"And where in that thread does it say Printouts That Are Locked And Saved For Recounts or some such phraze that succinctly states the entire solution not just a part of it?"

(I suppose we have become lazy here, for a long time we've talked about secure ballot boxes, so I guess we assume that by now people know we are talking about depositing the VVPB in secure ballot boxes, either by the voter or by the machine. I didn't write that article but I know the people who did and they understand the concept of secure ballot boxes. You want short, simple answers, yet you ask for these specifics. See how rapidly things get complicated?)

"I respect all that you say, and I do understand how a movement like this can get locked into its own myopia and lose focus, which I think is what's happened. Part of the cause is no doubt because everybody's overburdened. But this effort needs focus and direction. I am certain that if those are restored this effort WILL succeed. Eventually, after all, it must succeed -- because eventually this message WILL seep through to the average voter. But eventually is not soon enough.

Another brief point, please show me where on the BBV web sites a succinct statement of the solution exists? I don't think you'll find it.

OK, I'm wired. Let's get rolling. I suggest the LWV convention is an excellent start. But let's get to them BEFORE the convention and make them our friends. Who's in charge here?"

(We welcome new and energetic blood but we're not going to reinvent the wheel here. We want:

1. Voter verified paper ballots, human readable, that are verified by the voter at the time of voting and put in a secure ballot box either by the voter or machine. Voter Verified means a paper ballot filled out by the voter or a machine generated paper ballot that the voter verifies as an accurate record of his vote.

2. Auditing. We need recount provisions for close races,(most states have this) that mandate manual recounts.
We need random, manual audits of the voter verified paper ballots of at least 4% of the precincts in each county, chosen at random. Such audits will be of all ballots cast on all races in those precincts.


Are those specifications short? No. Why- because I've dealt with officials and legislatures for the last two years on this issue and you have to be specific, very specific or you don't get what you thought you would. That's the honest truth from experience.

The shortest version you can come up with, and it would have to be sheparded through each step of the way:

"Voter verified paper ballots, deposited in ballot boxes, and used for recounts and for random, manual audits of elections, of 4% of the precincts in each county."

I do guarantee that most election officials will scream their heads off over the idea that they should have to audit elections. They've been promised over the last 10 years that elections will be as easy as punching a button- or a screen, and by golly, no one is going to take that away from them, democracy be damned.)

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/audit-methods.htm

(This was updated in January from a previous posting. As to the plan, well, I can tell you that Bev is about as busy as one individual can be. Do we need that specific plan from Bev? Nope. Most of what needs to happen is right here)

What is "proper auditing" and why isn't it included in pending legislation?

— Bev Harris


Old news, still needed: You cannot audit properly without an independent record which has been verified by the voter. The system does not meet the "by the people" test unless citizens can see their vote for themselves — a receipt with a code number to check against an encrypted file on the Internet fails the "by the people" test. We need a voter-verified paper ballot (not "receipt," not "trail" — only a BALLOT has standing as a legal document).

But after we get a voter-verified paper ballot, what do we do with it? The prevailing (and incorrect) view is that all we need to do is use it for random spot-checks against the machine. Like the Logic & Accuracy tests, indeed we must do this, but (like the L&A tests) this method will not reliably catch fraud. Random spot-checks will help catch programming errors and fraud perpetrated by a moron. So what should we do?

I must tell you, these answers are evolving more slowly than I would like, partly because we are still asking computer scientists to give us answers for which they have little expertise. Just recently, following a Washington legislative session, legislators asked computer scientists to tell them what a statistically acceptable random spot-check percentage should be. That's nice, but it's only part of the answer. As I've been saying, we need to bring in the right kind of expertise. No one has yet done that, and now we're making things up as we go.

Here it is in a nutshell: We need to interview experienced elections officials to map out the life of a vote, in each of the voting methods. Vote-counting is a form of bookkeeping. We need to share this information on the life of a vote, including chain of custody and current safeguards, with forensic auditors and reformed embezzlers, and ask them to identify attack points and suggest preventive procedures.

Interviewing elections officials: Several of us at BlackBoxVoting.org have already begun citizen audits. We need detailed information from elections officials from both large urban areas and small rural areas, because the logistics of running elections vary depending on county population. We also need to interview officials who handle a variety of voting styles: touch-screen, optical-scan, punch-card, absentee, and mail-in.

Why reformed embezzlers and forensic accountants? If you want to prevent hacking, you want to interview some hackers. If you want to prevent the embezzling of votes, you need to talk to embezzlers. The "law & order" side of embezzling is forensic accounting. Note that you cannot bring these experts in until you have first mapped out the life of a vote in each voting method, because they need to analyze the specific system, not a theoretical one. Also, they will want to ask questions of elections officials after they identify potential attack points.

- Map the life of a vote in each system.

- Identify attack points with experts who have experience with attacking counting and record-keeping systems.

- Obtain suggestions from elections officials and reformed embezzlers/forensic accountants to plug the holes.

Then, we need to put some teeth into legislation to require proper auditing procedures and penalize noncompliance. Most locations have some auditing procedures in place.

- Almost all locations use a canvassing technique where the number of voters who sign in is compared with the number of votes cast. This is just one of several auditing methods needed.

- Some locations already require a random spot-check of paper ballots against machine tallies, but the techniques for "random" selection are not prescribed, and sometimes the selections aren't really randomly chosen.

- In California, a very important audit procedure is required — but is not used consistently, and there is no noncompliance penalty! This procedure involves posting a tally at the polling place which supposedly is compared with the tally at the county. Still, this needs more teeth: It needs a requirement that this posting be done before any communication with other locations about number of voters or vote results has been transmitted. What you want is comparison of independent data, never data that could be adjusted before running the report to match it up with something else. Also, these reports should be run in detail and for each voting machine, in addition to the polling place as a whole.

- Because several fairly serious attack points currently have no safeguard procedures set up, we need to add a few new auditing procedures.

Auditing procedures are often surprisingly easy and can cost almost nothing. They do require discipline and enforcement, however.

For example, running a report at the polling place costs virtually nothing, and takes very little time. You simply push the "print" button -- and yes, even the touch-screens have this function already built in.

The basic idea in auditing is that data (votes) should not change at all while passing through the system. Also, the number of votes needs to be matched in various ways — for example, number of voters who sign in matched with number of votes cast; number of absentee ballots received by the post office compared with number of absentee ballots transferred from post office to elections division. Most of the time, these are simple reports already available with current technology.

Strengthening audit procedures means setting up additional check-points as the vote data moves through the election. The data from each checkpoint must match the next. Any discrepancies mean we must pull the voter-verified paper ballots and count them by hand.

Digital data should change not a whit as it moves through the system. If you have a memory card or a cartridge at the polling place and it gives you the following report: "Jones, 104 votes, Smith, 221 votes" when you transfer that memory card or cartridge to a new location, it must still say exactly "Jones, 104 votes, Smith, 221 votes." Not a single vote must change.

So, one of our audit methods, a very simple one, will be to run a few more reports, compare them more rigorously, and insist on pulling the paper ballots if the digital data, or the report run from the digital data, becomes mismatched.

We need several additional checkpoints on our absentee ballot system. Even if we were to go back to an all-paper, all hand-counted system, we'd need to strengthen some of the safeguards (like requiring the U.S. Post Office to provide a report of the number of ballots received, and comparing that with a report of the number of ballots actually received by the elections division).

If we are to use a hybrid system (paper ballots and computer tallies), with voter-verified paper ballots, we need several more checkpoints. When memory cards, or cartridges, travel from place to place -- either by modem or in person -- we need a before and after report. Example: Report taken at polling place #116 before any results are phone in, modemed in, or driven in to a regional or county location. When the cards arrive, run another report, verify that the data is the same. After the data is tabulated into the overall county results, run a detail report on each of the precincts (yes, all of them) and compare to make sure all of them still match the original.

Observe how this reduces attack points: If you get a report from polling place #116 and before communicating with any other area, print it; and if this report says Smith 102, Jones 211; and then you transmit the votes by whatever method to the county and run another report after transmission, which should still say Smith 102, Jones 211 (thus showing that no one hacked in and inserted changes during upload), upon receipt at the county server, the county runs a report that still says Smith 102, Jones 211; and then the county merges vote data from all its polling places and gets a grand total, which it submits as the election results, you run another detail report on each polling place and #116 still shows Smith 102, Jones 211 — you have just removed most of the attack points between the initial report and the final tabulation.

Think of vote auditing procedures as checkpoints. Votes go from here to here to here. They must pass a checkpoint (print a report) at each stage. All the checkpoints must match. Simple!

Objections for the above: I have heard election officials give the inappropriate answer that comparing results as they travel through the system to make sure they still match won't work. They say it won't work because during the course of the election, absentee votes, provisional votes, challenge votes and mail-in votes are added to the polling place votes. In some places, mail-in votes are not differentiated from the polling place votes. Well now, here's the beauty of computers: Simply account for each type of vote on a separate line item. This is not difficult. It is not time-consuming. It's called "proper accounting."

For absentee voting, we also need to add some reports. The data we want to track here includes the number of ballots sent and recieved, and the information we require needs to include the detail of how many were sent, and received, from each 13-digit zip code, along with the weight of each piece.

The checkpoints for these absentee reports should include the number of ballots sent out from the elections division, from any presort facility or middleman, and from the post office. Incoming, compare the number of ballots (and weight of ballots) received by post office, presort facility, and elections division. Basically, you want a before-and-after number, and it should match.

We also need to formalize what happens when the audit turns up discrepancies. In a nutshell, when you discover a discrepancy, you pull the paper ballots and also expand the spot-check audit. If another discrepancy is discovered, you expand the audit further.

We have used some dreadful procedures for handling audit discrepancies up to now. Some elections officials have told me they need the ability to change vote totals in order to reconcile them. (Yes, really!). Diebold spokesman David Bear recently told a reporter that the reason the GEMS program allows entry of negative votes is in case the elections officials need to use such a function for some reason. News flash: There is NO legitimate reason, if you are doing proper bookkeeping, to have an election official override votes cast by citizens with "negative" votes.

The proper way to handle a situation where an adjustment is needed is to retain the original data in a pristine condition, add a "correction entry" and journal the reason why with a very clear and sufficiently detailed explanation. You never just go in and alter the original data.

When the audit reveals discrepancies, two things need to happen: First, we need to pull the paper ballots for that machine or polling place and examine them, and next, we need to review the other data to see if we find any more flawed data. In an audit, if you find a discrepancy, you expand the review.

For example, suppose you have 500 machines in the county, and five machines in polling place #116. You spot-check polling place #116 and discover that you are 100 votes short, and further examination shows that Machine D4 miscounted and dropped the 100 votes. If you do not expand the audit upon finding this discrepancy, you do not know if your county had 20 percent or one-quarter of a percent of its machines miscount. Before the expanded audit, you have a 20 percent failure rate (one out of five machines). You cannot assume it was one out of 500 machines (county-wide) — actually, you have no idea until you expand the audit.

A common auditing error that I am hearing from county elections officials is this: "If it wouldn't change the election, there is no need to expand the audit." This is incorrect. Let's look at the above example: You have 500 machines in the county, you spot-check 1 percent, or 5 machines. You find that one of these machines miscounts by 100 votes. The election spread was 1000 votes, so 100 votes couldn't make a difference, right?

Wrong — because, without expanding the audit, you may have a 20 percent machine failure (one in five machines). If one in 500 machines loses 100 votes and the spread is 1,000, it wouldn't change the election. If one in five machines loses 100 votes — that is, 100 of 500 machines — you've got a 10,000-vote discrepancy, which is ten times as much as you need to swing that election.

But is it practical to expand the auditing just because one machine miscounts? How much should we expand it? Here is where the statisticians should weigh in, but the concept is really quite simple: When the data is discrepant, you must expand the audit to a larger pool. If, in that larger pool, you find another discrepancy, you must expand to a still larger pool.

For example: You examine 1 percent and find that one machine of five did not count right. You then examine 10 percent and find one more machine that miscounted. At first, you were sitting at a 20 percent machine or programming malfunction (1 in 5 machines). After expanding the audit, you were sitting at a four percent problem (2 in 50 machines). Still too high. So you expand to a 50 percent audit and find two more machines that miscount. Now you are at 4 machines out of 250, a 1.6 percent failure rate.

And, of course, where one machine might drop 100 votes, another might drop 1,000. In Allamakee County, Iowa a machine miscounted by 3.9 million votes, and in Boone County, Indiana, another system miscounted by 139,000 votes. That's the trouble with computers. When they screw up, they can do so in a spectacular fashion. We can't assume that a 100-vote discrepancy in one computer means all other computers will miscount by only that amount.

It's simple: If you find a discrepancy, you expand the audit. Find another, expand it more. And folks, I really don't care about the explanation for the error. I will tell you this: embezzlers always have an explanation when you find a discrepancy. Doesn't matter what it is. If you find a discrepancy, you expand the audit.

I am working on developing a 10-point audit plan so that we can come to a meeting of the minds on what is needed. This is not a five-minute process, and cannot be done by computer scientists working in a university office. It requires getting out in the field to talk with elections officials who can reliably and accurately define the life of a vote in each of the various ways it is cast. It then involves meeting with auditors and, yes, I have it in mind to talk with an embezzler or two who have gone straight, to identify attack points and checkpoint procedures.


I'm hoping that we will begin to take auditing much more seriously. Our vote is not an experiment, and our democracy is too important to be making it up as we go. I am, frankly, a little horrified that people with few qualifications are telling legislators their supposedly authoritative opinions, and that, alternatively, people are out there writing legislation while talking to no auditing experts at all. Therefore, I'm gonna find experts myself, document what they have to say, write it up and present a 10-point set of procedures that tell us WHAT TO DO WITH THE PAPER BALLOTS!

.....times the number of different voting systems in each state, each with its own method of reporting results, divided by the number of people actually looking at the variables involved and you get an idea of the scope of the challenge we all face in coming up with a 'one size fits all' auditing solution under the current laws. :evilfrown:

The obvious solution would be a National Voting Standard that includes VVPB and audits as outlined above. The problem is that it has been left up to each State to develop the methods of how elections are conducted within that State, and up to each County within each State as to the method the votes will be cast and counted locally. :crazy:

It seems to me that we should be pursuing a Constitutional amendment that takes the 'equal protection' clause into account to guarantee that all of our votes are afforded the same treatment while being cast and counted and a penalty consistent with treason for anyone attempting to subvert a Federal election, and by extension, our form of government.

The voting machine vendors are trying to do just that with their emphasis on the ease of casting a vote, while downplaying the security and integrity aspects of protecting our votes.

"We The People" got lazy and let others make those decisions for us.
Worse yet, we let those decisions be made by the very people who benefit the most from our votes, the winners of the elections! We allowed our 'elected representatives' become our 'de facto' leaders! We allowed them to develop a system of obscurity through complexity using the legal system that gives them the opportunity to rig elections and keep themselves in power. It's time for US to get our shit together and Take Back The Vote!

"We The People" must devise a simple, open, consistent electoral system of our own device that assures equal protection for everyone. We MUST put out the effort to run and police it ourselves and put our 'leaders' on notice that they are merely our representatives and they had better give us what we want or else!

So where do we start? :shrug:
Do we continue to 'play the game' fighting the legalese built into the current system that keeps the decision making in the hands of the few who have ordained themselves our 'leaders' and set themselves up for perpetuity or do we take pencil and paper in hand to simplify our electoral system and pledge to get out there and oversee it?

Discuss! :evilgrin:

Hand count cross checks of the voter verified ballots of a randomly selected subset of precincts/races.

What's the problem again? That our state governments are slothlike and our federal government is evil?

Who said Bev Harris had all the answers? Perhaps you should be providing the support and help needed to come up with a solution instead of criticizing those actually trying to first educate the public about the issue. We're all ears....

In the UK, Canada, France, Germany, and many other places, ballots for national elections consist of a single piece of paper with one candidate to be selected for one office. This is an extremely reliable process, is counted very quickly in a highly distributed fashion, and seldom challenged.

Having worked on dozens of elections municipally, provincially, nationally and internationally I am truly astounded that after the 2000 US election debacle, 3 1/2 years later America is still "looking for a solution".