Wellstone & Other Surviving Families Settle For 25 Million

http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/news/politics/6643417.htm

WELLSTONE PLANE CRASH: Victims' families settle for $25M
BY CHARLES LASZEWSKI
Pioneer Press

The families of then-U.S. Sen. Paul Wellstone, D-Minn., and other passengers killed in a plane crash near Eveleth, Minn., last fall have reached a $25 million settlement, one of several actions likely to result from the crash. Michael Ciresi and other lawyers at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi obtained the money for the families of the Wellstones — Paul and Sheila and their daughter, Marcia Wellstone Markuson — and of campaign staff members Mary McEvoy, Thomas Lapic and William McLaughlin.

The settlement announced Thursday with Aviation Charters Inc., Beech Transportation Inc. and Executive Aviation, of Eden Prairie, all owned by Roger and Shirley Wikner. The companies operated the Beech King Air A100 twin-engine plane that crashed at the Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport on Oct. 25. The money comes from the companies' insurance policies, which had a $25 million limit.

(snip)

So far, the biggest problems cited by the safety board involved pilot Conry. (snip) One pilot told the safety board that Conry once banked a plane and sent it descending 1,000 feet a minute without realizing it. Another told how three days before the fatal crash, Conry pushed the wrong switch while 300 feet off the ground, pitching the nose down. In both cases, the co-pilots quickly corrected the problem.

There was light to moderate icing in the area, according to safety board documents. However, the plane was well maintained by Aviation Charter, the engines were working perfectly, and pilots in a simulator were able to power up and land the plane even at the dangerously low speeds Wellstone's plane was flying just before the crash, according to the National Transportation Safety Board. The plane was flying at 76 knots before the crash, well below the normal landing speed of 100 knots and 1 knot less than the speed needed to keep from stalling.


OK, first to correct the final paragraph, please note:

1) The article gives the impression that the plane would necessarily stall at speeds under 77 knots. This is a load of crap. The Flight Manual for a King Air A-100 lists gross weight "dirty" (flaps fully extended and gear down) stall speed as 73 knots. And Wellstone's plane wasn't found in a fully "dirty" but in an approach configuration with the flaps partially extended -- which would result in an even lower expected stall speed value -- perhaps around 70 knots. While actual stall speeds depend on a multitude of factors, the idea that 76 knot speed (with engine and propeller confirmed to be operating just fine at the time of the crash by the NTSB) in +1 C temperatures necessary resulted in a stall is complete load of crap.

2) There was no "light to moderate" icing reported below 5,000 feet in all of MN that entire day. Meanwhile, Wellstone's plane was instucted to descend to 4,000 feet several minutes before the last recorded transmission, and the plane reported no icing despite a request by the ATC to report any encountered ice. Furthermore, the plane made a couple of precision turns and was basically on course at least until it descended to 3,500, well below the altitude where trace to light icing was reported (5,000 - 8,000 trace and 8,000 - 11,000 light to moderate).


More on Wellstone's flight going dangerously slow:

http://www.startribune.com/stories/1752/3784724.html

Preliminary examination of radar information indicated that the ill-fated Beechcraft King Air A100 carrying Wellstone, two Aviation Charter pilots and Wellstone's five-person entourage had slowed to an airspeed of 85 knots, or 98 miles per hour, seconds before crashing. Wednesday's more-detailed report from NTSB aerospace engineers said the plane had slowed to 76 knots, or 87 miles per hour.

At a speed of 76 knots, Capt. Richard Conry and co-pilot Michael Guess would have been decidedly below safe-speed parameters set by the airplane's manufacturer, the report said. The Raytheon King Air A100 flight manual calls for a minimum airspeed in icing conditions of 140 knots. Wellstone's plane was flying at a time when other pilots in the area reported light-to-moderate icing.

In non-icing conditions, the Raytheon King Air flight manual calls for a minimum airspeed of 99 knots when the plane's flaps are extended 10 degrees, the NTSB report said. The wreckage of Wellstone's plane showed a 10-degree flap setting.

Wednesday's report also quoted the chief pilot at Eden Prairie-based Aviation Charter as telling investigators that Aviation Charter pilots were instructed to fly at 130 knots while in final approach to an airport such as Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport. Even when touching down, the chief pilot told investigators, the King Air A100's speed should be 100 knots, according to the report.


In addition, please note that an extremely loud warning blares into the pilots' ears whenever the plane's speed gets below 85 knots.

This is what I mean when I say that those who suggest pilot incompetence are suggesting an extraordinary -- almost inexplicable -- level of pilot incompetence.

Also, please note that much of the plaintiff's case was based on statements made by then current employees of the defendent. (Bolded in the first article cited.) You would perhaps think this would be discouraged by the charter plane company's management? Furthermore, none of these horribly dangerous and highly negligent incidents were ever reported before Wellstone's crash -- not even to Aviation Charter's management and not even in the co-pilots' flight logs.

I don't know about you, but it still feels a bit strange to me that all these folks were so eager to make the case that their dead co-worker was an extraordinarily shitty pilot at the expense of:

1) their dead colleague's reputation,
2) their employers' chances of defending themselves against pending multimillion dollar litigation, and
3) their own reputations for reporting egregious safety violations.

I mean, would you want to hire one of these pilots at your firm knowing that they'll stay silent when their warnings might help you avoid a serious fatal accident, but open up just as soon as their long suppressed recollections will cost you millions of dollars?


******


Still more on this very same topic, from this archived thread:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/cgi-bin/duforum/duboard.cgi?az=show_thread&om=17316&forum=DCForumID61#10

I've now read well over 1,000 fatality NTSB reports and I've never once read of a single pilot talking in this harsh manner about his dead colleague(s).

Note that none of these pilots ever reported a single incident about Conry's profound incompetence, not even to their employer, until well after Conry crashed his plane into the ground at a steep 25 degree angle, killing himself and seven innocent souls (including a US Senator) because of his sheer and obvious incompetence, if we are to believe all of these accusers.

Do these accusers realize that their conspiracy of silence about Conry's incompetence makes all of them culpable for the deaths of a US Senator and five other innocent passengers?

Are their suddenly guilty consciences forcing them to come forward now? Are they trying to make good by offering all their personal wealth and assets to the surviving relatives of the passengers whose horrible and avoidable death they are so directly responsible for?

Is the FAA going to revoke their pilot licenses, censure them or discipline them in any way for letting a menace like Conry fly solo or first in command day after day after day?

How many of these individuals still work as pilots? How do they think their new employers will react when they read that these pilots and instructors caused their former charter airline employer to become liable for the wrongful deaths of 6 passengers, including a US Senator, by covering up the obvious and highly dangerous incompetence of a colleague who obviously had no business flying himself around, much less the most famous and publicly celebrated individual who regularly booked flights with Aviation Charter?

Did any of these accusers so much as make an entry into their flight logs about all of their hair raising experiences flying with Conroy?

Did any of these accusers ever request not to be paired on flights with Conry, fearing for their own lives and safety?


First, let's examine the strange case of Chad Kozloski:

In the latter case, Aviation Charter copilot Chad Kozloski said he was at the controls of a Wellstone flight sometime last summer when he let Conry fly while he turned around to talk to Wellstone. "Kozloski turned around for 10 seconds to talk to the senator and when he turned back, he had to take over the airplane," the report said. "The airplane was rolling through 45 degrees of bank and descending at 1,000 feet per minute."

Mike Lindberg, an attorney for Aviation Charter owners Roger and Shirley Wikner, said the Wikners were not aware of the new allegations. "None of the allegations that are now being made were ever brought to the company's management before the accident," Lindberg said.


1) Since when do second-in-command pilots "let" first-in-command pilots fly?

2) Why didn't Mr. Kozloski file a report about Conry's outrageous and dangerous incompetence with the FAA or at least with his employer?

3) Wellstone's fear of flying was notorious. Why did he feel so comfortable with a pilot who was apt to put a King Air into a dive and roll whenever he was left alone at the controls for 10 seconds?

4) I'm sure Kozloski, Conry and/or Aviation Charter have flight logs that list the other passengers on this dreadful flight. Are any of them still alive? If so, can any of them corroborate this frightful story?

5) Can we expect the FAA to discipline Mr. Kozloski for not reporting this dangerous breach of safety? Will he be censured by the FAA? Will his pilot license be revoked?

6) Does Kozloski realize that his failure to report Conroy's egregiously dangerous error makes him culpable for the deaths of 6 innocent passengers on a flight booked with the company he currently works for? How would he feel about being named as a co-defendant along with the principles of Aviation Charter in a wrongful death lawsuit?

7) Does Kozloski realize that his current employer will almost certainly be sued over the Wellstone crash? Is he planning to testify for the lawyers of the dead passengers and against the company he works for at this trial? How does he think his employers will react to the fact that their asses are already smoked because he told the NTSB about an egregious pilot error that he never thought to report to them? Does he realize that the fact that he waited until 8 people were dead to report this incident is more than grounds for his immediate termination?

8) Conry's log books stated that he was always the controlling pilot whenever he was flying Wellstone, and that he allowed the copilots to fly only the passenger-less legs of these flights. Do Conroy's and Kozloski's log books confirm that Kozloski was in fact the controlling pilot on the flight in question? How about any ATC tapes?

9) Is there any existing radar tracking data of the flight in question? If so, is it consistent with Kozloski's description of Conry's supposed dive and roll?


Now, what are we to make of Justin Lowe?:

Another ex-Aviation Charter pilot, Justin Lowe, told investigators of two other flights where Conry made serious mistakes, including one with Wellstone. Lowe said Conry did not appear confident as a pilot: "He just seemed real slow. Always hitting wrong things, saying wrong things."


1) Was Lowe a pilot or a co-pilot? If he was a regular pilot, then what was he doing flying second in command with Conry?

2) Which flights did Lowe share with Conry? Are there any ATC tapes of these flights available from which to judge whether Conroy was always "saying wrong things"?


On to the far stranger case of, Oliver Koski, former Aviation Charter Director of Operations:

At the company responsible for the flights, a supervisor knew that some pilots considered Conry to be below average, forgetful and prone to random errors, the NTSB said. Oliver Koski, a ground instructor and a former operations director at Aviation Charter, said Conry's performance was "a little bit below average" on written quizzes.

The supervisor, pilot instructor Oliver Koski, told investigators that Conry's copilot on Wellstone's fatal flight, Michael Guess, needed extra instruction during ground training and that the company's "weakest link" in training regarding cockpit coordination was between captain and copilot. Koski also said he spent "extra time" working with Guess on ground school lessons. "He called Guess 'borderline,' " the NTSB report said.

He said Conry tended to let his copilots fly "all the time" and probably would not have been at the controls when the plane crashed. After interviewing Koski, investigators also wrote: "Other pilots commented that Conry was below average. That sounded like a consensus opinion but no specifics were given. He had heard that Conry was forgetful and made random errors."

Koski told investigators that Conry "did not fly like a seasoned pilot" even though he claimed to have the hours of a seasoned pilot.

Koski told investigators that he rated the company's standardization as "fair." He said he suspected some pilots were following standard procedures, while others were not.


And here's an interesting request that our friend Koski made of the FAA in September, 1999:

http://www2.faa.gov/avr/afs/exempt/EX6986.DOC

September 3, 1999
Exemption No. 6986
Regulatory Docket No. 29297

Mr. Oliver Koski
Director of Operations
Aviation Charter, Inc.

Dear Mr. Koski:

By undated letter, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Aviation Charter, Inc. (ACI), for an exemption from § 135.299(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to the extent necessary to permit AVI (Aviation Charter) pilots to accomplish a line operational evaluation in a Level C or Level D flight simulator in lieu of a line check in an aircraft.


Note that the FAA quite wisely denied Koski's bizarre and dangerous request to evaluate his Aviation Charter pilots using a flight simulator rather than live flight in a real aircraft.


OK, now let's examine this a bit deeper. Imagine that you were the Director of Operations for a charter airline and the NTSB asked you to answer some questions about a former colleague of yours who just died in a tragic plane crash every media outlet and expert in the world is chalking up to bad weather.

Would you tell the NTSB investigators that this former pilot, who flew for at least several months at your whim and directly under your charge, was:

1) below average,
2) forgetful,
3) prone to random errors,
4) unable to fly like a seasoned pilot, and
5) apt to let his inexperienced, "borderline, weakest link" copilot land whenever he was transporting his most important passengers?

Furthermore, would you describe the standardization of the charter airline company at which you yourself served as Director of Operations for many years including the time period in question as "fair"?

Conry joined Aviation Charter in April 2001 and Guess joined Aviation Charter in June 2001. Now consider that Koski was the Director of Operations at Aviation Charter when both Conry and Guess were hired and initially trained and evaluated. So Koski himself both hired and approved for scores of commercial passenger flights a lead pilot who Koski himself describes as "below average, forgetful, prone to random errors, and unable to fly like a seasoned pilot" and a co-pilot who Koski himself describes as "borderline and the company's weakest link." Then Koski continued to serve as their direct supervisors, allowing the horrendously incompetent Conry to ferry hundreds of innocent passengers across the often fearsome skies of Minnesota and often scheduling him together with a "borderline" copilot, even though he knew Conry would almost certainly let "the company's weakest link" handle all of the most critical and dangerous flight duties. Even as other pilots were constantly reporting to him that Conry was "below average", "forgetful", and prone to make "random errors"?


And how about the ever changing stories Mark Schmidt/Schmit?

Former Aviation Charter pilot Mark Schmidt contacted investigators with another story about Conry. According to the report, Schmidt said that he observed Conry and a copilot during takeoff and that their plane "came over the top of Executive Aviation in a 60-degree bank and it looked like they were going to take out the tower."

Schmidt linked the incident to Conry's throttle technique. He said he did not know whether any kind of report was filed.


1) Doesn't this type of dangerous near miss require the filing of an NTSB incident report?

2) Pray tell, why didn't Mark think such an important illustration of Conry's obvious incompetence was topical when he talked to the media about Conry in November?


From a November, 2002 story: http://www.startribune.com/stories/1752/3420441.html

Mark Schmit, a former Executive Aviation pilot, said Conry told him he had flown for American Eagle. "I remember him telling me he flew ATRs for American Eagle," said Schmit, who left the company in January. "Which model, he never said. Just generally, ATRs."

"He never was more elaborate than that," added Schmit, who said he flew only once with Conry while at Executive Aviation but said he talked with him casually at the company's offices. Schmit said he worked at Executive Aviation for a little more than a year.


3) So Mark "links" Conry's supposed but unreported "60-degree bank" that "looked like they were going to take out" an ATC tower to "Conry's throttle technique." But didn't Conry have a copilot in that plane? And didn't Aviation Charter's Director of Operations assure us that Conry let his copilots fly "all the time"?

4) Mark told the Star Tribune that he "flew only once with Conry." But since Conry always let the other pilot fly, when did Mark have a chance to observe Conroy's supposedly very nearly homicidal throttle technique?


And what are we to make of this information? Is it all false?

From: http://www.airsafetyonline.com/cgi-bin/news/exec/view.cgi?archive=2&num=22

Conry grew up flying with his father and had his own plane by the early 1980s. He pursued a full-time flying job after real estate fraud charges ended his construction business.

According to Executive Aviation, which hired him in April 2001, Conry had logged just under 5,200 hours of flying time. He had an airline transport pilot certification, the highest possible rating. Guess, the co-pilot, was certified as a commercial pilot and had about 650 flight hours.

Rod Ahlsten, who gives pilots "check rides" part time at Executive Aviation, said he was told Conry was a good pilot. Twice a year, pilots take check rides, an extensive test consisting of an oral test, preflight checks and about two hours in the air, including some maneuvers in which emergency situations are simulated.

Conry passed his check ride the week of the crash, and Ahlsten spoke to the pilot who conducted Conry's test. "I've heard nothing but good about his flying skills," Ahlsten said.

Several people who flew with Conry praised him, including Curt Anderson, a carpenter for Conry's defunct development business.

Anderson said Conry also owned a stunt plane, in which he could fly upside down and perform loops. But he left the stunts behind when flying his usual single and double propeller planes, said Anderson, who flew with Conry about 40 times.

"His dream after construction was to fly,'' Anderson said. "He just wanted to be in the air. It's tough to believe he crashed.''


And what about this information? All false as well?:

From: http://www.startribune.com/stories/1752/3420441.html

"His training record with us is impeccable," Wikner said. "Some very important people wanted him as their pilot. They liked what he did. They liked the way he handled the airplane."

Conry had experience flying private planes, and he owned planes over the years. Federal Aviation Administration records show that in 1989, Conry obtained an air transport pilot rating, the highest rating a commercial pilot can get and one that requires at least 1,500 hours of flying time. That rating requires a minimum of 250 hours as captain or co-pilot, among other requirements. He also was licensed to fly single-engine and multiengine, land-based airplanes and single-engine seaplanes, records show.

On the basis of those certificates, and his successful completion of training and flights tests administered to him by Executive Aviation, Conry was legally qualified to fly as captain. Wikner said Conry passed a proficiency test just two days before the fatal crash. In addition, in August 2002, Conry completed a recurrent training program on the same type of plane he flew for Wellstone, Wikner said. Hoffert, the chief pilot, said, "From our standpoint he was very qualified, and we have the documentation to show that."

Conry's employment as a pilot trainee at American Eagle spanned five months, according to the record obtained by the Star Tribune. According to the record, Conry began his training Nov. 27, 1989. He resigned April 20, 1990. His brief stay included a leave of absence from Feb. 5 to March 6, 1990, the record said.

James Hurd, a business associate of Conry's dating back 25 years, said in an interview that Conry flew him about 50 times on business and recreational trips throughout the Midwest and Canada in the time he knew him. On those trips, he said Conry flew him in a single-engine Cessna. "I trusted him totally as a pilot," Hurd said. "He was unbelievably careful. Never cut a corner. I can't say strongly enough what a good pilot he was."

"Dick was the most careful person," he said, recalling all the flights he had taken with Conry.


*****


Finally, Conroy passed an extensive proficiency test exactly two days before he piloted the Wellstone crash. So who administered Conroy's last check ride--"an extensive test consisting of an oral test, preflight checks and about two hours in the air, including some maneuvers in which emergency situations are simulated"--and passed him "with flying colors" going so far as to mention to another tester what a good pilot Conry was? Or wouldn't it make any sense to interview the person most qualified to assess Conry's aviation proficiency the day of the crash?

To which I only have a firecracker in response. But I hung a couple of weeks ago with the Veterans for Peace, and those boys loved Wellstone. Loved him. He was their boy. You can bet your butt that they'd be digging like maniacs to get to the bottom of this. They did. The Minnesota VfP gentlemen I spoke to, specifically on this matter, had nothing good to say about this pilot, and dismissed any thoughts of a conspiracy.

So take that for whatever it may be worth. Wellstone's biggest advocates from MN believe wholeheartedly that it was, in fact, pilot error.

My theory, based on all the evidence at hand so far (which is frustratingly spotty on the most critical details concerning pilot error) is some form of pilot incapacitation.

Note that the difference between pilot error and pilot incapacitation exists on a continuum and that "mild" pilot incapacitation could be the result of any of a number of possibilities, only a subset of which suggest foul play.

Furthermore, foul play doesn't necessarily suggest a conspiracy. And even a "conspiracy" doesn't necessarily suggest a widespread government conspiracy, as I am sure Wellstone has many capable and/or powerful enemies, both individual and group.

Basically, the level of pilot incapacitation displayed here -- letting the plane slow down almost 10 knots below the stall warning blare and about 55 knots below the typical approach speed while (supposedly) executing a turn in the opposite direction of the proscribed missed approach go around after mysteriously drifting well over a mile south of the intended course your instruments are supposed to unfailingly guide you to by locking onto the nearby VOR tower signal -- is not your typical level of pilot error, especially considering the level wings at the time of the crash, perfectly calm wind, above freezing temperatures, lack of any known attempt to contact air traffic control and ease with which other pilots simulating this flight were able to power up and recover even after slowing this dangerously.

Very detailed and comprehensive. I believe you may be onto something as far as your pilot incapacitation theory. My only question to that is, if Conry had become suddenly incapacitated for some reason, wouldn't the co-pilot, Michael Guess, have taken over? Unless he was also incapacited or otherwise unable to react in time. But you're right, something just doesn't seem right here regarding the plane's actions in its final few minutes.

I know it may sound paranoid, but I tend to agree with those who believe that the crash was no accident. Wellstone was specifically and relentlessly targeted for defeat by that cold, cruel, arrogant psychopath Cheney and his merry band of ruthless thugs, including John ASSkroft, and I firmly believe those people are quite capable of ANYTHING as far as getting what they want, including murder. It's just too convenient that this happens only a little more than a week before the election, when Wellstone's poll numbers were good and he had a good chance of reelection. We may never know for sure, or ever be able to definitively prove it, but I firmly believe that. It does seem strange that nothing like this ever seems to happen to any of the repukes, doesn't it?

...commencing with your first "fact"

OK, first to correct the final paragraph, please note:

1) The article gives the impression that the plane would necessarily stall at speeds under 77 knots. This is a load of crap. The Flight Manual for a King Air A-100 lists gross weight "dirty" (flaps fully extended and gear down) stall speed as 73 knots. And Wellstone's plane wasn't found in a fully "dirty" but in an approach configuration with the flaps partially extended -- which would result in an even lower expected stall speed value -- perhaps around 70 knots. While actual stall speeds depend on a multitude of factors, the idea that 76 knot speed (with engine and propeller confirmed to be operating just fine at the time of the crash by the NTSB) in +1 C temperatures necessary resulted in a stall is complete load of crap.

This is, quite simply, factually wrong. The reverse is true...the stall speed is decreased as flaps are extended. This is just typical of your historical sophomoric, ignorant, half-baked pontifications on the topic. As I, and many others with experience in the subject have pointed out...your expertise in all things aviation ends with an ability to recognize an airplane when you see one.

edited for html

morning, didn't you? Don't you think personal attacks are a bit out of line?

Yes, I used the wrong word both times. I meant to say "deployed" instead of "extended." But this doesn't change the fundamental analysis ONE IOTA.

Here is the corrected passage:

1) The article gives the impression that the plane would necessarily stall at speeds under 77 knots. This is a load of crap. The Flight Manual for a King Air A-100 lists gross weight "dirty" (flaps fully DEPLOYED and gear down) stall speed as 73 knots. And Wellstone's plane wasn't found in a fully "dirty" but in an approach configuration with the flaps partially DEPLOYED -- which would result in an even lower expected stall speed value -- perhaps around 70 knots. While actual stall speeds depend on a multitude of factors, the idea that 76 knot speed (with engine and propeller confirmed to be operating just fine at the time of the crash by the NTSB) in +1 C temperatures necessary resulted in a stall is complete load of crap.


Now, other than your bullshit overblown "gotcha" about my dyslexia, what MEANINGFUL criticism(s) do you have?

This has NOTHING to do with incorrect terminology!

And Wellstone's plane wasn't found in a fully "dirty" but in an approach configuration with the flaps partially DEPLOYED -- which would result in an even lower expected stall speed value -- perhaps around 70 knots.

It is the reverse! It results in a "HIGHER" stall speed!!!!!!!!!!!!
Google SOMETHING.....PLEASE!

You are correct. I had it fundamentally backwards. Twice. A million apologies.

The flaps on Wellstone's plane were extended 15 degrees on each wing and the gear was down.

If the dirty stall speed (full fuel & cargo load, flaps down, gear down) is listed in the flight manual as 73 knots, what would you estimate the stall speed in this "almost dirty" (not quite full fuel or cargo load, flaps extended 15 degrees, gear down) configuration to be?

I realize that we are missing some important variables like the angle of attack, but perhaps a skilled pilot like you would deign to explain this rather than just asserting your infinite superiority.

And please, cut out the garbage about how this single error negates everything in my post, especially since most of what I posted has nothing whatsoever to do with the technical aspects of aviation.

If you have any other problems with anything I've written, address them.

You don't arrive at the truth by waving your hands.

has, for me, evolved into a passtime that I will partake in at my leisure...just for fun. Others have declined to even engage you on the topic anymore. It, quite frankly, is an exercise in futility as you will simply rehash the same tired, uninformed nonsense you've been peddling since day 1 as soon as a new development in the Wellstone crash is presented. And you will do it with a sophomoric ARROGANCE that is astounding. To wit:

The article gives the impression that the plane would necessarily stall at speeds under 77 knots. This is a load of crap.

or

While actual stall speeds depend on a multitude of factors, the idea that 76 knot speed (with engine and propeller confirmed to be operating just fine at the time of the crash by the NTSB) in +1 C temperatures necessary resulted in a stall is complete load of crap.

or

Now, other than your bullshit overblown "gotcha" about my dyslexia, what MEANINGFUL criticism(s) do you have?

I only have so many "bullshit overblown gotchas" left in me to deal with your prattle. Perhaps you'll win by dint of sheer persistance, certainly not by content.

I said: The article gives the impression that the plane would necessarily stall at speeds under 77 knots. This is a load of crap.

I also said: While actual stall speeds depend on a multitude of factors, the idea that 76 knot speed (with engine and propeller confirmed to be operating just fine at the time of the crash by the NTSB) in +1 C temperatures necessarily resulted in a stall is complete load of crap.

These are both true statements and you know it. Yes, I was blustery in response to the reporter's error, but no more blustery than you were in response to my error. I was pointing out the reporter's incorrect definition of stall speed (which was 4 knots higher than the A-100 flight manual's, btw) as the speed the aircraft must stall out at.

If I'd said the exact same thing, you would have jumped down my throat with baseball cleats.

I only have so many "bullshit overblown gotchas" left in me to deal with your prattle. Perhaps you'll win by dint of sheer persistance, certainly not by content.

Who exactly do you think you're fooling here? This the very first thread you've posted on since the new message boards came out.

And you arrived mighty fast to save the day!

So don't give up now, lest you be exposed, once more, as the puffed up bluffer you are.

Finally, I'm not trying to win anything. If you have a legitimate beef, I'm all ears. You can lend constructive criticism when you feel like it, and everyone can benefit from that.

is that usually parties who receive a settlement do so on the condition that they not pursue the case any further or discuss the terms of the settlement.

The only people we know of who could really tell us what happened that day are dead, and if there was any kind of sabotage or dirty tricks involved, the person or persons involved would have no motivation to admit it, since it would make them susceptible to criminal prosecution.

I guess we'll never know. But this bad-mouthing of the dead pilot seems to go beyond the typical attribution of "pilot error" and raises serious questions of why the company let such an allegedly incompetent and erratic pilot anywhere near a plane, much less assigned him to fly a U.S. senator around. If the company did consider him competent to fly VIPs, why are they bad-mouthing him now in retrospect?

My mystery reader instincts smell a rat here.

:tinfoilhat:

I was never big on conspiracies, but this.. I dunno.

edit: emoticon, heh, heh

The co-pilot was frozen out, and the other survivors may still sue Minnesota and/or the FAA.

The deal they cut was typical Wellstone, it appears, looking to help the families who would never have gotten such generous settlements without negotiating as a cohesive group.

After my stint in the military, I began my career in commercial aviation. During that early period, I was fortunate to be able to land a job with a company that offered Lear Jets for charter. One of the senior pilots with that company was a grizzled old WW2 aviator who had flown P-38's in the Phillipines theatre. In fact, he was a part of the very mission that shot down Yamamoto, tho he was in the flight (of 2 flights) that didn't make contact. On the occasion of a trip to the west coast, I had the opportunity to meet one of his peers....who was in the process of retiring as Chief Pilot of a MAJOR airline. They had both been offered positions with that same company at the same time. One accepted and went on to an enviable career and a most comfortable retirement...the other opted for a career in one of the lowest and financially unstable rungs in commercial aviation...charter.

I always had a sense of bitterness about the man, and it was affirmed
by an expression that he loved to impart to his associates which I have never forgotten. "Aviation charter is a business staffed by amateurs and misfits". While this is no absolute, there is a definite element of truth in his observation.

After my stint in the military, I began my career in commercial aviation. During that early period, I was fortunate to be able to land a job with a company that offered Lear Jets for charter. One of the senior pilots with that company was a grizzled old WW2 aviator who had flown P-38's in the Phillipines theatre. In fact, he was a part of the very mission that shot down Yamamoto, tho he was in the flight (of 2 flights) that didn't make contact. On the occasion of a trip to the west coast, I had the opportunity to meet one of his peers....who was in the process of retiring as Chief Pilot of a MAJOR airline. They had both been offered positions with that same company at the same time. One accepted and went on to an enviable career and a most comfortable retirement...the other opted for a career in one of the lowest and financially unstable rungs in commercial aviation...charter.

I always had a sense of bitterness about the man, and it was affirmed
by an expression that he loved to impart to his associates which I have never forgotten. "Aviation charter is a business staffed by amateurs and misfits". While this is no absolute, there is a definite element of truth in his observation.

The first time I tried to post, I got some error gobbledegook, so I sent it again...looks like it went thru the first time.

They were all from the land of misfit toys!