Voting scams are happening now, and we should be watching

There is a lot of concern about black box voting, some of it justified, some a bit too paranoid (but still probably good). But cheating can and does occur other places, and we can be concerned about that now.

At a recent meeting of my club (link below), we had our local county clerk as a guest to speak about electronic voting and fraud. She is the one who chose the machines for Travis County, which is Austin and surrounding towns. Austin takes a strong lead nationally amongst mid-size cities on several issues, and so she has become a bit of an expert on the subject from her research and from her discussions with other local officials. I don't remember exactly the title or role, but she has been chosen as one of two members on a national level to advise cities on electronic voting, so she has some recognition as an expert.

We drilled her for a while on cheating possibilities on voting machines (and this wasn't the first time, either) at our last meeting, and she went into a lot of detail on the different types and their different problems. Travis County uses an electronic system with a dial and buttons, because touch-screen voting relies on unreliable grids and can malfunction, and also require sight, so they are unable to be used by vision-impaired people without assistance. Our machines can be used without vision through headphones and braille lettering on the buttons, and thus, with the headphones, can be used by those products of the Bush Texas Education Miracle-- the illiterate.

On cheating, there are a lot of different types of machines, and she agreed that some were more easily cheated than others, but in general she argued that the electronic voting machines were harder to cheat with than the paper ballots they replace (not sure that says much), and that a widespread conspiracy affecting a large number of voting machines is not likely, or even practically possible.

I'm not going to defend or argue against her here, since that's not my main point, but I will say she knew who Beverly Harris was, and she knew all the websites and literature on the subject, and from some of her comments I thought she might even have hung around here a bit. She's not arguing her position from ignorance, and believe me it isn't from complicity with a grand conspiracy. She's done a ton of research on all sides of the issue and that's her conclusion. Again, I'm not really supporting that argument, though I tried and failed to poke holes in it at the meeting. I'm just mentioning it as a setup to my real point.

And that point is this: the next election is being stolen right now. She believes Katherine Harris cheated in Florida, and implied she should be in jail. But the biggest cheating occured, as Greg Palast demonstrated, a year or more out from the election, when Harris was rigging the voting rolls and confirming illegal ballot designs. She didn't say this, but I think many of us believe Teresa Lapore was a plant, and chose the butterfly ballot because it was known to create the type of error it created. Anyone in the voting equipment industry knew that it would favor Bush, that the candidate at the top of the ballot gets fewer mistakes than those at the bottom. (I believe, too, that this fact is not enough to explain the 633% increase in overvotes, and that ballots had to be tampered with).

Katherine Harris was caught red-handed, and not punished in any way. Because of that, the Republicans know they can do it again. And they will. They are doing it right now, in every state where they have access. They are purging voting rolls, they are trying to find ballot designs and ballot organizations that favor them, they are trying to word intitiatives in such a manner that they will confuse voters. NOW is when we have to stop the cheating.

Now is the time to hound them, to call the AGs and the county clerks and the elections suprvisors and find out what they are doing. Learn about the machines they are using. Join or form local clubs and invite your local elections people to explain and demonstrate their machines. Bring all of Bev Harris's info with you and ask them to comment on it.

And most of all, call your AG's office and find out what you can. Ask if they are purging voting rolls. Ask if felons are allowed to vote once they have served their sentence. They are in Texas, which makes it harder to purge our rolls (as if it mattered in this fascist backwater state). Find out what they will tell you about voting rolls, and what they won't. Get involved in GOTV efforts, and see what those organizations know already. See how your state and local districts register voters, who is ineligible, what changes have been made recently. Write back to us here, write to your local paper to explain what you have found out. Write feature stories, not just letters to the editor, explaining what you find, avoiding the temptation to write like a sleuth who has just uncovered the biggest crime of the century. If there is a problem, form a group to fight it. A lot of attorneys are Democrats, and a lot would be excited to get in on a case involving Republican cheating, so if you find something big, ask for volunteer legal advice. Etcetera.

WHo knows, maybe you can stop the next Katherine Harris before she strikes.

And on Black Box Voting-- I still wouldn't let that slide, but a lot of people are aware of it now, so a lot of people are watching it. We need to expand our spotlight. These damn Republican cockroaches have a lot of shadows to hide in.

Post what you know, any ideas you have, etc.

at the Georgia Tech forum. Of course, since he is from Texas, he has had first hand experience with your voting machines - the HartIntercivic.

According to Dan Wallach, there's no difference in them and Diebold. With the single exception of HOW the vote is entered.

Instead of a touchscreen, where you touch the name of the candidate you wish to vote for, Hart uses a DIAL. You turn the dial to select the candidate on the screen then push the enter key. They are just as vunerable to vote fraud as the Diebold machines.

BTW, she's wrong about the disabled functions being appreciably different as well. The blind use the headphones and vocal prompts to select their candidate with Diebold AND HartIntercivic.

They may be trying to distance themselves from the Diebold Debacle, but it won't work. Dan Wallach was just as determined to get a voter verified paper ballot on the Hart machines as he is to get them on the Diebold machines. He even (badly) altered the graphic on his slide and stuck a printer on it to make the point. :-)

can't see the screen to know where to touch it. On the button models, the buttons are used to move the cursor, so seeing the screen isn't necessary. I've seen both.

As for the Diebold being less difficult to hack, she didn't seem to think either was easier or harder, just that touch screens were less reliable over time.

The machines are kind of like touch screens, but you use a wheel to make your selection, rather than touching a screen. This is better in some ways -- there are calibration problems with touch screens.

But Hart Intercivic still doesn't have a voter-verified paper ballot (the dealbreaker). I don't see why there would have to be a difference in accessibility for the blind, because the mechanism is headphones that guide the actions, which seems plausible with either a wheel or a touch mechanism.

Anyway, the point of the post that I really don't want to see get lost:

VOTER PURGING and biased voter registration present just as big a fraud risk as unauditable voting machines -- and it's probably easier to do.

Bev

She convinced me that was a bad idea, though I was for it before.

People can take the paper ballots home by mistake or by ignorance of procedure, they can try to change their vote on paper instead of in the machine, they can argue after their vote is cast that they voted for a different candidate (which can't be changed, since the vote is secret and can't be retrieved). If you let voters handle the paper ballot there will be discrepancies from these types of errors, and if you don't let them handle the paper ballot (keeping it under glass, for instance) there is no real reason to even have paper ballots.

I've wondered if there could be two levels of electronic counting-- one at the precinct, then one at central. It would be harder to rig the central machines if there was already a preliminary count at the local level that could reveal a different outcome. It would also make it harder to cheat at the local level, since that would be caught at the central location.

One parallel from the Middle Ages keeps occuring to me. When people first began using paper and written documentation to record property transactions, no one trusted the new system (remember, this is after the fall of Rome, so writing had disappeared for centuries). The old tradition was to transfer a symbolic piece of the land-- a stick, a rock-- in front of many witnesses. Children were forced to watch, and then beat, so that they would remember the incident because of the pain (different world, eh?). Children were chosen because they would be expected to live longer.

Anyway, when people began to write these transactions down and keep them at a central office, people were so distrustful that they continued to use the old methods along with the new. So there were dozens of witnesses, and many children who were beaten to remember the signing, and then a stick was transferred anyway, and recorded in the written documents.

Students always get a chuckle at this story, but they don't see how we do it ourselves. We can't give up paper for electronics. Even though we could save forests of trees each year, we prefer to have printed copies of every legal transaction we sign. One day students will chuckle at us.

People can take the paper ballots home by mistake or by ignorance of procedure,

You have a check in procedure, so you can have a check out procedure. During check out you surrender the ballot to the ballot box.

they can try to change their vote on paper instead of in the machine, they can argue after their vote is cast that they voted for a different candidate (which can't be changed, since the vote is secret and can't be retrieved).

That happens now, so what the diff?

It's one thing if one person claims there vote wasn't recorded correctly, another if several people report the same problem.

If you let voters handle the paper ballot there will be discrepancies from these types of errors, and if you don't let them handle the paper ballot (keeping it under glass, for instance) there is no real reason to even have paper ballots.

Huh? If it is under glass but the voter sees it and confirms it or rejects it, how is this no reason to have the paper ballot?

Obviously if you go the glass route, then you have a last step for casting the vote which is when the voter examines the paper. If the paper is deemed incorrect, then the ballot is voided. If the voter accepts the ballot, the vote is cast.

David Allen
Publisher, CEO, Janitor
Plan Nine Publishing
http://www.plan9.org


She still has not addressed the question of how votes are retrieved from a machine that written gibberish to the hard disk (and all the backup devices). Machine error is the biggest, most likely event to cause election results to be skewed. Bev dug up 30+ pages on the machines doing precisely that.

If the paper and the chip (not a hard drive, or at least not in any sensible system) disagree, which is right?

You are running two voting systems side by side in the hope ultimately that they agree. What if they don't? What if no error can be found in the circuitry or the programming, but ultimately the machine votes disagree? Do you assume someone got to the machines, or someone printed fake ballots? What if the numbers of votes cast don't agree? Out of millions of votes, you will have discrepancies. Which set of votes do you count, and no matter which one you count, how will you convince the supporters of the other candidate that you chose rightly?

If you have ballots under glass, and someone reviews their ballot and it is wrong, what do you do then? You have to have someone get the ballot out from under the glass, or it will be submitted, too. Again, no secret ballot. For the same reason you would have to have the ballots fall directly into a ballot box. Someone will claim their vote was wrong after it was submitted. Someone would then have to open the ballot box, or just ignore the problem-- in which case there is no point in having the system. Even if the ballot is caught before it falls, the vote has to be cast over and someone has to see the ballot. People will make mistakes, in great numbers. We've seen that.

And how many volunteers will be needed? People to hand out ballots. People to monitor each polling station to make sure no one escapes with a ballot, or to monitor a checkout station where people have to line up to leave the booth. It's hard to find enough poll workers now. The addition of more poll workers makes for more probability of fraud or error. How many voters will be running late, and rush out without checking out? Then does the vote count? How would you know which electronic votes to descredit if not? And then the paper totals and the vote totals don't match. Again, which do you trust? How much longer will the line be? Twice as long, at least, obviously, since you have to check out just like you checked in. How many people will that discourage from voting? How many people will feel intimidated if someone is standing gaurd, collecting their ballots? How many people will use that intimidation aka Rehnquist to discourage people from voting, or turning in their ballot?

I'm assuming you've worked busy polling places before, and can identify with each scenario. If not, work one next November, and see.

No system is foolproof. There are too many fools.

Parallel systems create too much room for error. The double check has to come from somewhere else, like in the counting. Or else we have to go back to paper, which is worse. In the case of system failure-- meaning jibberish written to chips instead of actual votes, since a power shortage or a machine crash wouldn't really affect what is already on the chips-- the machines will have to be built to detect the jibberish and warn the voter, or at least the polling place attendant, that something went wrong.

The solution is in building the machines better, taking them away from private enterprise (or at least creating an oversight board to watch the private corporations), and demystifying the machines so that we can check them. Reveal the code, for instance, though then it would be easier to hack. I don't believe the printer idea is workable in the real world. For the reasons above, I believe it would cause more confusion, more delays (some deliberate-- you can shut down a polling place by sabotaging the printers), and more people not getting to vote.

There are ways to print paper ballots that make it difficult or impossible to just print and substitute different ones.

The paper must be compared against the machine. Congrats on your efforts -- you have just been introduced to the official talking points they use, none of which hold water.

"Parallel systems create too much room for error" -- no, what we are talking about is double entry, used in every accounting system in the world. Vote counting is accounting. The records should MATCH. The idea that they won't is unacceptable. It means you have created a flawed system.

Check into Avante and AccuPoll, both of whom make touch screen machines with a paper ballot.

I know a thing or two about double entry bookkeeping. It never, ever matches the first time. You have to continually find discrepancies by reviewing individual transactions and individual ledger entries. You can't do that in a secret system, because looking at voting discrepancies means looking at how individuals voted.

The electronic record and the paper ballot will never, ever match. There will be a hundred little reasons why, but they won't. I run a very simple point of sale computer system, where all that happens is an item is entered into the system when it is bought, and taken out when it is sold, and the costs and incomes are balanced automatically. Very simple, it should match 100% every time. It never, ever does. If it did, I'd have no job. Computer problems keep it from matching. Human error keeps it from matching. There are times when odd little glitches in the programming make things happen that wouldn't even seem possible. Most errors are caused by humans, though. They don't do what they are supposed to. They improvise, they cut corners, they enter items wrong then experiment until the system takes what they've entered even though it's wrong. I deal with a staff of thirty. Imagine a staff of thousands, and how many mistakes they can make.

The standard procedure will become to ignore the discrepancies, probably in favor of the electronic vote, just because it is easier. People will become complacent, stop watching for problems, and just ignore the differences over time.

The system has to work in the field, and in the field it will be run by volunteers who handle the equipment once every two years at most and who will make mistakes. Creating paper ballots along with the electronic vote may seem like a great idea-- and I know it sounds great because I was touting here long before I had heard anyone else suggest it, so I came up with it on my own-- but it's going to create more problems, more discrepancies, and more fraud (since the former two make the latter easier).

Better to stick with punch cards, then we don't have the added distraction of having to decide which of two competing systems is right. If the paper is going to be right, save money and skip the electronics altogether.

I admire the work you've done on this, Bev. I'm not sure you aren't falling into the trap of believing your own point to where you exclude the possibility that the other side may have one, too. As always, I'm between the two sides on this (well, I'm a long way from the Republicans on any idea, but there are competing sides amongst liberals), or rather I see what both sides are saying and am trying to incorporate all the facts into my ideas. Both are talking past the other, so both are missing key points the other is making.

If the paper and the chip (not a hard drive, or at least not in any sensible system) disagree, which is right?

Paper beats chip. The voter saw that. Also, My proposal is to also have a CD-R record of the whole voting session as well. Since the data can't be erased, it is more tamper-resitant . And before you ask, if all three sources disagree, I think you would admit that it is time to have the FBI grilling people under hot lights.

If you have ballots under glass, and someone reviews their ballot and it is wrong, what do you do then? You have to have someone get the ballot out from under the glass, or it will be submitted, too. Again, no secret ballot.

Complications, complications... If you display it under glass and the voter disagrees with it, the voter voids the ballot. The paper reverse line-feeds and is marked VOID VOID VOID a few dozne times, the paper is then advanced and a new ballot printed. If the voter still has problems then the machine must be inspected. If the problem is "stupid voter" then you give them a blank, old-style ballot and a pen and let them mark it that way. In fact, this should be an option for anyone.

If you are going to put the ballots under glass, you don't cut individual ballots off as they are cast, you have a "take up" reel which the ballots load on to (Just like the audit journals in banks).

When paper ballots are inspected or counted, it is *obvious* which ones you don't count, they have VOID all over them.

And how many volunteers will be needed? People to hand out ballots.

Hand out ballots? The ballots are a roll of paper in the voting machine.

to monitor a checkout station where people have to line up to leave the booth.

Since we are now talking about "ballot under glass", we have eliminated this function.

The addition of more poll workers makes for more probability of fraud or error. How many voters will be running late, and rush out without checking out? Then does the vote count? How would you know which electronic votes to descredit if not? And then the paper totals and the vote totals don't match. Again, which do you trust? How much longer will the line be? Twice as long, at least, obviously, since you have to check out just like you checked in. How many people will that discourage from voting? How many people will feel intimidated if someone is standing gaurd, collecting their ballots? How many people will use that intimidation aka Rehnquist to discourage people from voting, or turning in their ballot?

Again, if the ballot is under glass, these problems don't exist. If you have voters handle ballots you do what you do now if the voter walks out with their ballot, you don't count something you don't have. We have already stated that the paper ballot rules.

No system is foolproof. There are too many fools.

And all you can do is make it fool *resistant*.

Parallel systems create too much room for error.

Hmmm... Jets have multiple propulsion systems and multiple guidance systems; bridges have multiple support systems; memory chips have multiple parity checking systems, drive array systems have multiple drives (the computer I am working on has two controllers, each with a mirrored drive pair); and the human body has twin renal systems, twin respiration, auditory, visual, and balancing systems. Men have two testicles, women two ovaries. Somehow these parallel systems have worked fine for ages.

The solution is in building the machines better, taking them away from private enterprise (or at least creating an oversight board to watch the private corporations)...

Agreed, as long as "better" involves storage on a non-volatile medium the voter can see and verify. Anything less than that is a problem.

I believe it would cause more confusion, more delays (some deliberate-- you can shut down a polling place by sabotaging the printers),

I can shut down a polling place by tripping a breaker. I could sabotage the machines themselves. I can shut down a polling place with a telephone call ("There is a bomb in the building."). I could set a fire, set off tear gas grenade, pick off voters with a rifle from the book depository, or mug them in Col. Mustard's conservatory with the pipe wrench. All systems have these vulnerabilities, not just computers.

Some of that is good, especially the reverse feed, as long as it works all the time. You are underestimating the increased need for volunteers. You are assuming that these volunteers will be comfortable with electronic equipment they don't understand beyond the external buttons. I work with a degreed nuclear physician (not what he does now) who can't fix a printer jam.

As far as your CD-R idea-- that's what's done now, except on a chip (at least in the systems I've seen that make sense). The CD-R would be no less rewritable than the chip, so there'd be no need of it.

As for using the paper as the ballot and the electronics only to print it, if that's the case then we need to do away with any electronic tabulation of the vote altogether, to avoid competing outcomes. That might not be a bad idea. But it seems like a waste of money to me. Optical scans would work just as well, in that case.

As for your argument on parallel systems, all that you described are supporting systems. The two systems work together to have the same or even a complementary effect. With the paper ballot, you have two different systems which will have two different outcomes, thus one will not support but undermine the other. Not in theory, of course, but in practice. Your dual supports for bridges don't have one pushing down while the other is pushing up. That can happen with jet engines, but it's rare. It won't be rare with paper ballots.

Good ideas, though. Good post.

Have her, in the interest of fairness, call up Accupoll and Avante and find out how the systems REALLY work.

I've been there when a Sequoia rep handed out false information about other systems to a roomful of people.

Machines that produce a voter verified paper ballot have to meet the same requirements as any other system. That includes the ability to spoil the ballot.

With Avante, that's done with the printer, no one handles the ballot, period.

I'm assuming with Accupoll, that the voter can indicate the ballot is spoiled and an election worker will dispose of the spoiled ballot properly with no disclosure.

With the help of technology, paper ballots can be made pretty fail safe, down to making it darn hard to stuff a ballot box. By putting code, etc., on the ballot, anything that didn't have that is suspect.

Read the HAVA Act. It calls for a permanent paper record with audit capacity. These machines without voter verified paper ballots violate that rule.

The paper ballot will always take precedence over the electronic record because it is the verified ballot of record. That's why the paper ballots produced by optical scan and punch cards are what is recounted when a recount is called for.

The only problem with a parallel system in Touch Screen is that a physical record of the voter's intent, the ballot, makes it harder to "fudge" an election.

I remember using the dial wheel machines. I didn't like them but you could go back and "verify" that you selected the candidates you wanted. I wasn't crazy about them though.

Jazzgirl

Really.

Sorry. I'm a bookwriter by inclination, trying to fit it all in a single post. :-)

The central "election management" computers are the biggest worry for me. Specifically, a Diebold program called GEMS. If elections in states with mixed voting equipment, such as California, are to be rigged, GEMS is my "likeliest suspect". Here's an older Bev Harris article:

Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program

One way citizens could help is by demanding that precinct tallies are printed and made public BEFORE they are transmitted to the county. Then make sure these tallies square with the precinct-by-precinct report that the SOS publishes.

And you are absolutely right, they are barreling ahead with it. California, once we get it all sorted out, will show that as well.

I see the manipulation of the people's voice taking many forms:

- biased and unneccesary redistricting
- forgetful voter registration (you registered but the dog ate it)
- wrongful voter registration purges
- polling place access problems -- changing the polling place, long lines in strategic places, and more
- vote casting and counting fraud
- once people are elected, retaliation by doing "investigations" and recalls

Thanks for a very important post. (I go by "Bev" not "Beverly")

Bev Harris
The site is back up: http://www.blackboxvoting.com
Chapters 8 and 9 are up

I suppose it's a type of fraud, but there are as many techniques for SUPPRESSING the vote as there are clever people to think up new ways. Any method that results in fewer people voting or being able to cast a vote in the first place is a vote suppression technique. Many of the following were used in FL in 2000:

* any method that would create overly long lines (so some people can't stand the wait or the polls have to close) -- too few voting machines, too few poll workers, improperly working voting machines, late polling place opening, closing half the polling places (like they did in CA)

* having too few ballots, or too few provisional ballots, or too few different language ballots in areas where they are needed
* moving a precinct without proper notification or notice on the old precinct location
* posting police or sheriffs or deputies at minority polling places
* traffic stops near a polling place
* flyers that tell people the wrong date for the election
* flyers that tell people they have to have their current rent receipts or x number of ID cards
* Polls showing big leads for someone who doesn't really have big leads (like Arnold Schwarzenegger) would help suppress the vote
* dropping people off voter rolls; jammed phone lines to HQ so improperly dropped voters can't be validated
* ballots that create planned confusion for voters (such as the butterfly ballot)

And probably more I'm not even thinking of.

I think the term vote fraud more properly applies to fraud on votes cast or being cast (changed mid-process, such as with a rigged machine).

Eloriel

It's sad when they can get the cops to affect voting. Bush is beyond contemptable.

One note: I didn't call it fraud. I called it cheating, and a scam. Not sure it matters, but I kind of agree with your distinction. Seems semantic, but somehow I don't believe it is.

Electronic machines are EASIER to cheat, by far, IF you have someone on the programming staff who purposely puts malicious code in there. Not only that, but the cheating can be far more widespread than typical vote fraud in localized areas where you have to get your hands on those ballots and abscond with them. And currently we have no reliable way of detecting malicious code.

Unfortunately, election officials around the country can't seem to grok that simple point. Their frame of reference seems to be paper ballots are the only avenues to fraud and if you don't have paper ballots, you don't have fraud.

Too, they certainly don't seem to understand that all the physical security in the WORLD cannot guard against that.

In addition, they really don't have a good appreciation of the extraordinary vulnerabilities inherent in having these machines and servers hooked up by modem. They are taking weak assurances strongly stated and probable outright lies by manufacturers as gospel truth. And of course, all their physical security measures break completely down as soon as they plug those things in.

That problem (unauthorized access by modem by either insiders or hackers) is actually worse than I thought, a point that I came to realize during the GA Tech forum and in the discussions afterwards.

We have a VERY serious uphill battle to wage with these people. Even your expert isn't as knowledgeable and savvy as she thinks she is.

Eloriel

Either those who work in the election field in both parties are completely unable to grasp simple computers as well as the people here at DU, or they already know all of what we are saying and have factored it into their knowledge and believe we are wrong based on their better knowledge of the systems.

I can tell you that the one person I spoke with was sure of her knowledge, knew the systems inside and out, knew what Bev Harris and we here at DU were saying, knew about the MIT study, and knew the data from both sides. She believed that widespread tampering by a single outside entity was next to impossible. I'm not sure I agree with her, but I promise you she grasped everything you've mentioned, because it was all brought up and she gave detailed answers concerning it.

And there are no programming staffs and no modems, or at least there aren't supposed to be. None of the systems I've seen use modems. And there aren't programming staffs to play around with these computers. They are calculator-level machines. You can enter data into them to set up a ballot, and the machines display that data and write it to a chip. Not a hard drive. You can't enter programming, and the circuitry is not sophisticated enough to handle anything too complex.

At least that's the way the machines are sold. If there is an exception to this, it comes from some conspiracy deep in the hearts of the manufacturing plants, where circuits are being installed that no one is supposed to know about. It's possible, but it's Orwell stuff and we're sunk already if we are at that point.

Explain to me how she can "know the system inside and out" having never looked at the source code.

The source code gives the commands to the system. If you don't review it, you don't know what the commands are. If you don't know what the commands are, you have no idea what the machine is doing, it's as simple as that.

Hart Intercivic is not a company I deal with a lot in Black Box Voting, but it also is not at all widely used. The three biggest companies are ES&S, Diebold, and Sequoia.

You would not necessarily know if a system is using a modem, because the modem can be internal and wireless. In fact, most manufacturers are producing machines with internal wireless modems that you don't see.

If Hart Intercivic says it has no "programming staff" that sounds nice, but are they saying they have no support techs? We know that support techs have access to the machines and can do many functions that can compromise an election. Not only that, but support techs are quite often temporary help hired from outside the company just for an election.

I run across many people who claim they know what I am saying. If they have not read the chapters (which are the definitive word, not a bunch of casual chat at DU) then no, they do NOT know. And the chapters contain the documentation that proves what we say is true.

I believe the person you spoke with, while well intentioned, was just quoting the talking points provided by the vendor. Now, if you can convince me she personally has examined the source code itself, that would go a long way toward bolstering her credibility.

Most of the election officials think that if you push the buttons and it appears to function the way it should, that is being familiar with the machine. If she truly does have expertise, invite her to debate me on the air. I will be delighted to set up a radio show and she can demonstrate to me that she actually knows what she's talking about.

I think it has been nearly a year since ANYONE from the elections industry has been willing to debate me or any of the computer scientists. There is a reason for that: They are quoting talking points which are dissassembled very quickly.

Bev

we still have not seen any convincing evidence that the ITA's actually look at the code. In fact, I am now betting money that they don't.

Why?

You mean to tell me that Cyber looked at Diebold's source code and somehow *overlooked* 328 security flaws?

Your election official talks about massive conspiracies between shadowy groups or companies, whereas all it would take is *one* programmer who worked on the code knowing how to exploit a single hole.

But let's set that aside a moment.

I am on record saying I worry less about Dr. Evil's plot for world domination and more about crappy Diebold code running on crappy Microsoft code.

Which is more likely to happen to me in the next 24 hours?

1) A car will crash through my wall and total my computer.

2) Windows will crash my computer.

#1 Could happen, but I am more worried about #2. However if #1 occurs, the results are more dire.

Or at least that's certainly the way she presents herself. Sure, confident (read: arrogant), definitive, haughtily dismissive of any and all questions.

And wrong. A good bit of the time.

Either those who work in the election field in both parties are completely unable to grasp simple computers as well as the people here at DU, or they already know all of what we are saying and have factored it into their knowledge and believe we are wrong based on their better knowledge of the systems.

People here at DU grasp computers at all different levels -- from downright illiterate to hardened, veteran programmers, analysts and engineers of various types.

I can tell you as a non-technie myself, it's very easy to fall prey to the fancy footwork of faux explanations. Very. If you trust your source, you'll trust the information you're being given. These election officials have a built-in predisposition to trust:

* the vendors who are so very nice and helpful and have so many answers to their paper-based problems,

* the head of their professional organization (R. Doug Lewis),

* the organizations who support the disabled community (League of Women Voters, Common Cause, ACLU) but are themselves mis- or ill-informed about the threats of the machines,

* certifiers and certification procedures (cough, cough) about which they know NOTHING, and

* early adopters like Cathy Cox of Georgia who stays fairly busy talking up electronic voting.

* And oh yes, how could I forget: Georgia's own "nationally renown expert," Dr. Brit Williams.

Of COURSE they think they know the answers. They do -- they just don't happen to be the right answers to the right questions. And even if your expert is RIGHT about her machines, that doesn't answer for the other manufacturers.

There are just too many vulnerabilities with computerized voting. From certification procedures that cannot catch numerous obvious hacking vulnerabilities let alone malicious code (and doesn't even LOOK at non-COTS software or so much as whimper about Windows or Access), to shell games on the issues of modems, and the inability to prove fraud if and when it does take place.

Think about that again: There's no way to PROVE fraud should it occur. No one can legally look at the "proprietary, trade secret" code to find evidence; recounts are meaningless because with no paper ballot any machine recount is either a regurgitation of the results already coughed up or merely a reprint of the results already coughed up; and on Diebold mahcines, audit logs are pretty meaningless.

What's the situation in your state? Ask your expert: if a whistleblower came forward and said, "I know there was computerized vote tampering in the last election because I watched it happen," how could any defeated candidate get satisfaction? How could any wrongdoer be found leta lone punished? IS THERE ANY WAY TO GET PROOF beyond someone's testimony (which surely seems to little for a court of law)??

Eloriel

How is it that the "certifiers" missed all of those 236 (?) flaws that SAIC found?

What the hell does that say about the "certification" process and those who conduct it?

Ooooops!

and on edit:
Has that certifier been fired yet?

I think this is prime evidence that either:

1) The ITAs don't see the source code, in which case the certification is a lie.

2) The ITAs are as incompetent as Diebold in which case the certification is a sham.

David Allen
www.plan9.org

Diebold Voting Machines
We vote for you, so you don't have to!

1. They are appointed by Doug R. Lewis, star of the ITAA conference call.
2. Brit Williams plays a critical role in NASED and he is a proven liar, see Rob Georgia (Chapter 9.)
3. The ITAs themselves are constantly playing musical chairs with their owners but always have Shawn Southworth (an apparently neckless jock... not that that means anything) on board.
4. From what we know of the ITAs methodolgy through the Access Audit trail hack they are clearly incompetent.

All this adds up to in my view a conclusive case that the ITAs are being intentionally run in an incompetent fashion. No ifs no buts no maybes.