Conyers: An Intriguiging Story Under the Radar

An Intriguiging Story Under the Radar

The LA Times reported this weekend on an interview with the former head of French counterintelligence, Alain Chouet, in which he provides a revealing timeline for the Bush Administration's internest in the Niger yellowcake issue. For some reason this story has not received much attention. Alain Chouet was asked to verify the authenticity of the Niger documents which indicated that Iraq was seeking to buy uranium from the African country to build nuclear weapons. After a thorough investigation, he emphatically rejected them as forgeries and discredited any suggestion that Iraq was purchasing uranium in Niger. Most intriguiging is Chouet's claim that the U.S. was touting these forged documents before 9/11. Chouet's December 1st interview in the Italian newspaper, La Repubblica, offers a few more specifics than the L.A. Times piece and thanks to the Booman Tribune we have a translation:

“Early in the summer 2001, the CIA passed us a piece of information both general and alarming. ‘Iraq’ – Langley warned – ‘is apparently trying to purchase uranium from an African country’...

I rolled up my sleeves. I instructed my men to get to work in Africa. In Niger, obviously, but also in Namibia (you will soon understand why). The outcome was entirely negative...

Five of our best men were part of the team. With a deep knowledge of Niger and of all the issues connected to yellowcake. My men stayed in Africa for a couple of weeks and, once back, they told me a very simple thing: ‘the American information on uranium is all bulls--t’. When I read their report, I did not doubt their work nor, if you let me say so, my mind. I know Niger well but I can say that I have known Baghdad and Saddam even better. And I know that if Saddam had wanted to purchase yellowcake (which he already owned in great quantities) from Niger he would have never asked an Ambassador to open negotiations. Saddam did not trust anybody in his Foreign Office. He certainly didn’t trust his ambassadors around the world. For such a task he would have sent one of his sons. On the other hand, we knew the reason of the journey of Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See, Wissam Al Zahawie. He had to identify an African country ready to accept the storage of the regime’s hazardous toxic waste, in exchange for money. In fact Namibia, which had been used as a dumping ground by Iraq, had told Baghdad they couldn’t go on contaminating their soil. I told the CIA the results of our mission in Niger. The Americans seemed very disappointed for what they had to hear. I understood then the reasons for their frustration and I understood them even better when the CIA, not content with the result, at the end of June 2002, sent us a part of the documents of the Niger dossier, as if they wanted to underline the reasons for their insistence.

Chouet's account includes further insights on Italy's handling of the forgeries, and suggests that a lot more was known about the documents and their forgers than the U.S. and Italian intelligence agencies would like to reveal.



Blogged by JC on 12.13.05 @ 07:01 PM ET