Sen. Kit Bond R-Missouri on CSPAN2 (Presidential Power)

Does the court decision he mentioned actually have any relevance to the surveillance issue?

I did find this case:

The title of and excerpt from that U.S. Supreme Court case follows.
407 U.S. 297; UNITED STATES V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
UNITED STATES V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ET AL. (PLAMONDON ET AL., REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST)
NO. 70-153.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 1972
DECIDED JUNE 19, 1972
444 F.2D 651, AFFIRMED.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
THE UNITED STATES CHARGED THREE DEFENDANTS WITH CONSPIRING TO DESTROY, AND ONE OF THEM WITH DESTROYING, GOVERNMENT PROPERTY. IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' PRETRIAL MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION, THE GOVERNMENT FILED AN AFFIDAVIT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATING THAT HE HAD APPROVED THE WIRETAPS FOR THE PURPOSE OF "GATHERING) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEEMED NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE NATION FROM ATTEMPTS OF DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS TO ATTACK AND SUBVERT THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT." ON THE BASIS OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND SURVEILLANCE LOGS (FILED IN A SEALED EXHIBIT), THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED THAT THE SURVEILLANCES, THOUGH WARRANTLESS, WERE LAWFUL AS A REASONABLE EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THE DISTRICT COURT, HOLDING THE SURVEILLANCES VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, ISSUED AN ORDER FOR DISCLOSURE OF THE OVERHEARD CONVERSATIONS, WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD. TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT, WHICH AUTHORIZES COURT-APPROVED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR SPECIFIED CRIMES, CONTAINS A PROVISION IN 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) THAT NOTHING IN THAT LAW LIMITS THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO PROTECT AGAINST THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OR AGAINST "ANY OTHER CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO THE STRUCTURE OR EXISTENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT." THE GOVERNMENT RELIES ON SEC. 2511(3) IN SUPPORT OF ITS CONTENTION THAT "IN EXCEPTING NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCES FROM THE ACT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT, CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT SUCH SURVEILLANCES WITHOUT PRIOR JUDICIAL APPROVAL."
HELD:
1. SECTION 2511(3) IS MERELY A DISCLAIMER OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO DEFINE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS IN MATTERS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY, AND IS NOT A GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCES. PP. 301-308.
2. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (WHICH SHIELDS PRIVATE SPEECH FROM UNREASONABLE SURVEILLANCE) REQUIRES PRIOR JUDICIAL APPROVAL FOR THE TYPE OF DOMESTIC SECURITY SURVEILLANCE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. PP. 314 321; 323-324. SURVEILLANCE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. PP. 314-321; 323 324.

more...
http://www.democrats.com/node/7192

Olafr

Also, what other precautions were added to US law after the Nixon days? That would post-date that case, too.

Warrantless ''National Security'' Electronic Surveillance .--In Katz v. United States, 151 Justice White sought to preserve for a future case the possibility that in ''national security cases'' electronic surveillance upon the authorization of the President or the Attorney General could be permissible without prior judicial approval. The Executive Branch then asserted the power to wiretap and to ''bug'' in two types of national security situations, against domestic subversion and against foreign intelligence operations, first basing its authority on a theory of ''inherent'' presidential power and then in the Supreme Court withdrawing to the argument that such surveillance was a ''reasonable'' search and seizure and therefore valid under the Fourth Amendment. Unanimously, the Court held that at least in cases of domestic subversive investigations, compliance with the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment was required. 152 Whether or not a search was reasonable, wrote Justice Powell for the Court, was a question which derived much of its answer from the warrant clause; except in a few narrowly circumscribed classes of situations, only those searches conducted pursuant to warrants were reasonable. The Government's duty to preserve the national security did not override the gurarantee that before government could invade the privacy of its citizens it must present to a neutral magistrate evidence sufficient to support issuance of a warrant authorizing that invasion of privacy. 153 This protection was even more needed in ''national security cases'' than in cases of ''ordinary'' crime, the Justice continued, inasmuch as the tendency of government so often is to regard opponents of its policies as a threat and hence to tread in areas protected by the First Amendment as well as by the Fourth. 154 Rejected also was the argument that courts could not appreciate the intricacies of investigations in the area of national security nor preserve the secrecy which is required. 155  


The question of the scope of the President's constitutional powers, if any, remains judicially unsettled. 156 Congress has acted, however, providing for a special court to hear requests for warrants for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence situations, and permitting the President to authorize warrantless surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information provided that the communications to be monitored are exclusively between or among foreign powers and there is no substantial likelihood any ''United States person'' will be overheard. 157  

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment04/05.html

and this:

http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:HbIHVUgbIB0J:www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/0responses/2004-0232.resp.pdf+Halkin+v.+Helms,+690+F.2d+977+(D.C.+Cir.+1982)&hl=en&ie=UTF-8