Safe gaurd votes - check this out:

"Computer voting systems are coming, even though they are "not ready for prime time." The corporations that make them are keeping secret how the machines work, saying, "Trust us, nothing can go wrong." They don't even have a way to have a real recount should the machines crash or there be any other reason to think that something might have gone wrong. When Maryland election officials tested the machines, hackers were able to compromise the systems in a matter of minutes.

This is a rare example of a serious problem that has a simple remedy. The machines can be opened to election officials for monitoring, and each voter can check a printout of his or her vote to confirm it was entered correctly. Then the paper version can be collected and be available for routine audits and recounts if necessary. This creates a voter-verified paper trail."


www.truemajority.org/voting.cfm
www.verifiedvoting.org www.calvoter.org/votingtechnology.html#resources

...These voting machines are going to corrupt the whole voting system in November. Gas pumps give receipts, so can voting machines for god's sake.

...which is supposed to be anonymous. Creating forgery-resistant receipts would be too expensive.

Voting systems should have the voter physically fill-in marked ovals with a no. 2 pencil on a paper ballot, creating a traceable, physical record that is anonymous. These type of ballots are scanned by very simple electronic devices that do not require "software upgrades". Recounts can quickly be done electronically or by hand, without the entire populace having to queue up at the county clerks to have some ridiculous receipt looked at.

...but an independently auditable paper trail. The machine prints out a your voting choices in human and computer readable form (e.g. barcodes w/human readable text). You review the printed copy for accuracy, and stuff it in a box. Preliminary results are derived from the electronic tally from the voting machine.

However, prior to certification of the election results, some random selection of voting precincts count the printed copies manually, and compare to the computer tally. If they differ (perhaps by more than a small tolerance level, say 0.5%), count even more by hand. Also, if any candidate questions "suspicious" results for any precinct, they can be recounted manually, as well.

It's not so much the machines themselves, I can live with technological advances, and the desire for modern technology in our voting systems. What is necessary to ensure the integrity of an election is an *independent* means of recounting the ballots for accuracy, and the ability to audit the electronic results for the purposes of recounting.