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" The parents of the killers also suffered the loss of their children, and they felt that loss as deeply and keenly as the families of the murdered students. That's more than punishment enough. They didn't get the sympathy and concern that the other families got, even though they also suffered the loss of their children."
Generally speaking, the harm that one may have done to one's self in committing a crime is really not regarded as a "sentence" for committing that crime.
One drunk driver who hits another car head on may kill a family of four.
Another drunk driver who does the same thing may kill a family of four and also kill his/her own two children and spouse.
Should the second one not be punished for doing the same thing the first one did? Isn't that just a little contrary to the principle (flexible though it is) of similar sentences for similar crimes?
If the issue arises in a civil suit, as it seems to have done here, should the drunk driver not be liable for causing the deaths of the other family just because s/he managed to wipe his/her own family at the same time?
I don't actually know what crimes or negligence the parents in question are supposed to have committed. I gather that it has at least something to do with allowing children access to firearms.
If they're liable for the resulting damages, then they're liable. Their liability, and the quantum of damages -- the reparation that the other parties deserve and entitled to -- really can't be said to depend on whether their own children killed themselves or not.
That kind of "compassion" is what I was referring to a while ago when I said that it was appropriate to exercise compassion, and be lenient, when doing so did not endanger society -- i.e. it may be reasonable to exercise compassion for, and be lenient toward, a true "mercy killer", who is very unlikely to need punishment either to protect society or to "punish" or ensure remorse.
But where someone else's rights are in play, I can't go along with making compassion the governing principle. Leniency for one suffering party would simply mean hardship for the other, at least equally deserving (and in this case more deserving?), party.
That's not to say that money can cure that hardship. But that's how we attempt to do it in our societies, and no victim should be denied that relief just because the "offender" is sympathetic.
"They weren't the ones who planned the massacre and pulled the triggers, and if they'd had any idea of what was going to happen they would have done their best to stop it."
Maybe so. And maybe if the drunk driver had had any idea that s/he was going to wipe out a family of four that night, s/he really would have handed over the car keys and taken a taxi.
The operative principle is not hindsight, though. It is responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of one's actions.
I by no means think that parents are automatically or universally responsible for their children's actions; far from it. But if they actually had an opportunity to anticipate and prevent those actions and didn't take it, or if what they did facilitated those actions and that could have been foreseen, then I see liability.
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