Palestinians sue (Avi) Dichter in U.S. for millions of dollars

By Yuval Yoaz

Palestinians filed a civil suit against former Shin Bet security service chief Avi Dichter in a U.S. federal court yesterday, seeking millions of dollars in damages.

The plaintiffs are relatives of the 14 civilians who were killed when Israel assassinated senior Hamas operative Salah Shehadeh in July 2002.

The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court - Southern District of New York.

While Palestinians have previously filed suit in the United States against other Israeli security officials, Dichter, unlike the defendants in those cases, is currently in the U.S. As a result, the plaintiffs have been able to serve him with the papers, thereby enabling the court to hear the case.

More at;
Haaretz

'12 dead in attack on Hamas

Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem
Tuesday July 23, 2002
The Guardian

Israeli F-16 warplanes bombed the house of the military commander of Hamas in Gaza City last night, burying him and at least 11 other Palestinians, including seven children, beneath the rubble of a four-storey block of flats, and wounding 120 others.

Last night's assassination of Sheikh Salah Shehadeh is the most serious blow to the military wing of Hamas since the start of the Palestinian uprising nearly two years ago. Shehadeh was among the founders of Hamas's Izzedine al-Qassem Brigades, and spent a decade in Israeli jails.

More at;
Guardian Unlimited

If anyone deserves to win a case, it's the families of those who were killed in that bombing...


Violet...

By Yuval Shany

The civil suit filed in New York last Wednesday against Avi Dichter, the former head of the Shin Bet security service, demonstrates once again the very real possibility that Israeli soldiers and civilians could be sued in foreign countries due to their involvement in military actions taken during the current intifada. The arrest warrant issued against Major General Doron Almog in London last September was an example of the possibility of filing criminal charges against Israelis in a foreign country, whereas the suit against Dichter demonstrates the possibility that civil "intifada suits" could be filed abroad. Moreover, it would appear that the legislation passed in the Knesset in the past year, which gives the state broad immunity against "intifada suits" in Israel, significantly increases the chances of legal steps against Israeli soldiers and civilians being taken in foreign courts.

The suit against Dichter assigns him with personal and command-level responsibility for killing and injuring innocent Palestinian civilians during the targeted assassination of Salah Shehadeh, the head of the Hamas military wing in Gaza, in July 2002. The steps taken in the United States are based on American law that grants American courts "universal" authority regarding damages or physical injury caused as a result of the violation of international law, regardless of where the damage was caused. Many dozens of suits have been filed in the United States based on these laws.

American law, however, stipulates that the American courts can apply their authority only in cases in which the plaintiffs have no possibility of filing suits in the local courts of the country where the injury was caused. It is this backdrop that underscores the dubious practical wisdom behind the amendment to Israel's Civil Torts (Liability of the State) Law, which considerably broadened the immunity granted to the state against damage suits stemming from Israel Defense Forces actions in the territories, thereby retroactively denying the right of Palestinians to submit "intifada suits" related to damages caused them after September 2000. Consequently, denying the right to file suits in Israel's courts means that there is nothing to prevent the filing of corresponding damages suits in the United States.

Moreover, the writing regarding this legal development was on the wall. In a debate held in the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in June (before the amendment to the law was passed), Prof. Mordechai Kremnitzer of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem warned the committee: "I propose thinking very carefully before blocking the way to the these suits in Israeli courts ... There is a more realistic danger that we will find ourselves facing these suits in various courts in other countries, with far fewer defenses under far less favorable conditions ... No one will be able to defend this stupidity." The filing of the suit against Dichter in the United States illustrates very well the legal logic behind Kremnitzer's opposition to the broadening of state immunity (although it is possible that the wording of the law that preceded the amendment would also have prevented the filing of "intifada suits" in Israel due to clear-cut "war-like actions").

It would appear that the message coming now from New York is that in an age when the enforcement of international law, both on the civil and criminal level, has become a global matter, the state's eschewal of conducting a serious investigation into the complaints of suspicion of international crimes being committed by its citizens, and the denial of the right to file claims of damages by the victims of Israel's military actions, does not grant broad legal protection to its soldiers and citizens, as might have been assumed. On the contrary, broadening the state's immunity considerably increases the risk of having suits filed against Israeli soldiers and citizens in less friendly legal forums and under far harsher legal conditions. As a result, there is a serious likelihood that Almog and Dichter will not be the last Israelis to find themselves open to "intifada suits" abroad.

Dr. Yuval Shany is a senior lecturer in international law in the faculty of law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Link;
Haaretz

But I doubt any US court is going to give the plaintiffs a fair go. If it does, I'll gladly eat my words :)


Violet...

that is one of the reasons that our so-called leaders are constantly trying to "reform" them in one way of another.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions

(a) Signature.

Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of attorney or party.

(b) Representations to Court.

By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,--


(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

(c) Sanctions.

If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.


(1) How Initiated.


(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.

(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.


(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.


(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).

In which case they are awarded against the LAWYER


(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.


(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
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