|
Edited on Wed Jan-23-08 05:46 PM by The Magistrate
Having stumbled upon this discussion and having had my interest piqued by it.
When a thing is being described as backward or inferior, it can only be considered so relative to some other thing, and so it is well to establish what standard is being employed, since obviously, different standards will yield different results.
One of my favorite standards for human political and social arrangements is that of longevity and stability. By this standard, probably the supreme success in human history is Imperial China, which preserved a basic political structure over a span of some two thousand years, and a basic cultural stream for perhaps twice that length of time, in broadly recognizeable form. By this standard also, it is quite impossible yet to say whether the modern West is superior or inferior, as it simply has not lasted long enough for judging the question. The most generous estimate would give it perhaps six hundred years, during which it has displayed tremendous instability in its political and social arrangements.
Societies without much political structure beyond tribal allegiance gain very high marks for longevity, as the pattern is unquestionably the most ancient of forms, and wherever it is encountered in the present always stretches back into the most remote reaches of the past, but must be assigned very low marks for stability in terms of the day by day security of its constituents. This instability, however, is an essential element of such a society's longevity, as it is the constant jostling of its diminutive political units that maintains the stability of the cultural and social whole containing these units. Unlike the instability displayed by the modern West, which has altered out of all recognition political and social and even moral arrangements of its society over the course of its run to date, the instabilities within a cultural and social whole with political organization based on tribal identities act to conserve its original practices and mores, and pass these down the years with very little change.
A society with a strong centralized political organization is far more susceptible to change than a society without such arrangements. While such a society can marshal great resources to resist change, should that be the will of its ruler, should the ruler's will be otherwise, those resources can as easily be marshaled to compel change. Such a society is also vulnerable to capture entire as a unit, if an invader or rebel can manage to take over its central institutions more or less intact, and wield them to its own desires, the Manchu 'conquest' of China, and the earlier rebellion establishing the Ming dynasty, being perfect examples.
A society that lacks strong centralized political institutions can never be changed by a word, since no one is in position to give such a word, or can be, unless he or she has succeeded in so impressing the whole of the society, by whatever means, as to compel the personal allegiance and obedience of all its variegated chieftains. In such instances, the unity concentrated in the person of such a leader seldom survives that leader's death, since there will have not been time in the span of a single life to create either the habit of obedience to a central authority, or the politicaL structures to compel it. Two perfect examples of this are Genghis Khan of the Mongols and Mohammed of the Arabs. Each managed to weld a tribal society into a political unit loyal to his person, and in each case after his death this political unit dissolved into the original fractionated state in a short space of time.
Foreign conquest of such a society differs little from the rise of a unifier within it. Both will be accomplished in detail, tribal unit by tribal unit; both will exploit existing fractures between tribal units, and take on the aspect of civil war accordingly; both will benefit greatly by some awe-inspiring element in the rising power, whether it is some decisive advantage of military skill or organization or tools, or personal charisma, or ideology. The consolidation phase will usually differ, of course. The foreign conqueror will exploit success in a different manner, and probably encounter more residual resistance, but even here, both foreign conqueror and internal unifier will raise a favored strata composed of their earliest and staunchest allies, and break to dust their longest and staunchest opponents. The favored strata raised by the conqueror will be his administrators and hostages for profit from and good behavior in their districts; the favored strata raised by the internal unifier will share the profits and constitute the leading factions that will fall to quarreling on the death of the leader and destroy what political unity he or she managed to impose while alive. The foreign conqueror will have no particular desire to alter the subjugated people's social arrangements, wanting only a steady revenue stream from them; the internal unifier will be unable to bring about a great deal of permanent change in their social arrangements, even if this is what he or she desires.
Mohammed certainly wrought a permanent alteration in one element of the social arrangement of the Arabs, namely their religious arrangements, but on reflection there is less to this than meets the eye. The substitution of Christianity for the 'civic religion' of Rome, for example, did not alter much about the character of the Empire, beyond what body of clerics wielded sacred authority. It remained an engine for extracting gold and silver from whomever it could, organized in an exploitative pyramid, with established structures of central authority, and maintained by military force. Even the hysterical focus on chastity that marked the latter stages of Christian consolidation there had deep roots in earlier philosophic attitudes towards a dichotomy between spirit and matter, and represents no really new development. Similarly, Islam did not greatly change the structure of Arab society; it simply sanctified the usual practices of the tribal culture, with some small nudges towards an idealized formulation of them in a few fields.
With the passage of time, it seems clear that this had had the effect increasing the resistance of this basically tribal society to change. When a current cultural arrangement becomes invested with sacredness, it gains a much firmer lease on life. Examples can be found in some Christian sects such as the Amish. These people have essentially invested with sacredness the normal routines of life at the time of their forming. Thus, employing an internal combustion engine rather than a team of horses to pull a plow becomes not a practical matter of costs and times and areas and yields, but a religious question of whether or not the new device has sanction from the deity, to which the sect returns the answer, 'No, it does not.' Therefore those born into this sect continue to plow fields with horses, and the man who purchases a tractor is an apostate, a heretic, doing an ungodly thing. No innovation to which the divines of the sect cannot answer 'Yes' when asked if the thing has sanction from the deity may be employed. There may be quarrels over this answer; the sect may split into sub-sects, some of which flourish and some of which do not, but the basic question and answer remains determinative, and the rate of change and innovation is slowed relative to groups that do not have to ask and answer that particular question at all.
Generally, nowadays and here, it is the standards of the modern West by which another social and cultural pattern is adjudged to be backward or inferior, though of course people seldom bother to state so. The standards by which these judgements are made are generally these: first, does the culture employ Western notions of political organization and social arrangements, namely state authority, and assigning great worth to individual conscience and expression and liberty; and second, does the culture place a high value on innovation, whether technical and social and individual, and is it, if it has not developed such innovations as has the West in recent centuries itself, quick to adopt these when they are encountered, and make them their own. Thus, for instance, in the early twentieth century, in the West, Japan was regarded as not nearly so backwards as China, since it met much better at least some of these tests. Nowadays, of course, no one really regards China as backwards in any signifigant sense. No society, however, which still preserves major elements of tribal structure in its arrangements will ever pass muster by these standards, particularly not when these social elements are invested with a quality of sacredness that increases resistance to changing them on purely practical grounds.
|