Theodore Meron, the Israeli Foreign Ministry legal adviser notified the Israeli government of these fact way back in September of 1967:

"The declaration by Theodor Meron, the Israeli Foreign Ministry's legal adviser at the time and today one of the world's leading international jurists, is a serious blow to Israel's persistent argument that the settlements do not violate international law, particularly as Israel prepares to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the war in June 1967.

The legal opinion, a copy of which has been obtained by The Independent, was marked "Top Secret" and "Extremely Urgent" and reached the unequivocal conclusion, in the words of its author's summary, "that civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention."

Judge Meron, president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia until 2005, said that, after 40 years of Jewish settlement growth in the West Bank - one of the main problems to be solved in any peace deal: " I believe that I would have given the same opinion today."

Judge Meron, a holocaust survivor, also sheds new light on the aftermath of the 1967 war by disclosing that the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, was " sympathetic" to his view that civilian settlement would directly conflict with the Hague and Geneva conventions governing the conduct of occupying powers"

The declaration by Theodor Meron, the Israeli Foreign Ministry's legal adviser at the time and today one of the world's leading international jurists, is a serious blow to Israel's persistent argument that the settlements do not violate international law, particularly as Israel prepares to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the war in June 1967.

The legal opinion, a copy of which has been obtained by The Independent, was marked "Top Secret" and "Extremely Urgent" and reached the unequivocal conclusion, in the words of its author's summary, "that civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention."

Judge Meron, president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia until 2005, said that, after 40 years of Jewish settlement growth in the West Bank - one of the main problems to be solved in any peace deal: " I believe that I would have given the same opinion today."

Judge Meron, a holocaust survivor, also sheds new light on the aftermath of the 1967 war by disclosing that the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, was " sympathetic" to his view that civilian settlement would directly conflict with the Hague and Geneva conventions governing the conduct of occupying powers"

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/secret-memo-shows-israel-knew-six-day-war-was-illegal-450410.html

Meron Benvenisti - former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem

And there's a fourth model, which can be called "undeclared binationalism." It's a unitary state controlled by one dominant national group, which leaves the other national group disenfranchised and subject to laws "for natives only," which for the purposes of respectability and international law are known as laws of "belligerent occupation." The convenience of this model of binationalism is that it can be applied over a long period of time, meanwhile debating the threat of the "one state" and the advantages of the "two states," without doing a thing. That's the situation nowadays. But the process is apparently inevitable. Israel and the Palestinians are sinking together into the mud of the "one state." The question is no longer whether it will be binational, but which model to choose ".

link to full article:

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=363062&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y

There are approximately 450,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, (*now closer to 500,000) including East Jerusalem. According to B'tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights, " the built-up area of the settlements in the West Bank covers 1.7 percent of the West Bank, the settlements control 41.9 percent of the entire West Bank".* http://www.btselem.org/English/Maps/Index.asp

As appears from the map, while the built-up area of the settlements in the West Bank covers 1.7 percent of the West Bank, the settlements control 41.9 percent of the entire West Bank.

full PDF map: http://www.btselem.org/Download/Settlements_Map_Eng.pdf

LAND GRAB:

Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank

link to full report:

http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.doc

Introduction


In December 2001, a long article appeared in Ha’aretz under the headline “Five Minutes from Kfar Saba – A Look at the Ari’el Region.” The article reviewed the real estate situation in a number of “communities” adjacent to the Trans-Samaria Highway in the vicinity of Ari’el. The article included the information that most of the land on which these “communities” were established are “state-owned land,” and that “despite the security problems and the depressed state of the real estate market, the situation in these locales is not as bad as might be expected.”

The perspective from which this article was written (the real estate market) and the terminology it employs largely reflect the process of the assimilation of the settlements into the State of Israel. As a result of this process, these settlements have become just another region of the State of Israel, where houses and apartments are constructed and offered to the general public according to free-market principles of supply and demand.

This deliberate and systematic process of assimilation obscures a number of fundamental truths about the settlements: the “communities” mentioned in the article are not part of the State of Israel, but are settlements established in the West Bank − an area that has been occupied territory since 1967. The fundamental truth is that the movement of Israeli citizens to houses and apartments offered by the real estate markets in these “communities” constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The fundamental truth is that the “state-owned” land mentioned in the article was seized from Palestinian residents by illegal and unfair proceedings. The fundamental truth is that the settlements have been a continuing source of violations of the human rights of the Palestinians, among them the right to freedom of movement, property, self-determination, and improvement in their standard of living. The fundamental truth is that the growth of these settlements is fueled not only by neutral forces of supply and demand, but primarily by a sophisticated governmental system designed to encourage Israeli citizens to live in the settlements. In essence, the process of assimilation blurs the fact that the settlement enterprise in the Occupied Territories has created a system of legally sanctioned separation based on discrimination that has, perhaps, no parallel anywhere in the world since the dismantling of the Apartheid regime in South Africa.

As part of the mechanism used to obscure these fundamental truths, the State of Israel makes a determined effort to conceal information relating to the settlements. In order to prepare this report, B’Tselem was obliged to engage in a protracted and exhaustive struggle with the Civil Administration to obtain maps marking the municipal boundaries of the settlements. This information, which is readily available in the case of local authorities within Israel, was eventually partially provided almost one year after the initial request, and only after B’Tselem threatened legal action.
The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians did not lead to the evacuation of even one settlement, and the settlements even grew substantially in area and population during this period. While at the end of 1993 (at the time of the signing of the Declaration of Principles) the population of the settlements in the West Bank (including settlements in East Jerusalem) totaled some 247,000, by the end of 2001 this figure had risen to 375,000.

The agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority entailed the transfer of certain powers to the PA; these powers apply in dozens of disconnected enclaves containing the majority of the Palestinian population. Since 2000, these enclaves, referred to as Areas A and B, have accounted for approximately forty percent of the area of the West Bank. Control of the remaining areas, including the roads providing transit between the enclaves, as well as points of departure from the West Bank, remains with Israel.

This report, which is the continuation of several reports published by B’Tselem in recent years, examines a number of aspects relating to Israeli policy toward the settlements in the West Bank and to the results of this policy in terms of human rights and international law. The report also relates to settlements in East Jerusalem that Israel established and officially annexed into Israel. Under international law, these areas are occupied territory whose status is the same as the rest of the West Bank.

This report does not relate to the settlements in the Gaza Strip. Though similar in many ways to their counterparts in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip settlements differ in several respects. For example, the legal framework in the Gaza Strip differs from that applying in the West Bank in various fields, including land laws; these differences are due to the different laws that were in effect in these areas prior to 1967.

This report comprises eight chapters.

• Chapter One presents a number of basic concepts on the principal plans implemented by the Israeli governments, the bureaucratic process of establishing new settlements, and the types of settlements.
• Chapter Two examines the status of the settlements and settlers according to international law and briefly surveys the violations of Palestinian human rights resulting from the establishment of the settlements.
• Chapter Three discusses the bureaucratic and legal apparatus used by Israel to seize control of land in the West Bank for the establishment and expansion of settlements. The chief component of this apparatus, and the main focus of the chapter, is the process of declaring and registering land as “state land.”
• Chapter Four reviews the changes in Israeli law that were adopted to annex the settlements into the State of Israel by turning them civilian enclaves within the occupied territory. This chapter also examines the structure of local government in the settlements in the context of municipal boundaries.
• Chapter Five examines the economic incentives Israel provides to settlers and settlements to encourage Israelis to move to the West Bank and to encourage those already living in the region to remain there.
• Chapter Six analyzes the planning mechanism in the West Bank applied by the Civil Administration, which is responsible for issuing building permits both in the settlements and in Palestinian communities. This mechanism plays a decisive role in the establishment and expansion of the settlements, and in limiting the development of Palestinian communities.
• Chapter Seven analyzes the map of the West Bank attached to this report. This analysis examines the layout of the settlements by area, noting some of the negative ramifications the settlements have on the human rights of the Palestinian population.
• Chapter Eight focuses in depth on the Ari’el settlement and the ramifications of its establishment on the adjacent Palestinian communities. This chapter also discusses the expected consequences of Ari’el’s expansion according to the current outline plan. "

link to full report:

http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.doc

A bit of context may be called for, as this matter, like most, is barely understood by most observers while being widely cited. In order for a law to be legislated in Israel, it must pass three readings, three seperate votes, in the Knesset. If it's initiatied by the government, it fmust irst pass a ministerial committee even before the first reading. After the first reading it goes to a parliamentary committee (or three), which can eviscerate it, change it to mean something else, block it indefinately, or forget it forever - or, occasionally, pass it back to the full Knesset for legislation. If legislation is not supported by the government, it can nonetheless be submitted by an individual MK or 30 of them, but in that case it must pass four readings: a preliminary one, a committee, and then the mandatory three readings.

And all this is merely the outline. Bismarck famously quiped that there are two things one can enjoy upon completion but should never observe in the making: sausage and legislation; this is as true for Israel as anywhere. It just so happens that some of my best friends are lobbyists, and damn good ones, too, and I've watched many of the shticks from close up. Getting a law passed in Israel requires either the bulldozer of the Finance Ministry on your side, or lots of talent and experience.

So whenever some populistic politician moots some idiotic idea for an outlandish law, the fact that it passes the first of four readings is almost meaningless. It's an act of futile grandstanding. 100% of the legislators involved know the chance of the law ever being enacted are slim to non-existent, depending on how idiotic it is. But no matter.The point is to appear to be trying, to score brownie points for intentions. Since the system won't ever let it happen, there's nothing to lose but lots to gain: if you're behind the law, you'll be interviewed by lots of media outlets and your constituents will see you. If you're scandalized by the law, you'll be interviewed by lots of media outlets and your constituents will see you. If you're a media type, you'll have lots of fun footage of passionate politcians talking through their hats, you'll be able to report breathlessly on the dramatic events, and your ratings will rise. If you're an NGO who lives off donations from foreign folks, you'll be able earnestly to tell them of your heroic efforts to fight the good fight; some NGOs work harder at putting out English-language press-releases than at Hebrew ones, since the Hebrew ones are pointless but the English ones go into dramatic files for donors.

Sooner or later the law will reach some adults who bear real responsibility, and they'll shoot it down. The Loyalty Law, for example, was apparently voted down in something like 30 seconds, with no discussion: Yaacov Neeman, Minister of Justice, going through the meeting's agenda, reached this line and curtly noted that there'd be no discussion, merely a vote, who's for who's against, the majority's against, the law's rejected next item.

And note who did the voting: government ministers, not the Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI). Cabinet members from Likud, Shas, haBayit haYehudi, and of course Labor - the first three solidly on the Right. These people aren't idiots. They recognize a destructive and imbecillic law when they see one, and dispose of it with no qualms.

All of which leaves the question, why try in the first place if everyone knows it won't happen? Why give the Guardian and the Juan Coles of this world unnesseccary grist for their mills? A fine subject for a different post, someday. Though I will note that no matter how childish the politicians-media-NGO activists are, the foreign reporters who eagerly take only part of the story and use it to damn Israel shouldn't be exonerated. They could tell the same story I've just told you, but scrupulously won't, ever.