The Great Satan

To have a good foreign policy, one needs good assumptions about the world. When it comes to the Middle East, those at the policymaking level of the Bush administration seem to have strong views about the region, but they have precious little grasp of its politics, history and culture. For example, throughout 2002 and early 2003, the American public was told that Iraqis would celebrate with U.S. soldiers in the streets of Baghdad when Saddam Hussein fell and that the Iraqi people would assist in a relatively smooth rebuilding of the country. There were, of course, stirring images of U.S. Marines helping Baghdadis pull down the statues of Saddam in Firdous Square on April 8, 2003, but there were no large-scale celebrations. Not because Iraqis were unhappy to see Saddam go but because of their manifest mistrust of the United States. Why would anyone expect Shiites to celebrate and assist the United States after the first Bush administration abandoned them to Saddam in the spring of 1991? Was it realistic to believe that the Sunni population -- a minority that prospered in Iraq under Saddam -- would help the United States raze the very institutions that had privileged this group since the founding of modern Iraq

Historical perspective was severely lacking in the policy process. If the administration had considered Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, some of the overly optimistic assumptions about Iraq might have given way to cogent analysis. In the summer of 1982, then Minister of Defense Sharon sought regime change in Lebanon. Upon their entry to Shiite west Beirut, Israeli soldiers were welcomed with rose petals and candy. Yet this enthusiastic welcome turned to hostility as Israel's Lebanese Christian Phalange allies proved unable to generate the requisite legitimacy among Lebanon's sectarian and political factions to effectively rule the country. Subsequently, the Israelis became entangled in Lebanon's complex politics, and the Israeli Defense Force's occupation of Beirut and southern Lebanon became brutal. Sound familiar?

Not only is the current administration seemingly unable to draw the appropriate lessons from its closest regional ally's own disastrous experience with regime change, but the Bush team has also been unwilling to consider the counsel of experts and allies. As a result, Washington seems to believe that a sheer demonstration of strength will bring the Arabs along. It has not happened, and it is not likely to happen. Egyptian, Qatari, Bahraini, Jordanian and Saudi officials all flatly refuse to even consider sending forces to Iraq to assist the United States. As one Egyptian official said, "We understand the complexities of Iraq, but the Bush administration refused to listen to us. Under no circumstances will the government send Egyptian forces to Iraq."


To be sure, past Arab advice has been cynical and self-serving, but in the months preceding the war Washington's Arab allies actually had fairly good advice for the administration. For the most part, our Arab allies counseled Washington not to go to war because Saddam was a paper tiger, but if there was going to be war, the United States should do everything possible to make its occupation short. Toward that end, the Iraqi military -- save the Republican Guards and special Republican Guards -- should be left intact not so much to help U.S. troops but as an "employment program." In addition, Baathist functionaries, not hardcore party members, are an important resource, with expertise to offer in administering the country. Finally, Washington must do everything possible to prevent the centrifugal forces of Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite politics from pulling the country apart.

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/05/07/arab/index1.html