The Commission by Philip Shenon

Release date: February 5th.

I haven't found much detail about his book. I can't imagine it will be as candid as the Kean/Hamilton tell all.

:hi:

http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:XT_V09_P7nAJ:www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp%3Fentity%3Dphilip_shenon+Philip+Shenon&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us

Profile: Philip Shenon
Philip Shenon was a participant or observer in the following events:

December 3-14, 2001: Bush Administration Officials Tip Off Reporters About Raids on Suspect Charities On December 3, 2001, New York Times reporter Judith Miller telephones officials with the Holy Land Foundation charity in Texas and asks them to comment about what she says is a government raid on the charity planned for the next day. Then in a December 4, 2001, New York Times article, Miller writes that President Bush is about to announce that the US is freezing the assets of Holy Land and two other financial groups, all for supporting Hamas. US officials will later argue that Miller’s phone call and article “increased the likelihood that the foundation destroyed or hid records before a hastily organized raid by agents that day.” Later in the month, a similar incident occurs. On December 13, New York Times reporter Philip Shenon telephones officials at the Global Relief Foundation in Illinois and asks them to comment about an imminent government crackdown on that charity. The FBI learns that some Global Relief employees may be destroying documents. US attorney Patrick Fitzgerald had been investigating the charities. He had been wiretapping Global Relief and another charity in hopes of learning evidence of criminal activity, but after the leak he changes plans and carries out a hastily arranged raid on the charity the next day (see December 14, 2001). Fitzgerald later seeks records from the New York Times to find out who in the Bush administration leaked information about the upcoming raids to Miller and Shenon. However, in 2005 Fitzgerald will lose the case. It is still not known who leaked the information to the New York Times nor what their motives were. Ironically, Fitzgerald will succeed in forcing Miller to reveal information about her sources in another extremely similar legal case in 2005 involving the leaking of the name of CIA agent Valerie Plame. The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that in addition to the above cases, “press leaks plagued almost every that took place in the United States” after 9/11.
Entity Tags: Philip Shenon, Patrick Fitzgerald, Judith Miller, Hamas, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, Federal Bureau of Investigation, George W. Bush, Global Relief Foundation, Bush administration
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline


December 14, 2001: Two US-Based Charities Are Shut Down for Links to Al-Qaeda and Other Militant Groups US intelligence had been investigating the US-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) long before 9/11 for links to al-Qaeda and other radical militant groups (see 1997-Late Spring 2001 and March 2000).The plan is to shut down a number of GRF’s overseas offices while continuing to monitor the GRF’s main office in Illinois and see how that office reacts to the overseas shutdowns. But on December 13, 2001, New York Times reporter Philip Shenon calls the Illinois office one day before the planned raids and asks them to comment about an imminent crack down on the charity (see December 3-14, 2001). The FBI quickly decides that the GRF is destroying documents after the tip-off, and they hastily arrange a raid on the Illinois office and the overseas offices the next day. Since the GRF and the Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) are considered to be closely linked, the BIF US office is raided and shut down at the same time, and the houses of GRF executive director Mohammad Chehade and BIF executive director Enaam Arnaout are searched. GRF fund-raiser Rabih Haddad is detained on the basis of overstaying a visa while Arnaout remains free in the US. <9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 98-100 > October 18, 2002, the Treasury Department will officially designate GRF a terrorism financier. It will do the same to BIF on November 19, 2002. The UN also soon lists both groups as linked to al-Qaeda. <9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 98-100 > Haddad will be imprisoned for 19 months and then deported for the immigration violation.
Entity Tags: Global Relief Foundation, Al-Qaeda, Benevolence International Foundation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Rabih Haddad, Enaam Arnaout, Mohammad Chehade, Philip Shenon
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

"It is still not known who leaked the information to the New York Times nor what their motives were. "

I find this troubling. If these two Times people got a leak from the government (as opposed to discovering some document or other form of investigative reporting) then the reporters were agents
of the government and they were not covered by the first amendment and other protections. I remember
the DC area raid that wasn't thanks to Miller. That was outrageous.

I can hardly wait to hear what this guy has to say (not).

Typically scribe to power, posing forgettable questions in a self-important tone. I can imagine the pretend controversies he'll come up with. Figure it's 50-50 he'll even mention that Cleland resigned and declared the Commission to be a whitewash and a scam.

Perfect. MSM reporters don't have to do real interviews. They just do a "virtual" give and take making up quotes as they go along. What a deal!

Modified limited hangout of a Limited Hangout?

Something about CIA scrivener Max Holland pushing this establishment story does not pass the smell test.

These clowns suck as much oxygen as they can out of every room giving the impression that the issues is actually being addressed. Wonder if he'll interview the engineers and architects;)

Brrr... suggestions!

http://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2008/01/commission-conf.html

• The full extent of Zelikow’s involvement with the incumbent administration administration only became evident within the commission on October 8, 2003, almost halfway into the panel’s term. Determined to blunt the Jersey Girls’ call for his resignation or recusal, Zelikow proposed that he be questioned under oath about his activities. General counsel Daniel Marcus, who conducted the sworn interview, brought a copy of the résumé Zelikow had provided to Kean and Hamilton. None of the activities Zelikow now detailed—his role on Rice’s transition team, his instrumental role in Clarke’s demotion, his authorship of a post-9/11 pre-emptive attack doctrine—were mentioned in the résumé. Zelikow blandly asserted to Marcus that he did not see “any of this as a major conflict of interest.” Marcus’s conclusion was that Zelikow “should never have been hired” as executive director. But the only upshot from these shocking disclosures was that Zelikow was involuntarily recused from that part of the investigation which involved the presidential transition, and barred from participating in subsequent interviews of senior Bush administration officials.

• Some two months later, as Bob Kerrey replaced disgruntled ex-Senator Max Cleland on the panel, the former Nebraska senator became astounded once he understood Zelikow’s obvious conflicts-of-interest and his very limited recusal. Kerrey could not understand how Kean and Hamilton had ever agreed to put Zelikow in charge. “Look Tom,” Kerrey told Kean, “either he goes or I go.” But Kean persuaded Kerrey to drop his ultimatum.

• In late 2003, around the time his involuntary recusal was imposed, Zelikow called executive secretary Karen Heitkotter into his office and ordered her to stop creating records of his incoming telephone calls. Concerned that the order was improper, a nervous Heitkotter soon told general counsel Marcus. He advised her to ignore Zelikow’s order and continue to keep a log of his telephone calls, insofar as she knew about them.

• Although Shenon could not obtain from the GAO an unredacted record of Zelikow’s cell phone use—and Zelikow used his cell phone for most of his outgoing calls—the Times reporter was able to establish that Zelikow made numerous calls to “456” numbers in the 202 area code, which is the exclusive prefix of the White House.

• Even after his recusal, Zelikow continued to insert himself into the work of “Team 3,” the task force responsible for the most politically-sensitive part of the investigation, counter-terrorism policy. This brief encompassed the White House, which meant investigating the conduct of Condoleeza Rice and Richard Clarke during the months prior to 9/11. Team 3 staffers would come to believe that Zelikow prevented them from submitting a report that would have depicted Rice’s performance as “amount to incompetence, or something not far from it.”

In Without Precedent, Kean and Hamilton’s 2006 account of the 9/11 panel, the two co-chairmen wrote that Zelikow was a controversial choice

. . . we had full confidence in Zelikow’s independence and ability—and frankly, we wanted somebody who was unafraid to roil the waters from time to time. He recused himself from anything involving his work on the NSC transition. He made clear his determination to conduct an aggressive investigation. And he was above all a historian dedicated to a full airing of the facts. It was clear from people who knew and worked with him that Zelikow would not lead a staff inquiry that did anything less than uncover the most detailed and accurate history of 9/11.

Shenon’s radically different account of the commission’s inner workings promises to achieve what none of the crackpot conspiracy theorists have managed to do so far: put the 9/11 Commission in disrepute.

Zelikow has already responded to the allegations:









Link to complete story


Though Zelikow implies his work on the 9/11 Commission made him persona non grata in the Bush administration, his employment record suggests otherwise:

"He who doth protesteth too much".

Thanks for this thread, noise.

He would have the public believe that there is nothing suspicious about Zelikows's OUTRAGEOUS conflicts of interest and evident communication with Rove. One would almost think Isikoff doesn't give a shit about the truth.

Michael Isikoff was at the 9/11 Commission public hearings on April 13-14, 2004, I know because I was there and saw him there. Here is but a small part of Tenet's testimony that Isikoff heard on April 14, 2004.

When Tenet was asked at the April 14, 2004 public 9/11 Commission hearings, why no one at the CIA responded to the cable that said Nawaf al-Hazmi had entered the US on January 15, 2000, Tenet said no one at the CIA had read this cable. But we now know , from the CIA IG report, at least 50-60 people at the CIA had read this cable.

When Tenet was asked by 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer, why if he knew a huge attack was going to take place inside of the US in August 2001 that would kill thousands of Americans, what did he tell the President about this attack? It would seem that this horrific information would have been given immediately to the President of the US. After all he has told America on numerous occasions that his most important responsibility is to protect the American people, and surely CIA Director Tenet would have been aware that this was "the President's most important responsibility".

But Tenet said he had not talked to the President at all in August 2001, when he knew thousands on Americans were just about to be killed in a horrific al Qaeda attack inside of the US. He said he was in Washington and the President was in Crawford, Texas in August, and that was the reason he had not talked to the President in August 2001.

But when asked why he did not use the telephone and call the President and tell him this horrific information Tenet said he had not called the President on the telephone but could not explanation this any farther.

But Bill Harlow, spokesman for the CIA said right after Tenet's testimony that Tenet had lied to the 9/11 Commission, in fact to the 9/11 Commission several times. Harlow said that Tenet had talked to the President in August, when he flew down to Crawford on August 17, 2001 and in Washington on August 30, 2001. We also now know Tenet flew down to Crawford on August 24, 2001 just after he was told Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US and that Moussaoui an al Qaeda terrorists who had been arrested trying to take flying lessons on a Boeing 747 with no prior flight experience.

But we now know that Tenet had found out on August 23, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, and he clearly knew at that point that these two long time al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US in order to take part in the huge al Qaeda attack the CIA was aware of, an al Qaeda attack that he claimed he never told the President about!

But it had to have been on Tenet's orders in July that Tom Wilshire, former deputy chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit, was denied twice from turning the information the CIA had on the meeting in Kuala Lumpur and the names of the people who had attended this meeting, Mihdhar, Hazmi, and Khallad to the FBI criminal investigators in July 2001. Wilshire was denied permission to turn this information over to the FBI on July 13 and on July 23, 2001, even after Wilshire had stated in in his July 23, 2001 email that Mihdhar and by association Hazmi would be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda operation .

When Tenet was asked why he did not bring up this horrific information at the September 4, 2001 Principles meeting in the White House, the very first Principles meeting on the al Qaeda terrorists held by the Bush administration, that thousands of Americans were just about to be killed in a huge al Qaeda attack in the US, he said, "For what ever reason it was just not appropriate" and he could just not take this explanation any further than that.

But now we know that Isikoff was at the hearing where CIA Director George Tenet lied to the 9/11 Commission. But it is far worse than even this. The following information I don't believe was ever reported in the 9/11 Commission report or in any account of Tenet's testimony.

After CIA Director George Tenet said he had not talked to the President in August, in fact said this numerous times, he said in a very loud voice, just to make sure he had not talked to the President in August, he was going to re-check his records, and get back to the 9/11 Commission.

I was sitting directly behind Tenet, just behind the two rows reserved for the relatives killed on 9/11. When Tenet said that he was going to re-check his records to see if he had talked to the President in August, the people in these rows looked at each other in total and utter disbelief. How was it possible in fact even remotely possible that the Director of the CA could not remember if he had talked to the President of the United States in August 2001, just before the attacks on 9/11. Everyone in those rows and in fact the entire room knew at that point that Tenet was lying through his teeth and knew that there was a high probability that anything Tenet said in his testimony to the 9/11 Commissioners was most likely nothing but more bold face lies!

After Harlow confirmed that Tenet had been lying even Newsweek reporter Isikoff knew that Tenet had been lying to the 9/11 Commission and to the American people.

So what did Michael Isikoff, the hot-shot reporter for Newsweek, do with this horrific information?

NOTHING AS FAR AS I COULD TELL!

Michael Isikoff heard this horrific testimony and then did nothing with it.

While some of the other reporters did put this in their newspapers it generally ended up in the back pages and was very hard to find.

This obvious and blatant covering up out right perjury in front of the 9/11 Commission by the Director of the CIA by Newsweek's reporter, Isikoff, probably says more that anything I could ever say on the massively corrupt state of journalism in America's main stream media.

But this testimony had been about why 3000 people had been brutally and horrifically murdered by the al Qaeda terrorists on 9/11 and why no one at the CIA or Bush administration did anything to prevent these attacks. At this point it is now clear that main stream media has been culpable in deliberately hiding the real reasons the attacks on 9/11 were allowed to take place, and this fact is now all too obvious.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=125&topic_id=190636&mesg_id=193538">noise quotes a Newsweek article, http://www.newsweek.com/id/107492">Enough Blame for All by Michael Isikoff, Feb 1, 2008, as saying:



If indeed this particular email is genuine, it implies that Clarke did not have specific foreknowledge of 9/11. He was worried about an attack that would kill "hundreds," not thousands, of Americans "in several countries," not just the U.S.

Of course, I still think there's plenty of reason to suspect that other people in various parts of the government, e.g. in the CIA, would likely have known considerably more.

Remember Clarke had been in attendance with Rice at the July 10, 2001 emergency meeting in the White House where CIA Director George Tenet and CTC Manger Cofer Black had stated that the al Qaeda terrorists were just about to mount a horrific attack inside of the US that would causes mass casualties.

When this information was given to Ashcroft and Rumsfeld a week later, it was so specific that Ashcroft immediately stopped flying commercial aircraft and flew only on private jets for the remained of his term for all official AJ business.

Clarke had been reduced to whimpering questions to Rice, your quote, "imagine how they would feel after a tragedy where "hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the U.S.," adding that "that future day could happen at any time." " was I believe an email to Rice by Clarke just before the first Principles meeting in the White House on September 4, 2001 on the al Qaeda terrorists.

This is the meeting where Tenet had stated in the April 14, 2004 9/11 Commission hearings to a question by commissioner Tim Roemer, that "it was just not appropriate" to bring up the fact at that meeting that thousands of Americans were just about to be killed in a huge al Qaeda attack that was to take place inside of the US.

It seems strange that this was inappropriate when such a large number of people were about to be killed at the hands of the al Qaeda terrorists and this was in fact the very first Principles meeting held by the Bush administration on the al Qaeda terrorists. It would seem to me that it would have been perfectly appropriate to bring this up and then figure out how to stop this impending al Qaeda attack, but what do I know? After all the CIA knew by this time that Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, both known to be long time al Qaeda terrorists were already inside of the US preparing for this attack huge al Qaeda attack that the CIA had received numerous warnings about. Tenet had been told that these terrorists would be part of the next big al Qaeda attack in email in July 2001, by Tom Wilshire, former deputy chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit, when Tenet had denied Wilshire permission to transfer this information to the FBI.

Tenet clearly knew who Wilshire was, because it would have to have been Tenet who had moved Wilshire from the CIA Bin Laden unit to be liaison for the FBI ITOS unit in mid-May 2001, in order for Wilshire to find out what the FBI criminal investigators knew about the Kuala Lumpur meeting, and if they had uncovered any of the information that the CIA had been keeping secret from the FBI since early in January 2000.

Oddly enough we now know that at least 5 people at that Principles meeting on September 4, 2001 knew about this attack and knew that large numbers of Americans would be killed by the al Qaeda terrorists in this attack, Clarke, Rice Rumsfeld, Ashcroft and Tenet.

GO FIGURE!

that nobody seemingly has been able to find out WTF CIA was doing.

Who ordered CIA to back off al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in early January 2000? That cannot be blamed on Bush/Saudi relations. Clarke was there. Tenet was there. Clinton was there. Berger was there. Who gives a damn about Clinton vs. Bush politics in comparison to the horror of 9/11? Somebody needs to step forward and answer this simple question. All their posturing is crap considering they KNOW why the FBI wasn't alerted at the time. For the record, the exact same question applies to the Bush administration. Somebody in the Bush administration ordered the CIA to back off these two purported al Qaeda operatives.

No conspiracy theory here. Just some obvious questions that anyone with even a modicum of curiosity would want answered.

From my research now detailed in the book, "Prior Knowldge of 9/11" I could never find any documented reason why Tom Wilshire, deputy chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit, blocked FBI Agent Doug Miller's CIR on Khalid al-Mihdhar from going to the FBI criminal investigators on January 5, 2000.

It was easy to find out the reason this information was blocked after November 2000. The CIA at that point knew they were culpable in the Cole bombing and wanted to keep this a secret.

But both Wilshire and his CIA desk officer who had written on the CIR "Blocked by order of the Deputy Chief," (Tom Wilshire) tell the FBI IG investigators that they have no recollection of this cable or why it had been blocked from being sent to the FBI.

The CIA desk officer tells the FBI IG investigators she does not know why she sent out another cable that said Miller's CIR on Mihdhar had been sent to the FBI when it had not been sent, or who might have asked her to send this cable to the rest of the CIA to insure that no one else would send this information to the FBI criminal investigators.

Both Wilshire and the CIA desk officer he worked with to block Miller's CIR had complete amnesia at this point about this CIR. The CIA and Wilshire go on from this point to block this same information, and the information on the al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur and the fact that Mihdhar, Hazmi and Khallad had been at this meeting planning the Cole bombing from going to the FBI on at least 11 more occasions.

This is the very information that could have prevented the horrific al Qaeda attacks on 9/11.

GO FIGURE!

to cover their tracks in relation to the Cole attack. They could have claimed national security interests would be jeopardized by releasing evidence. They could have claimed they were fooled by double agents. They could have minimized the importance of the Malaysia meeting and the role of al Qaeda operatives who attended. Whatever it took to get them off the hook for the Cole bombing.

So with this in mind it becomes even more difficult to understand their conduct. After all, 9/11 left CIA officials vulnerable to all sorts of criminal charges.

During the beginning of the many criminal conspiracies at the CIA to hide their culpability in the Cole bombing, the CIA I am sure at first thought that they could just keep the Kuala Lumpur meeting and the people who had attended this meeting hidden from the FBI criminal investigators, and that would be that. The issue would just go away.

But it turns out every time FBI Agent Ali Soufan sent the CIA another request for any information on this meeting and if the CIA had any information on Khallad Bin Attash, it sent the CIA into another frenzy to figure out what the FBI criminal agents knew and then how to continue to keep the meeting in Kuala Lumpur secret from from these FBI agents.

When Soufan asked the Yemen CIA station in November 2000 for any information the CIA had on a al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur and if the CIA had any information on Khallad Bin Attash, the CIA went so far as to re-confirm the identity of Khallad from his photograph taken at Kuala Lumpur. But this involved the CIA Bin Laden unit, who supplied the photos from Kuala Lumpur, the CIA Yemen station, who coordinated giving these photos to the FBI/CIA joint source and even the CIA handler for the FBI/CIA joint source to make sure none of these people and groups said anything to the FBI and especially to FBI Agent Ali Soufan about the fact that this identification had been made.

When Soufan then asked FBI Director Freeh in November 2000 to ask CIA Director Tenet about this same information, and Freeh said the CIA did not have this information, in spite of the fact that Freeh himself had been given exactly this information by the CIA in January 2000, it is clear at this point that even the Director of the FBI had became involved in this massive criminal conspiracy to hide the information about the Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI criminal investigators.

When Soufan went around Freeh and sent his April 2001 request directly to the CIA for this same information, the CIA actually set up the June 11, 2001 meeting with the very people who worked for Soufan, to try to find out exactly what these FBI Cole investigators knew about the Kuala Lumpur meeting and two of the people that the CIA knew had attended this meeting, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.

At that meeting even FBI HQ IOS Agent Dina Corsi knew that Khallad had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, directly connecting these two long time al Qaeda terrorists to the planning of the Cole bombing and she said nothing to the FBI Cole investigators even to their direct requests for the identification of the people in the photos from Kuala Lumpur that she had presented to them, and their inquiry as to what was their connection to the Cole bombing investigation. It turns out at the time of this meeting Corsi already was aware that all of these al Qaeda terrorists had all taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing.

But how in the world was the CIA able to completely subvert a FBI IOS Agent at FBI headquarters into taking part in their criminal conspiracy is a still unsolved puzzle. Since one of the agents with the Cole investigation at that meeting was actually an intelligence agent, her excuse that this information could not be shared with these agents since they were all criminal investigators, is shown to be completely false, and is yet another lie she told to the FBI IG investigators.

But what explains the fact that when the CIA and Tom Wilshire knew both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US and all of these people knew these Al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US in order to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack the CIA had received innumerable warnings about, none of these people alerted the FBI criminal agents so this huge attack could be prevented. How do you explain that?

Tenet even claims for some unknown reason that he is now unable to explain, he never alerted the President of the United States to the fact that thousands of Americans were just about to be killed in this huge attack, even after he told Rice, Clarke, Ashcroft and Rumsfelf in July 2001?

How do you explain that? What am I missing?


GO FIGURE!

1. January 5-8, 2000 Malaysia meeting.

2. Early January 2000 CIA failure to alert the FBI when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar entered the country.

3. Cole attack on 10/12/00.

4. CIA failure to share intel with the Cole investigators.

5. 9/11

I have no idea what was going on at CIA in relation to withholding intel. IMO the CIA's motive wasn't to cover up previous failures (for example any links between the Malaysia attendees and the '98 embassy bombings). I base that on the CIA's extensive capability in CYA.

Another bizarre article.

Evan Thomas (the author of the article) mentions these points:

1. Berger stole documents from the National Archives.

2. Kissinger's client list may have included Bin Laden family members.

3. Zelikow had close ties to Rice and the White House.

4. Rice was evidently clueless about the terror threat despite others talking about a 'system blinking red.'

5. CIA failed to alert the FBI to the presence of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar until late August '01.

6. Ashcroft didn't want to hear about terrorism from acting FBI Director Pickard.

Then he concludes his article with this sentence:



Pure spin. His conclusion does not fit the content of the article at all.

And my suspicion grows larger. Is there a date on when the CIA happened to finally tell the FBI about the two terror suspects? Late August 2001 sounds like after August 22 - John O'Neill's last day at the FBI.

FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie, working at the CIA Bin Laden unit, found on August 22, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US. She contacted FBI IOS Agent Dina Corsi and both go visit Tom Wilshire, who by that point is the CIA liaison to Michael Rolince, head of the FBI ITOS section. Even though Wilshire had known since March 5, 2000 that Nawaf al-Hazmi had entered the US, he and Corsi now know that Gillespie, by not getting permission to ask the INS about the status of Mihdhar and Hazmi before she went to the INS, has now created a paper trail between the CIA Bin Laden unit and the INS and the fact that these two terrorists are inside of the US. He tells Gillespie that he is taking away from her any further involvement in the investigation and search for Mihdhar and giving it to Corsi. As a way to mollify her, he allowed her to request that the CIA Bin Laden unit issue a world-wide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi, which was done on August 23, 2001. On August 23, Wilshire sends the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi to the FBI New York office, but it is not clear where they went.

At the time the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi taken at Kuala Lumpur were sent to the FBI, both Wilshire and Corsi were aware that the CIA had also photographed Khallad Bin Attash at Kuala Lumpur planning the Cole bombing. This directly connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing, meaning both Wilshire and Corsi knew that FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team of Cole investigators should have been given the assignment to investigate Mihdhar. But in spite of this information, Corsi contacted the head of the intelligence unit at the New York office to tell him that it was urgent that he start an intelligence investigation as soon as possible for Mihdhar. In spite of the head of the intelligence unit at the New York office telling Corsi that this should be opened as part of the criminal investigation in Bongardt's group, at the insistence of Corsi, he finally gives in and agrees to open an intelligence investigation of Mihdhar. As soon as he tells Corsi on August 23, 2001 that the FBI intelligence unit will start an intelligence investigation of Mihdhar, Corsi emails Wilshire and tells him, "the FBI will open an intelligence investigation of Mihdhar". To make sure Bongardt is kept away from the investigation for Mihdhar, Corsi tells Bongardt , on August 29, 2001, that if one piece of paper ever is found at the FBI with his name and the name Khalid al-Mihdhar, his career is over at the FBI!

The 9/11 Commission and the Joint Inquiry investigation of 9/11 will later say:

The FBI opens an intelligence investigation to find hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, despite protests from the FBI New York field office that FBI headquarters has wrongly insisted on an intelligence investigation, when a criminal investigation would be more appropriate and have a better chance of finding him. The Justice Department’s office of inspector general will later conclude that “the designation of the Almihdhar matter as an intelligence investigation, as opposed to a criminal investigation, undermined the priority of any effort to locate Almihdhar.” Upon learning of the decision, Steve Bongardt, an investigator working on the USS Cole bombing, writes to headquarters agent Dina Corsi to express his frustration. He points out that she is unable to produce any solid documentary evidence to support her view of the “wall”, a mechanism that restricts the passage of some intelligence information to criminal agents at the FBI (see Early 1980s and July 19, 1995), and that her interpretation of the “wall” is at odds with the purpose for which it was established. He adds: “Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL , is getting the most ‘protection.’”
Both the Justice Department’s office of inspector general and the 9/11 Commission will later back Bongardt and say the investigation should have been a criminal investigation, as the “wall” procedures did not apply. The inspector general will comment that Bongardt “was correct that the wall had been created to deal with the handling of only information and that there was no legal barrier to a criminal agent being present for an interview with Almihdhar if it occurred in the intelligence investigation.” The 9/11 Commission will remark that Corsi “misunderstood” the wall and that, “Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information possessed could not have been shared with .” It will conclude, “It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels. Because Almihdhar was being sought for his possible connection to or knowledge of the Cole bombing, he could be investigated or tracked under the existing Cole criminal case. No new criminal case was needed for the criminal agent to begin searching for . And as the NSA had approved the passage of its information to the criminal agent, he could have conducted a search using all available information. As a result of this confusion, the criminal agents who were knowledgeable about al-Qaeda and experienced with criminal investigative techniques, including finding suspects and possible criminal charges, were thus excluded from the search.” <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 271, 539>

August 30, 2001:

The CIA finally tells the FBI that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash attended an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000 with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 5-8, 2000). The CIA monitored the meeting and has known that bin Attash attended for at least eight months (see January 4, 2001), but repeatedly failed to tell the FBI of this (see Shortly Before February 1, 2001, February 1, 2001, Mid-May 2001, and June 11, 2001). The CIA will later say that it thought the FBI knew of the identification in January 2001 (see January 5, 2001 and After), but a CIA manager asked for permission to pass the information to the FBI in July 2001, implying he knew the FBI did not have the information (see July 13, 2001). The cable containing the information is for Rodney Middleton, acting head of the FBI’s bin Laden unit, and also says that, if the FBI thinks it does not have all the photographs it needs of the Malaysia summit, it should ask the CIA for them. Middleton is aware that the FBI is investigating Almihdhar (see August 29, 2001), but there is no record of him or anyone else providing this information to either the agent investigating Almihdhar or the main investigation of the USS Cole bombing.... The information was requested by FBI agent Dina Corsi and was passed through a CIA Counterterrorist Center representative to the FBI, presumably Tom Wilshire.

September 11, 2001:

On September 11—after the 9/11 attacks are over—the New York FBI office learns that one of the hijackers was Khalid Almihdhar. One of these FBI agents( FBI Agent Steve Bongardt) had attempted to get permission to search for Almihdhar in late August, but was not allowed to do so. He wrote an e-mail on August 28 predicting that “someday someone will die… the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’”(see August 29, 2001). He later testifies that upon seeing Almihdhar’s name on one of the passenger flight manifests, he angrily yells “This is the same Almihdhar we’ve been talking about for three months!” In an attempt to console him, his boss replies, “We did everything by the book.” Now that this upset agent is allowed to conduct a basic Internet search for Almihdhar that he had been denied permission to conduct before 9/11, he finds the hijacker’s address “within hours.”

Note: The 9/11 Commission never points out that Corsi had known the CIA was hiding the photograph of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur when she forced Bongardt off of the investigation for Mihdhar, yet further evidence of a massive cover up by the 9/11 Commission.

You don't have to look at the contacts to Carl Rove to prove the 9/11 Commission investigation and report was a total fraud, just look at the report itself.

FBI Agent Ali Soufan, lead FBI investigator on the Cole bombing, is missing completely from this report.

It is possible to show that Soufan's November 2000 request to the CIA Yemen station for information on Khallad and a meeting in Kuala Lumpur resulted in Khallad's passport photo, which was attached to Soufan's request, being shown to the CIA/FBI joint source. This lead the Yemen station to request photos of taken at Kuala Lumpur, of Khallad and Mihdhar, from the CIA Bin Laden unit. When the photo of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur was identified by the joint source, in January 2001, every one at the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station, and the handler for the joint source knew that this directly connected people at the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the planning of the Cole bombing. This included Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi. Yet no one at the CIA who were aware of this information ever gave this information to Soufan in spite of his direct request, or to the FBI, clear proof of a wide ranging criminal conspiracy at the CIA.

When Soufan asked FBI Director Freeh to ask the CIA Director Tenet for this information again in November 2000, Freeh told Soufan that the CIA had none of this information. Yet we now know from the 9/11 Commission report, page 181, that the CIA had given this information to Freeh in January 2000, and this information ended up in Freeh's one page daily briefing papers in January 2000. We also know from the FBI IG report, page 239, that the NSA also gave this information to Freeh in January 2000. This is clear evidence that the Director of the FBI had criminally had obstructed his own FBI criminal investigation of the Cole bombing, yet the 9/11 Commission report never points this out. HOW IS THIS EVEN POSSIBLE?

We now know that when Soufan asked the CIR Director Tenet again in April 2001 for this same information, that both CIA officers, Tom Wilshire and Clark Shannon ended up with copies of his request. This information on this request and the fact that both Wilshire and Shannon knew about this request are both missing from the 9/11 Commission report. The fact that Soufan made this request is even missing from the FBI IG report. Instead of giving Soufan the information he asked for, Wilshire asked FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi to get the three photos of Mihdhar Wilshire had requested from the CIA, when he was trying to identify Khallad in these photos and set up a meeting with the very people who worked for Soufan. She set up this meeting for June 11, 2001 in New York City and at this meeting showed the photos of Mihdhar she had obtained from Wilshire to the FBI Cole investigators. At that point Clark Shannon asked Bongardt and the other agents if they recognized anyone in these photos. One photo only had Mihdhar and Hazmi in it

Both Wilshire and Shannon knew that the time of this meeting:

That Khallad Bin Attash had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Mihdhar and Hazmi, in fact FBI Agent Dina Corsi who set this meeting up, was also aware of this information.

That Mihdhar had a multi-entry visa for the US and that Hazmi was already inside of the US.

That the Cole bombing had been planned at this meeting, and that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were therefore liked to the planning of this bombing.

That the al Qaeda terrorists were planning a huge attack, possibly aimed at a target inside of the US.

Yet Soufan was never given this information, Bongardt and the other FBI investigators were not given this information in spite of repeated angry direct requests from the FBI Cole investigators.

Corsi finally told Bongardt one al Qaeda terrorist was named Mihdhar, but he was not given Mihdhar's passport number, information the CIA had, which made it impossible for the FBI to be able to track Mihdhar given the very confusing names from the middle eastern countries.

With holding this information by Wilshire, Shannon and Corsi, was clearly again criminally obstructing the FBI criminal investigation on the Cole bombing and the murder of 17 US sailors by the al Qaeda terrorists. It is now clear that the CIA had set up this meeting as sting on the FBI, to find out what they knew about Mihdhar and Hazmi and the meeting at Kuala Lumpur!

Wilshire was denied twice once on July 13, 2001, and again on July 23, 2001 from transferring the information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the FBI by his CTC managers, again making this criminal obstruction go right to the very top of the CIA management. It is clear that only CIA CTC manager Black and CIA Director Tenet had the authority to block Wilshire from transferring this information to the FBI

The planning for the attack on the WTC towers and the Cole had both taken place, in a horrible coincidence, at Kuala Lumpur meeting on January 5-8, 2000. By with holding the information on these occasions, the CIA and the FBI HQ agents they had enlisted in this criminal obstruction allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place. Since all of this information had been deliberately left out of the 9/11 Commission report, it is now clear that this report was put together only to prove to the Americans people that the CIA and FBI HQ had not deliberately allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place when it is now clear from information that has come out after the 9/11 Commission report, that is exactly what they had done.

Why didn't Philip Shennon point this information out in his book "The Commission". He spent all of this time on this "important work" and then missed the information that clearly showed that the 9/11 Commission investigation and report was nothing but a total and complete fraud!

GO FIGURE!

So it was on August 22nd, O'Neill's last day at the FBI. There's no reason to think they would have told him about this.

Lawrence Wright talks about the intense personal rivalry between John O'Neill and Micheal Scheuer. I've heard that Scheuer said the only good thing about 9/11 was that O'Neill was under the Towers.

At this point, Sheuer was no longer assigned to the CIA bin Laden unit. However, he was still coming into work and sitting in the library, disgraced and vehement. His co-workers saw him there every day.

It's my own CT that this information was not given to the FBI because O'Neill had his own problems and did eventually succumb to them. If the CIA alerted the FBI to the presence of these people, John O'Neill would have most likely caught them and salvaged his own position at the FBI, even while Scheuer was stewing in the CIA library.

Payback can certainly be a bitch.

What evidence do I have of this? None. It's nothing but my opinion of the matter. But I do manage to spit whenever Scheuer pops up on television these days with his "pox on both your houses" act.

But the investigation Corsi and Wilshire were blocking was FBI Agent Steve Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar, and by the time they were in full obstruction mode John O'Neill had left the FBI and Michael Scheuer had been reduced to the land of the living dead at the CIA.

CTC managers had blocked Wilshire' requests on July 13, 2001 and again on July 23, 2001, to transfer over to the FBI criminal investigators the information the CIA had on the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and the people who had attended this meeting, Khallad Bin Attash, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.

Wilshire had said in his July 5, 2001 email to his CTC mangers that he thought that the people at the Kuala Lumpur meeting were connected to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack. Then on July 23, 2001 Wilshire states in email that Mihdhar and by association Hazmi will be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack.

When Wilshire was told on August 22, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, he knows they are here only in order to take part in the huge al Qaeda attack the CIA is aware of. On August 23, 2001 Gillespie alerts the rest of the CIA to the fact that both Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US, and they all know at that time that these terrorists are inside of the US to take part in this huge attack. Yet the 9/11 Commission report says they can never figure out why the CIA never connected the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack to the fact Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, when there is now email that clearly says the CIA had connected them together.

Yet more evidence of a massive conspiracy by the 9/11 Commission to hide what went at the CIA prior to that attacks on 9/11 that had allowed these attacks to take place.

He makes a big deal of Kean's steadfast commitment to bipartisanship. Yet by the end of the book one comes away with the thought that if Zelikow was a White House mole then Kean and Hamilton were his handlers, making sure his efforts to sabotage the commission were not impeded. Shenon writes a lot about the partisan disputes, most notably Rice vs. Clarke (which was basically Bush vs. Clinton by proxy). It should be noted that some people seem to buy into partisan arguments. For example, the idea that the Clinton crowd warned the Bush crowd but the Bush crowd failed to take their warnings seriously. This argument presumes that the Clinton team was completely honest about al Qaeda. Ali Mohamed's involvement in the '98 embassy bombings and the fact that Clinton was in office during the 01/00 Malaysia summit (attended by al-Mihdhar, al-Hamzi and possibly Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) are two examples that dispute this notion. Another popular partisan argument is the idea that the Bush crowd hurt the WoT effort by invading Iraq. In fact, Richard Clarke is a leading advocate of this concept (along with Michael Scheuer). This talking point is based on the idea that the government has been honest about al Qaeda, Bin Laden and 9/11. We aren't supposed to question the validity of the WoT, just Bush's Iraq diversion.

The point being Shenon is fixated on playing up the D vs. R dispute. What is notably missing from the book is a discussion of a deep state apparatus which transcends political party. He gets around this flaw by using the time tested phrase 'conspiracy theorists' to suggest that only conspiracy nuts would conclude that something more sinister than CYA was involved in the 9/11 Commission's failure to produce an above board report. I do give Shenon credit for examining the problems with the commission's investigation. After reading the book even 'conspiracy phobic' readers will be hard pressed to defend the 9/11 Commission report.

Interesting. In his Feb.28th entry titled "Under Attack" he's upset that he's being criticized by the 9/11 Truth movement (he's seems particularly annoyed that they're leaving negative reviews of his book on Amazon). He says he finds it "odd" that these people denounce him, when he's given them "a new opening to make their case."

I'm not sure how to take that -- whether he's implying he went as far as he could go, I'm not sure. It's true that he's done something very valuable by exposing Karl Rove's major involvement in crafting the fictitious report, but Shenon's also been propping up the OCT, selling the incompetence theory, of all things. I think Shenon had better try to cultivate a thicker skin because as more of the OCT unravels, the more his great expose' will look seriously compromised.

Noise, thanks for starting this thread, which I found while Googling for other information about Philip Shenon's book The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation.

I also found a bunch of reviews of Shenon's book:

• http://www.slate.com/id/2183852/">Juliet Lapidos, Slate, Feb. 6, 2008


• http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/books/04thom.html?_r=1&oref=slogin">Evan Thomas, New York Times, February 4, 2008


• http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/books/review/Heilbrunn-t.html?ref=firstchapters">Jacob Heilbrunn, New York Times, April 13, 2008


• http://hnn.us/roundup/comments/47379.html">Max Holland, History News Network, 2-11-08


• http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/CA6530366.html">Dermot McEvoy, Publishers Weekly, 2/8/2008

I also found an http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18660248">excerpt from the book here, on NPR, plus an http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-benedict/philip-shenons-commi_b_90481.html">interview with Philip Shenon, by Elizabeth Benedict, March 7, 2008. (The latter has an introduction which mentions Nick Levis, a.k.a. JackRiddler here on DU.)

Thanks also to http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=125&topic_id=190636&mesg_id=197267">noise, for letting us know about http://www.philipshenon.com/blog/index.asp">Philip Shenon's blog.