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But I'm just trying to drill down through the stuff we have to work with (and again, taking this bunch at face value is likely ill-advised). As such, I've been hunting around for the appropriate statues re: monitoring of incoming int'l calls to US citizens, but no luck so far.
I realize that no one is going to have this on top of head, but had hoped someone had come across an investigative piece, legal blogger, etc. in last few days.
Do you agree that the "had to act fast" argument doesn't hold up for outgoing calls from US citizens that are under suspician? First there is the work up (and hence, ample time for FISA warrant), then the 72 hours retroactive thing. That's the thing that nagged at me and got me to this point.
I mean, I want to pin them down. Incoming or outgoing, I think the real reason was lack of PC. Outgoing: suspcious but no PC threshold that could be met, but they eavedropped anyway. Incoming: (I suspect) need to have warrant for reciever of call, and defacto, no PC on calls from int'l suspects to unknown parties in US.
Hope I'm making sense here. I can't spin it anyother way except the crime seems, on its face, worse than not getting FISA authority to chase "bad guys." In my opinion, they puposely did it because they knew they couldn't meet PC. Which is more damning, IMO, than that which the story is currently reflecting.
Back to the hunt....
:hi:
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