Edward Joseph: Edward Joseph from here at SAIS. I served about a decade in the Balkans and know first-hand how much your leadership meant to that region.
And, um General, I appreciate very much with respect to your remarks about Iraq, I appreciate very much the fact that you say we need a retrospective look and I think that that is uh…refreshing, quite refreshing to hear that. Of course we still do have to look forward and you’ve alluded to and presented some of your own vision of how we move forward in that region and you mentioned the Dayton Agreement and that’s where I’d like to turn the discussion with respect to Iraq and mention that I’m co-author with Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings of the forthcoming proposal, a soft partition, a detailed proposal along the lines of Senator Biden, uh…what he has proposed.
And given your experience in the Balkans, extensive as it was, both Dayton and Kosovo, but especially in Bosnia, and you know very well General that when we went to Dayton it wasn’t open-ended as you said, there were principles, we had a clear vision of our own political settlement that…that we had in mind, and obviously there was extensive negotiations.
What do you think about the idea of a Bosnia-style, acknowledging as we do the many differences between Bosnia and Iraq and there are many, but that kind of approach which is fundamentally different from the course that we’re on now? And if I could just…you mentioned Russia and of course your long-standing experience in the Balkans, if you might say a word about Kosovo and current Russian tactics to obstruct that.
GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thanks very much for the question and the comments. I…I have reservations about the partition approach in Iraq. I’ll tell you why.
In the Balkans first of all, we started with a rapid military offensive…I shouldn’t say “we”…the Serbs and the Bosnians fought a rapid military offensive in the summer of ’92 that overran, with the Bosnian Serb army, much of Bosnia and with some amazing miracles, the front more or less stabilized and so in the 1994 period Ambassador Charles Redman led an effort to put together a peace plan that was based on a 51/49 division of the country and basically that confirmed the status quo.
And so the idea was just to stop the fighting along the current lines because they figured that neither side was going to give in on what it rightly claimed when we went forward in ’95 with our plan. We basically took up where the Redman plan left off.
I think that’s different than where we are today in the Balkans and um, it may well be, when all is said and done, there are different political entities in some kind of a federated structure, very loosely controlled, but as an American, I wouldn’t want to be proposing it. It might emerge out of a dialogue that I described to the gentleman from the Voice of America, but it’s got to be the Iraqis’ idea, not ours.
I don’t think a gimmick solves the problem.
I think, if you look at the history of partitions, they tend to be accompanied by intense fighting, bitter feelings afterwards, and longstanding problems such as between India and Pakistan that persist to this day, in some respects as a result of the partition idea.
The idea that you can sort of draw a line…I sat with the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and the Croats after we had initialed the Dayton Agreement and Richard Holbrook had left and come back, he had other business in New York, and I was there with these three guys and we looked at the map and they said ‘you know, General, it’s very good you’ve drawn this line but this line on the ground is three kilometers wide - your pencil mark on this map is three kilometers wide – this is my cousin’s home and his orchard that’s under your line…it needs to be in…’ and so we went through the whole thousand kilometers of this on a pictal map, farm by farm, village by village, road intersection by road intersection, and only with the three people there that did it.
Could a process like that eventually emerge, could the United States be a sort of arbiter of this?
Certainly we could, but is it a gimmick that if the United States goes and proposes it, the people on the ground say ‘ah, oh God, you’ve taken us out from our misery – this is the exact thing we need. Yes. Let’s give the Kurds their piece and you Sunnis, you take Anbar - it’s a beautiful place out there. You can have it, we’ll keep the oil here in central Bosnia, don’t worry, the check’s in the mail, you’ll get it every month, it’ll be deposited in the Iraqi central bank and by the way there will be a federal assembly. Thanks very much. Okay, we’re going to now turn in our arms’ and no.
It’s beyond…it’s beyond belief that something like this could work.
I think, though, that if you took it over there and you listen to what the Iraqis say and it emerges as their idea, if they commit to it, if their principal leaders see it as their solution, then I think that’s fine, I’d have no problem endorsing it – I’d rather see an integral Iraq because I think it’s better for the security of the region, but if that’s the only thing they can accept for their own internal political dynamics, fine. Um, I understand why people are proposing it, um, and I have reservations. I wouldn’t propose it.
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