I believe Powell ruined himself, and has simply been "uplifted" to a "clean and higher" status by those he has allowed to use him.
I have never had any respect for him.
Read some here:
Crushing the Colin Powell MythSteve Grube
Tue Dec 19 21:28:35 PST 2000
All who would like to be disabused of the myth of Colin Powell's greatness,
see "Behind Colin Powell's Legend" by Robert Parry and Norman Solomon:
http://www.consortiumnews.com/121700a.html It's a few years old but right
on point.
A choice example: In 1968, the U.S. army committed one of the most horrible
attrocities of the Vietnam War, the Mai Lai massacre. This frenzied killing
of unarmed civilians was eventually exposed by servicemen who were appalled
by its brutality. As the piece relates:
"The slaughter raged for four hours. A total of 347 Vietnamese, including
babies, died in the carnage. But there also were American heroes that day in
My Lai. Some soldiers refused to obey the direct orders to kill and some
risked their lives to save civilians from the murderous fire.
A pilot named Hugh Clowers Thompson Jr. from Stone Mountain, Ga., was
furious at the killings he saw happening on the ground. He landed his
helicopter between one group of fleeing civilians and American soldiers in
pursuit.
Several months later, the Americal's brutality would become a moral test for
Major Powell, too.
A letter had been written by a young specialist fourth class named Tom Glen,
who had served in an Americal mortar platoon and was nearing the end of his
Army tour. In the letter to Gen. Creighton Abrams, the commander of all U.S.
forces in Vietnam, Glen accused the Americal division of routine brutality
against civilians.
Glen's letter was forwarded to the Americal headquarters at Chu Lai where it
landed on Major Powell's desk.
Major Powell undertook the assignment to review Glen's letter, but did so
without questioning Glen or assigning anyone else to talk with him. Powell
simply accepted a claim from Glen's superior officer that Glen was not close
enough to the front lines to know what he was writing about, an assertion
Glen denies.
After that cursory investigation, Powell drafted a response on Dec. 13,
1968. He admitted to no pattern of wrongdoing. Powell claimed that U.S.
soldiers in Vietnam were taught to treat Vietnamese courteously and
respectfully. The American troops also had gone through an hour-long course
on how to treat prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, Powell noted.
"There may be isolated cases of mistreatment of civilians and POWs," Powell
wrote in 1968. But "this by no means reflects the general attitude
throughout the Division." Indeed, Powell's memo faulted Glen for not
complaining earlier and for failing to be more specific in his letter.
"In direct refutation of this
portrayal," Powell concluded, "is the
fact that relations between American soldiers and the Vietnamese people are
excellent."
Powell's findings, of course, were false, though they were exactly what his
superiors wanted to hear.
http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/2000/2000-December/023643.html
* Behind Colin Powell's Legend -- Iran-Contra Amnesia
By Robert Parry & Norman Solomon
In 1984-85, as the Iran-contra storm clouds began to build, one-star Gen. Colin Powell was the "filter" for information flowing to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. It would be what knowledge flowed through that "filter" that investigators would try to determine years later -- a mystery still relevant as Powell's political star rises and his importance to Bob Dole's 1996 campaign grows.
When Iran-contra broke in 1986-87, Powell would claim to know next to nothing about unlawful 1985 shipments of U.S. weapons from Israel to Iran -- or about illegal third-country financing of the Nicaraguan contra rebels. But was the general lying? The documentary record made clear certainly that his boss, Weinberger, knew a great deal.
Weinberger, a close adviser to President Reagan, was one of the first officials outside the White House to learn that Reagan had put the arm on Saudi Arabia to give the contras $1 million a month in 1984, as Congress cut off aid. Like Weinberger, Powell was a very close friend to Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador who handled that transaction. Powell and Bandar, who had met in the 1970s, were frequent tennis partners.
<snip>
Meanwhile, the White House was maneuvering into dangerous territory, too, in its policy toward Iran. The Israelis were interested in trading U.S. weapons to Iran to gain a strategic foothold in that Middle Eastern country -- and to enlist Iran's help in freeing American hostages in Lebanon.
Carrying the water for the Iran opening was national security adviser Robert McFarlane, who circulated a draft presidential order in late spring 1985. As always, the paper passed through Weinberger's "filter," Colin Powell. In his memoirs, Powell called the proposal "a stunner" and a grab by McFarlane for "Kissingerian immortality."
After reading the draft, Weinberger scribbled in the margins, "this is almost too absurd to comment on." Ironically, on the same day the Iran paper went out, Reagan declared that the United States would give no quarter to terrorism. "Let me further make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America will never make concessions to terrorists," Reagan declared.
But in July 1985, Weinberger, Powell and McFarlane were actively meeting on details to do just that. Iran wanted 100 anti-tank TOW missiles that would be delivered through Israel, according to Weinberger's notes. Reagan gave his approval, though the White House wanted the shipments handled with "maximum compartmentalization" to prevent public disclosure.
On Aug. 20, 1985, the Israelis delivered the first 96 missiles to Iran, a pivotal moment for the Reagan administration. That missile shipment put the Reagan administration over the legal line, in violation of laws both requiring congressional notification for transshipment of U.S. weapons and prohibiting arms to Iran or any other nation designated a terrorist state. Violation of either statute could be a felony and an impeachable offense.
The available evidence from that period also suggests that Weinberger and Powell were very much in the loop on the operation, even though they may have opposed the policy. On Aug. 22, two days later, Israel notified McFarlane of the completed shipment. From aboard Air Force One, McFarlane promptly called Weinberger.
MUCH MORE AT LINK: http://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/colin6.html