DU Action...BUT you have to be nice. It's imperative to be nice

I am just back from the Progressive Democrats of America Conference in Washington. The trip was a very productive and the consensus coming from that is, that we all believe that a paper ballot is the first step in a larger battle for election reform. This is the beginning of a new Voting Rights Movement … and we are all on the front lines because democracy, itself, depends on us.

I am currently working with CASE America, National Ballot Integrity Project, and Velvet Revolution to build the broad-based coalition it will take if we are to succeed. CASE America, is led by Susan Truitt. As co-founder of CASE-Ohio, Susan built the grass-roots organization that forced Secretary of State Blackwell to back away from his plan to install Diebold touch-screen voting machines across the state. After the election, CASE members brought Ohio’s voting nightmares to national attention, while Susan has served as co-counsel on the lawsuit that brought the Conyers Committee to Ohio. The evidence they brought to light led to Senator Boxer standing up in the Senate to challenge the Ohio electors.

CASE America and the National Ballot Integrity Project are working together, under the CASE America banner, to form a new 501c3 organization to energize and empower the grassroots across the nation to take on voting machine and election law issues on a county, state and national basis. The National Ballot Integrity Project, which is a 501c4 organization, will continue as the lobbying and advocacy arm of the CASE America-NBIP effort.

We have already begun to fight. States and counties are lining up to order paperless touch-screen machines right now, and we need your help to stop them.

I will be back in Washington next week with Warren Stewart and Joan Krawitz of the National Ballot Integrity Project, to lobby for Senator Ensign’s Bill Entitled the Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005 (V.I.V.A. 2005). VIVA clarifies the language in the Help America Vote Act of 2002, adding a requirement for a voter verified paper ballot and making that paper ballot the primary ballot of record. It was introduced late in the last session with bi-partisan sponsorship as S. 2347 and we are told that it will have identical language this time and will be introduced early in February.

Ensign’s bill permits the voter to verify the accuracy of their ballot “in a private and independent manner” by allowing the voter to review an individual paper version of the “voter's ballot” before the “voter's ballot” is cast and counted. All electronic records produced by any voting system will be consistent with the paper records. In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and paper records, the voter verified paper record is considered the true and correct record of the votes cast. It also mandates that the paper ballots be used as the official record for the purpose of any recount or audit, conducted with respect to any election for Federal Office. Ensign’s bill is tightly focused and strong. and the provisions will take effect as if they had been included in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, that is, in time for the 2006 general election.

Ensign’s bill is competing with a bill introduced last Tuesday by Senator Dodd (S. 17). Dodd’s bill calls for "VOTER VERIFIED BALLOTS" In Dodd’s bill; voting systems will provide an independent means of voter verification. It mandates a list of verification options that must be offered to each voter: a paper record, an audio record, pictorial record, electronic record or any other means of verification which is equal or superior to verification through the use of a paper record.

This shell game is not even going to be required until January 1, 2009, and even then it will not apply to any voting system purchased before that date This bill does little to provide any meaningful voter-verified ballot requirement on any useful time scale. Longer term, it will impose complex, ill-defined, and costly mandates on the States, potentially interfering with State-level voter verified paper ballot bills that have already been passed into law by a number of States, and further restricting the range of HAVA-compliant choices from which States can choose to meet their voting system needs - more paperless DREs! We must insist on a “Voter Verified Paper Ballot”.


We are asking everyone both Democrat and Republican to come together on this and call or write the list of Senators below. Contact only Senators on the list. Being a constituent counts, so please call your own Senators’ offices personally. I think this goes without saying but the rhetoric that is used will be one of two things: hugely persuasive or a huge turnoff. Talk of "stolen" elections in 2000 or this year in communications will not open a productive dialogue. We need honey not vinegar on this one. If you’re contacting a Democratic Senator from one state, contact the Republican as well. For example, if you are contacting Dayton from Minnesota you should also contact Coleman.

The most important thing is to ask all the Republicans to co-sponsor Senator Ensign’s bill, which will be introduced either late next week or early the week after. Senator Ensign is a Republican, who was a leading member of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee that produced HAVA. The reason he introduced this bill last year (when it was numbered S. 2437, though a new number will be issued when it’s reintroduced this year) was that he wants to fix the misinterpretation of HAVA that has led to the purchasing of touch-screen voting machines without a voter-verified paper ballot. If you’ve never called a Senator’s office, don’t worry. The people in their offices are very friendly and courteous.

Urge the Republican Senators to co-sponsor and support Senator Ensign's Bill (VIVA 2005). With Democrats express your disapproval of Dodd's Bill (S. 17), and ask them to support the Ensign Bill to ensure voter verified paper ballots. This is a non-partisan issue and should be framed in terms of integrity, accuracy, and the security of the election process - the foundation of democracy.

Senator Ensign is a Republican, who was a leading member of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee that produced HAVA. He introduced this bill last year because he wants to fix the loophole in HAVA that has led to the purchasing of touch-screen voting machines without a voter-verified paper ballot. If you’ve never called a Senator’s office, don’t worry. The people in their offices are very friendly and courteous.

A great talking point for Republican offices has been to let them know that a recount and an election challenge was filed in Nevada. The Secretary of State conducted a random audit of 64,000 paper ballots, comparing them to the electronic record of that ballot. That audit showed 100% consistency between the paper and electronic records, providing a confidence in the vote that was impossible before Nevada established a voter verified paper ballot requirement.

Attached is the list of Senators to e-mail, fax and call. Contact only the ones on the list and remember…be nice and strictly NON-partisan!

Sincerely,
Andy

Alexander, Lamar - (R - TN) Class II
302 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4944
alexander.senate.gov

Allard, Wayne - (R - CO) Class II
525 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5941
Web Form: allard.senate.gov/contactme

Allen, George - (R - VA) Class I
204 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4024
Web Form: allen.senate.gov/index.cfm?c=email

Baucus, Max - (D - MT) Class II
511 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2651
Web Form: baucus.senate.gov/emailmax.html

Bayh, Evan - (D - IN) Class III
463 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5623
Web Form: bayh.senate.gov/WebMail1.htm

Bennett, Robert - (R - UT) Class III
431 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5444
Web Form: bennett.senate.gov/contact/emailmain.html

Bingaman, Jeff - (D - NM) Class I
703 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5521
E-mail: senator_bingaman@bingaman.senate.gov

Bond, Christopher - (R - MO) Class III
274 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5721
Web Form: bond.senate.gov/contact/contactme.cfm

Brownback, Sam - (R - KS) Class III
303 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6521
Web Form: brownback.senate.gov/CMEmailMe.htm


Burr, Richard - (R - NC) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3154

Chafee, Lincoln - (R - RI) Class I
141A RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2921
Web Form: chafee.senate.gov/webform.htm

Coburn, Tom - (R - OK) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5754

Cochran, Thad - (R - MS) Class II
113 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5054
Web Form: cochran.senate.gov/contact.htm

Coleman, Norm - (R - MN) Class II
320 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5641
Web Form: coleman.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Contact.ContactForm

Collins, Susan - (R - ME) Class II
172 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2523
Web Form: collins.senate.gov/low/contactemail.htm

Cornyn, John - (R - TX) Class II
517 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2934
Web Form: cornyn.senate.gov/contact/index.html

Craig, Larry - (R - ID) Class II
520 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2752
Web Form: craig.senate.gov/webform.html

Crapo, Michael - (R - ID) Class III
239 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6142
Web Form: crapo.senate.gov

Dayton, Mark - (D - MN) Class I
346 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3244
Web Form: dayton.senate.gov/contact/email.cfm

DeMint, Jim - (R - SC) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6121

Dole, Elizabeth - (R - NC) Class II
120 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6342
Web Form: dole.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContactInformation.ContactForm

Domenici, Pete - (R - NM) Class II
328 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6621
Web Form: domenici.senate.gov/resources/contactform.cfm

Enzi, Michael - (R - WY) Class II
379A RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3424
Web Form: enzi.senate.gov/email.htm

Graham, Lindsey - (R - SC) Class II
290 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5972
Web Form: lgraham.senate.gov/index.cfm?mode=contact

Grassley, Chuck - (R - IA) Class III
135 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3744
Web Form: grassley.senate.gov/webform.htm

Gregg, Judd - (R - NH) Class III
393 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3324
E-mail: mailbox@gregg.senate.gov

Hagel, Chuck - (R - NE) Class II
248 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4224
Web Form: hagel.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Offices.Contact

Harkin, Tom - (D - IA) Class II
731 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3254
Web Form: harkin.senate.gov/contact/contact.cfm

Hatch, Orrin - (R - UT) Class I
104 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5251
Web Form: hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Offices.Contact

Hutchison, Kay - (R - TX) Class I
284 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5922
Web Form: hutchison.senate.gov/e-mail.htm

Inhofe, James - (R - OK) Class II
453 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4721
Web Form: inhofe.senate.gov/contactus.htm

Isakson, Johnny - (R - GA) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3643

Jeffords, James - (I - VT) Class I
413 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5141
Web Form: jeffords.senate.gov/contact-form.html

Kyl, Jon - (R - AZ) Class I
730 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4521
Web Form: kyl.senate.gov/contact.cfm

Landrieu, Mary - (D - LA) Class II
724 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5824
Web Form: landrieu.senate.gov/contact/index.cfm

Leahy, Patrick - (D - VT) Class III
433 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4242
E-mail: senator_leahy@leahy.senate.gov

Levin, Carl - (D - MI) Class II
269 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6221
Web Form: levin.senate.gov/contact/index.cfm

Lott, Trent - (R - MS) Class I
487 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6253
E-mail: senatorlott@lott.senate.gov

Lugar, Richard - (R - IN) Class I
306 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4814
E-mail: senator_lugar@lugar.senate.gov

Martinez, Mel - (R - FL) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3041

McCain, John - (R - AZ) Class III
241 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2235
Web Form: mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Contact.Home

Murkowski, Lisa - (R - AK) Class III
322 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6665
Web Form: murkowski.senate.gov/contact.html

Nelson, Ben - (D - NE) Class I
720 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6551
Web Form: bennelson.senate.gov/email.html

Reed, Jack - (D - RI) Class II
728 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4642
Web Form: reed.senate.gov/form-opinion.htm

Roberts, Pat - (R - KS) Class II
109 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4774
Web Form: roberts.senate.gov/e-mail_pat.html

Salazar, Ken - (D - CO) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5852
Web Form: salazar.senate.gov/contactus.cfm

Santorum, Rick - (R - PA) Class I
511 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6324
Web Form: santorum.senate.gov/emailrjs.html

Sessions, Jeff - (R - AL) Class II
335 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4124
Web Form: sessions.senate.gov/contact.htm#form

Shelby, Richard - (R - AL) Class III
110 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5744
E-mail: senator@shelby.senate.gov

Smith, Gordon - (R - OR) Class II
404 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3753
Web Form: gsmith.senate.gov/webform.htm

Snowe, Olympia - (R - ME) Class I
154 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5344
E-mail: olympia@snowe.senate.gov

Specter, Arlen - (R - PA) Class III
711 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4254
E-mail: arlen_specter@specter.senate.gov

Stevens, Ted - (R - AK) Class II
522 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3004
Web Form: stevens.senate.gov/contact_form.cfm

Sununu, John - (R - NH) Class II
111 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2841
Web Form: www.sununu.senate.gov/webform.html

Talent, James - (R - MO) Class I
493 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6154
Web Form: talent.senate.gov/Contact/default.cfm?pagemode=1

Thomas, Craig - (R - WY) Class I
307 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6441
Web Form: thomas.senate.gov/html/contact.html

Vitter, David - (R - LA) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4623
Web Form: vitter.senate.gov/contact.cfm

Warner, John - (R - VA) Class II
225 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2023
Web Form: warner.senate.gov/contact/contactme.cfm

Wyden, Ron - (D - OR) Class III
516 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5244
Web Form: wyden.senate.gov/contact.html

decide if it goes there?

I can not start a thread, as I am but a lowly lurker,
Would someone like to start a thread for me...?

PDA has endorsed Howard Dean for DNC chair.
I have a link to a wonderful Howard Dean Remix that has been redone from the original that was created during the primary season.

I think most Dean supporters will remember this one. Originally titled "faulknerremix"

New version at: www.depthaudio.com/Dean.htm

Thank You.

This is a PLAN!
Even some Republicans can agree with this.

sent to Sens. Allen and Warner

Anyone else from VA? Back me up!!

(text of my letter:
As a resident of Charlottesville, I voted for the first time on an electronic voting machine. THe process was intuitive, quick, and easy. What it was not, however, was fulfilling.

I say this because after having pushed the "Vote" button on my machine, my vote was sent into some tabulation center and a tally mark was placed next to those individuals for whom I casted my vote (my ignorance on the matter of where my vote goes speaks volumes towards my cause.)

I urge you to support Sen. Ensign's upcoming bill, the Voter Integrity and Verification Act of 2005 (V.I.V.A. 2005.) A similar bill (S. 2347) was introduced late in the last session of Congress with wide bi-partisan support.

Sen. Ensign's bill, as opposed to Sen. Dodd's version (S. 17 introduced last week) clarifies exactly the provisions necessary to make computerized voting as reliable and secure as paper ballots. I'm sure you are familiar with the language of Mr. Ensign's proposal, and I think it is superior to that of Mr. Dodd's because it eliminates the foggy language of S. 17. VIVA 2005 explicitly requires a voter verified document that becomes the primary source of verification in the event of a close election.

Supporting VIVA 2005 is supporting fairness, verifiability, and a smooth running Democracy in the 21st Century.

Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,
Mario D. Salas
Charlottesville, VA)

Perfect! :yourock:

Start making those calls and spread the word to your email lists and the blogs. We're working our backsides off to get this bill passed and spread the word to Dems that the Dodd bill is a Trojan Horse.

Joan Krawitz aka hedda_foil

I contacted my senator on the list.

Be nice and courteous...even though you may want to vent...BE NICE.

:)

Just sent emails to my two republican senators. I never did that before!

On edit: And yes, I was nice. All I really did was ask them to support the bill, and I used Andy's words to briefly describe it. I used the Nevada example, too.

:)

Kick!

it takes forever to fill out all those webforms.

for us? Please?

Andy

they're highlighted. When you click, it opens up an email page, and all you have to do is copy in your message.

I thought you had something different.

a much better thing to do is to fax it or snail mail it.

I KNOW how wonderfully easy email is -- and that's preferrable to nothing, of course -- but faxes and snail mail are read and considered much more strongly than emails. Phone calls are better too, than emails.

calls and snail mail are certainly better.

Nice to see you BTW.

This looks GREAT. It's a helluva post, too. So glad you've teamed up with Joan.

:hi:

I have sent it out to the UDPC list (250 people) and will forward it on to all the utah dem yahoo group lists I belong to! THANK YOU ANDY!

:kick:

could you get me the URLs for the various groups working on this so I can update the UDPC website?

Thanks you wonderful wonderful person you!

OH, and why not call Randi Rhodes today and tell her about this??? :)

She loves you as much as we do. :)

See this thread!
<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x303273>

I couldn't agree more that the time-sensitive nature of the problem requires a quick solution, even it it's just a partial one. These 2 bills seem to be companions, but if you want to review HR278 and give it your blessing, please do. We need both houses of Congress on this one and we need to enforce and improve the recount and auditing laws in every state.

Thanks for the thread!

HR278

:kick:

Particularly after reading the VotersUnite.org document "Myth Breakers," I am concerned that lay people (like me) do not and cannot fully understand all of the subtle possibilities of manipulation and error in electronic voting and counting systems.

Before we support any bill, have the computer gurus in the progressive movement satisfied themselves that the bill in question adequately addresses all of these concerns.

I want to move forward as quickly as possible, but not at the cost of pretending to fully correct problems that are not in fact eliminated by the proposed legislation.

Andy, what's your take on how well this bill comprehensively addresses all reasonably-predictable problems?

what it does do...is it gives us a "paper ballot".

We are working Triage here.

How will this phrase be enforced: "All electronic records produced by any voting system will be consistent with the paper records"? In theory, my paper bollot can say one thing and the electronic vote can say another. If the two will not be compared for consistency unless there is a recount, how are we further along the road to election integrity, and how would we be spared a repeat of 2004?

First we get a paper ballot...then work on auditing.

This would be a huge step in the right direction and it doesn't restrict any form of auditing or recounting -- it enables them! The House bill also has some language about machine security which is helpful.

I too was of the opinion that we need the random auditing and the paper ballot all at once, but we have to take what we can get NOW and the rest will come in time. There are already initiatives underway at the state level to do the rest! Ballot initiatives are planned for 43 states for one thing. But this bill needs to be passed ASAP to get the paper in place by 2006.

I'm worried that if we get some change, either the public will lose interest, or the powers-that-be will absolutely block any further change.

Alternatively, if we accept the premise of the bill, as is, then we need to scrutinize the language used to make sure we detect and urge a cure for as many ambiguities as possible.

Many statutes are written in a way that creates more problems than solutions, because they are not carefully vetted by lawyers (on our side) who know how to craft legislative language.

...proposing a mandatory regimen of audits, which would compare the electronically coalesced vote totals against the totals found when scanning the barcodes(see below) that are printed on the paper "ballot." In turn, the barcode scan totals could be compared to their printed text counterparts. The audit of the printed text would be randomly selected and done by hand, at a percentage of the total -- say, for the sake of discussion - 35% to start. This percentage would be cripplingly expensive - year in year out, I suspect, but maybe it could get smaller as public confidence rises. Finally, a complete recount could be done if any inconsistencies became apparent or for the other various and sundry reasons that recounts need to occur.

I live in Nevada and I bet you might have guessed it with that Bingo-Recount Game I have going above. Our voting machines are touch-screen with a paper record of the vote. This paper record is in the form of a tape fed and gathered on rolls, I believe. Once the voter makes their way through the touch-screen ballot, they are prompted with a "last chance" screen that displays all of their votes. They are asked to recheck their selections and make changes as necessary. The voter then "casts" their ballot when no further changes are required. At that point, a printout displaying the voter's selections slides into view through a small window attached to the side of the touchscreen. The voter is asked to look to the paper record of the vote and if all is in order to push a submit button. Above their printed selections the voter notices a complex looking bar-code. Once the last review is complete and the voter is done, their paper record slides out of view in the window.

Let me say...I have NO confidence in electronic voting means. I work with computers enough to know that the ingenuity of geekdom can hack nearly anything and what they can't get the ingenuity of bad politics can....or the other way around or....Anyway, I can only allow for the use of electronic means in my own conception of it, if it can be verified up the wazoo. I love the idea of a paper ballot and a complete hand count, in principle. Nationwide, there would be month-long count-ins staffed by a veritable seas of altruistic and sharp eyed counters, there could be some great parties and hey let's take the month off....no wait...we could get all of our retirees to do it, they have a lot of time on their hands...no wait...we could just show up with a sleeping back and weeks-worth of clothes to the poll and we can count while we have a "sleep-over." O.K., seriously, who is going to pay for a hand recount of paper ballots for every race in America. It just ain't gonna happen. However, how's about wrapping our elections in another cloak of surety. The day after the election, nationwide, each state would get a bucket and throw in a bunch of lots, one for each race with the name of the race printed on the side of each lot. This could all be on TV...lots of pomp and circumstance and flashing lights, buzzer and ringing bells....no just joking, we wouldn't have any pomp and circumstance. Here is the KICKER...The governor asks some kindergartner up from the live audience to come and draw a lot and maybe draw a time or two more. The lots that are drawn have to have a hand recount...mandatoooooory.

...I can think of several concerns:

1. The reality of it is that people are really not as good at counting accurately as computers are. Realistically, the machines count every vote closer to perfection than a single hand-count could ever hope to achieve. The lion's share of problems arise, not from the machine's ability to count accurately, but from how the machine's human creators and administrators set them up or alter them to count. I like the idea of using machines for what they are good for, namely counting, but build in a comprehensive audit system and a series of random checks in the form of hand-counts done in a very public way.

2. So, doing a hand-count at the precinct means that you have a hand-count figure for the precinct, which then starts a journey of sorts. The concern then becomes the path that each precinct's hand-count figure travels along in the process of coalescing into the vote "pools" of our counties and states and ultimately our nation. Is it proposed that we add all of the hand-counts for all of the precincts of our nation by hand as well? At what point does the hand-count enter the electronic ether?

3. I don't believe that the logistics of an accurate and timely required hand-count are realistic now let alone in our future. If one proposes significant change to our election system, it is my hope that reform would be crafted with an eye to the future. And by future, I don't mean 2006, I mean 2056. While legislation can be made and changed, it can also be made and stay in place for an awfully long time. I wonder what those involved in the fight for the protection of our environment think of the Mining Law of 1872?

http://www.earthworksaction.org/ewa/1872.cfm

4. While we have a relatively engaged electorate at right now, this may not always be the case. Actually, is the electorate really engaged enough at this point to staff a nationwide hand-count?
What happens when fat and happy America decides to be more slothful too? What happens when we don't have enough people to count all of the votes? Do we hire them where there are shortages.

1. I'm not among the poll guru's, but there have been a lot of posts saying that hand counts generally are MORE accurate, not less, than scanned ballots. Apparently, most of Canada is done that way. I'm not arguing that all scanning equipment is suspect (it's been reported some may do better than others) but I'm not convinced the hand count is unachievable, practically or politically.

2. Hand counts at precincts, then going to county, then going to state. Some type of "chain of evidence" reciept systems might not be hard to implement. I'm not seeing that as formidable. Am I over-simplfying?

There have been suggestions that we need more precincts. I think that might be helpful. Smaller precincts would seem to help get the hand counting done, too. Perhaps, machine scan could be used for instant results, but the hand-count certifies.

Wilms wrote -- "I'm not among the poll guru's, but there have been a lot of posts saying that hand counts generally are MORE accurate, not less, than scanned ballots. Apparently, most of Canada is done that way. I'm not arguing that all scanning equipment is suspect (it's been reported some may do better than others) but I'm not convinced the hand count is unachievable, practically or politically."

O.K., let's put 100 people in a room and let them count 10,000 ballots. In another room, we could put a computer or two and let them count the same number. My money is on the computers for accuracy, but why worry about it if we back up the electronic means with audits and random checks. There are layers of accountability in this.

As for other countries completing a hand-count with out breaking a sweat...Canada, for example, has a population of 32,507,874 and a population growth rate of .92%. The United States has a population of 293,027,571 with pretty much the same growth rate at .92%. However, this means there are 26 million new Canadians every 10 years, as opposed to 234 million new Americans in 10 years time, assuming no change in the growth rate. Hand-counting a Canadian election is on altogether a different scale than hand-counting an American election now and will be more so as the years tick away.

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.ht...
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.ht...

In a country where the populace has been swallowed up by digitization, with little hope of coming back from a life spent swimming in 0's and 1's, the only island of the pre-digital age will be our voting system? Does it seem likely that this could be sold to the American public, successfully?...a public who has been so willing to let propaganda wash over them, so willing to surrender its freedoms, so willing to allow a soul-less group of hawks into office? The American public will be willing to dump all current investments in technology, develop a manual counting process, figure out how to fully fund and staff and implement it, all the while - lobbying this into legislation against the army of paid lobbyists grafting our congress at every turn, while still ensuring its integrity...and all by 2006? hmmmm!? I think this is a neo-Mennonite fantasy.

For the record, I was just issued a patent for a 0's and 1's device.

So I appreciate all the precise population data, as I appreciate how hackable digital devices can be.

Seems like we have @ 9X as many people as Canada. How about we use 9X the # of people to conduct our count as they do theirs?

With a population of 293,027,571 surely we could do this, even as we adjust for the population growth rate of .92%.

The original hand counting should take place at the precinct where the typical number of ballots is 300-700. Easily do-able in a couple of hours, especially if the Presidential Race is on a separate ballot from other issues and races.

The counting is done twice with observers and a clerk to tally the results. Ideally, the counting is done by volunteers from the community. This is the whole idea of "the vote of the people." The people are in charge. The counting process can also be filmed just in case it is needed. The results are also tied in to the total number of signatures of people signing in on the poll book. Any difference must be accounted for right there and then.

If there is difference of opinion among the counters about voter intent on a ballot, it gets referred to a committee. If two successive counts do not agree, a third count will be done.

The results are made public immediately.

The ballots themselves never need to be looked at again unless a recount is demanded by a candidate. They just go into a locked bag.


The county pulls together the results from all the precincts in the county. Others will do that as well. Some will even put the figures up on a web page. We can all check the accumulating totals for the county.

We know the county will make adjustments for Military Votes and other Absentee Votes and we understand that. The county must show how many votes of these types came from voters associated with each precinct, and locals can tell if the figures seem realistic. But we know we have an accurate total for all the votes that were actually cast at the precincts, and that constitutes the bulk of the votes cast in any election.

From there to the state level, it is just a matter of adding up the certified results from all the counties.

The "audit trail" is there with subtotals at every level. Total County recounts would never be necessary. We would know if a county left out some precincts or whatever.

What I am trying to say is --- the total population of the whole country has NOTHING to do with this problem and is a red herring.

He's new and deserves a warm welcome!

Would it also be appropriate for the PDA to launch one of their online petition drives for this bill and the House version?

definately!

And do you know anyone who could champion that effort?

got any ideas?

:shrug:

I'll get on it if Andy will remind me tomorrow.

:toast: :party: :loveya: :yourock:

Another nomination for the front page.

How enforcable would such a law be? I'm confused because I've been hearing that everything's up to the states, and nothing can really be done nationally without a Constitutional Amendment.

bought with HAVA money....would be required to produce a paper ballot.

It is a good thing.

I'm going to urge those senators to vote for the Democratic bill over the Republican bill.

:toast:

the Republican Bill is FAR better.

And use forceful language, and don't make it a secret that you're a liberal.

Please, not the Brier patch! Anywhere but the Brier patch!

;)

You're obviously trying to cause trouble. This is not about left or right! This is NON-PARTISAN.

the answer might be in this thread somewhere but i didn't see it.

why only these senators? what about the rest? what about Kerry, or Lautenberg....is it assumed that the Senators not mentioned would more than likely vote FOR the bill anyway?

Make it their idea.

Let them think they thought the whole thing up. Who cares? The point is we get what we need to save our democracy!

We don't know all the details of why previous bills didn't pass. It could be because they were just too complicated, had too many provisions, etc. These bills keep it simple (stupid). They get us the VVPB and that's a giant step in the right direction.

even if they are Dole and Burr. I'm thinking maybe I should copy your post (if that's OK) and go have a talk with them personally. Maybe if they realize that they wouldn't want NC republicans try to vote for them in the future and have Andy Griffith's name pop up, then they'll do everything they can to help get paper ballots across NC.

PS were you able to get your clothes taken care of in DC on inaug. day?

This well written DU post was discussed on United for SE conference call today. Glad to hear you're working at Velvet Rev. Best of Luck, keep up the good fight! Will get this out to many Ohio groups! They urged contact

:kick:

I thought I made Georgia's position very clear at the PDA Summit, Andy. This legislation will kill any chance of getting the Paper ballot as the COUNTED paper of record. This will ensure that the FAULTY Diebold software does the counting and put the burden of audits (AND YES THE COST AND TIME AS EACH COUNTY AVERAGES $1000 for an audit), do you want to pay for this state by state? IT IS NOT THE CITIZENS BURDEN TO PROVE A WORKING ELECTION SYSTEM. With computers anywhere in the mix, you have a system that according to Georgia Election code:

Vote Recorders:
"It shall be so constructed that an elector may readily learn the method of operating it; "

Computers are not accessible to us in Georgia as even the simplest Open records request for the CD, Andy, you should know, has resulted in You cannot have the data because "OCGA 50-18-72(f) an dit may contain information the disclosure of which would compromise security against sabotage or criminal or terrorist acts and the nondisclosure of which is necessary for the protection of life, safety, or public property."

IF you want to see our fight against Election fraud in GA go here
http://www.solarbus.org/stealyourelection/articles/0128-georgia.pdf

THIS RUSE OF A BILL if read carefully is setting activists like my group in Georgia back almost a year from our hard won efforts to secure that only the PAPER should be counted election night.

Forcing me and my friends to have to pay enormous sums of money to do election audits and doing only thru 3rd party candidates which in GA there are none cause ballot access is too high so we never get Pres. candidates that are 3rd party to effectively get ballot access in Georgia, AND THIS BILL IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. The only high ground any of us should support is a bill looking similar to this one we have already drafted for Georgia

STOP ALL THIS MADNESS AND GO FOR THE HIGHGROUND. Otherwise you cement that ability of Diebold to steal our elections for evermore.. Andy you know better than this...that we all go back to a paper ballot and the only thing a computer does is print us a ballot, that's it. COMPUTERS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO COUNT Votes no matter how secure you think (open source or whatever) we are opening our democracy up for a big huge opportunity to be hacked no matter what graft and corruption will go into that little hiding place of a software program and we cannot let this proceed.....

Please email me if you have questions.. .DO NOT SUPPORT THIS BILL.. get Hillary to rewrite her bill to read

CITIZEN COUNTED
CITIZEN SECURED
CITIZEN TRANSPORTED

Paper Ballots where the paper is what is counted on election night...
that is all we are willing to accept at this point.

What is going on here?

THIS BILL IS UNACCEPTABLE!

sorry to have to ask.. this is more important than you can possibly know...

TELL ME THE TITLE OF THE TREAD

Here's the problem with Andy Stephen's Ensign Bill as outlined...
1. It puts the burden of counting the paper on citizens
2. It puts a huge cost burden on citizens.
3. It Gives the Diebold Software supremacy as the counted record Eletion night (in GA we are 100% diebold, so this is a huge problem, cause the software is coded to default to certain repub. pres. candidates, to lose the novotes/undervote percentages and to shave 3rd party candidate votes)
4. It gives legitimacy to computerized voting like there can be a 'better or more perfect computerized voting scheme'. Lynn Landis is the expert on this, we take her high ground, there can be no computer usage other than a great big printer... go to www.ecotalk.com
5. Puts us in the situation we have in GA, when you ask for the digital files to 'audit' the computer, Georgia has this handy little 'baby patriot act' called 50-18-82 where they say you cannot access the software because you might cause terrorist acts... give me a break, citizens asking for voting data will be seen as wanting to cause terrorist acts... don't believe me, read the letter from Cathy Cox Office (georgia's secretary of state who ushered in the Diebold hell in GA)
http://www.solarbus.org/stealyourelection/articles/0128-georgia.pdf


Georgia has 159 counties, the cost per county averages $1500 to get the printouts of the Diebold tapes (receipts) as well as provisionals and absentee and labor charges. This would rack up up to $500K in just doing a full audit of the Georgia election (and put me exactly where I am today). Does Andy plan on lending all 50 states the money to do this counting?

The problem is right now Georgia IS NOT GIVING US THE DATA. They are denying access to the CD that contains the source / primary digital data from which the Georgia totals were calculated claiming it has Diebold software and using this asinine Georgia code to suggest to their Elections workers to break a law (The Georgia Open Records law clearly requires them to provide me the data). We have been told by ACLU, and 3 other law firms denying access to the CD is unlawful end of story, but still we have to pay our time/money fighting this battle.


DON'T LET THE ROVE REPUBLICANS STEAL THIS ISSUE. NOTICE ON ANDY'S LIST ALL THE REPUKES that were listed.. we need to work with Hillary Clinton who has her own elections bill and get it written from ground up correctly to go back to counting paper.. sorry if states spent millions on stupid computers, but that's not our problem. if Ireland could go from spending $45M on computers back to paper, so can we in the US...

It is triage! The other bills do not address the VVPB issue. from Verified Voting's website.

"Requires the voter-verified record to be the official record used for any recount. Clearest language of the three bills"

http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5074

And then you'll open a new thread

the thing this bill does is mandates a "paper ballot" what we do with that ballot we work out at a later date. Right now it is vital to get the "paper ballot" language. We are doing triage here people.

Ensigns bill gives us a "paper ballot"...We can figure out what to do with that "paper ballot" next. Right now we need to stop the bleeding. Many states are poised to purchase electronic voting machines. This will force them to buy machines with a "paper ballot"

Forrest for the trees here.

Andy

Is quite "naive" to put yourself in the hands of Republicans for this topic.

Ensign's is better. Plain and simple. Believe me...if I thought it was bad I would not be sticking my neck out on this. I don't care who proposes the bill as long as it mandates a paper ballot. Dodd's bill opens the door for vote here and other wacky schemes.

After we get the ballot then we go for the other things we need and want. Again this is triage.

Andy

Millions should hear about this and she'll talk to you!

and at the moment, all branches of the government are controlled by the Republicans, you don't have much choice if you want a bill passed.

The bill looks good to me and I trust Andy and Rox.


The taste of Republican butt does not improve with age.

"The NeoCons can't be bargained with. They can't be reasoned with. They do not feel pity, or remorse, or fear. And they absolutely will not stop, ever, until you are dead.

David Allen
www.blackboxvoting.com
www.thoughtcrimes.org

are where our focus should be because of republican majorities everywhere.... we can only win now by saying the electronic voting machines are fraudulent.. to my knowledge, GA is the only state mounting such a challenge...

http://www.solarbus.org/stealyourelection/articles/0128-georgia.pdf

I, like Howard Dean, do not settle for 2nd best. I go for the highroad and will win there.... I will not worry about the other things later, this bill if passed will end all debate on election reform in senate. It's more strategic for me to let the worse version of this pass and beat it up on legal courts than to pass Andy's version which is a defacto 'shutup you activists' when we go to get the paper counted....

NO WAY NO WAY NO WAY... I"m tired of this crap. My life has become very unidimensional because we are not counting the paper (I basically send out open records request every second of every minute of every day). and it's tiring.... NO WAY!!!

a paper ballot to count. Ensigns bill gives us that!

Read the Bill!

Legal challenges are where our focus should be because of republican majorities everywhere.... we can only win now by saying the electronic voting machines are fraudulent.. to my knowledge, GA is the only state mounting such a challenge...

I disagree. You are not going to be able to win in court because you are not going to be able to prove fraud.

Legislative bills are the way to go. I'm sorry, you are not going to overturn the 2004 election. I would have though that obvious by now.

David Allen
www.blackboxvoting.com
www.thoughtcrimes.org

"We can figure out what to do with that "paper ballot" next."

I don't understand your position here. Do you mean that we leave this up to the states? Or that it would be codified in a national bill amendment later?

It seems to me that the KEY is not JUST getting a paper ballot but, EXACTLY WHAT IS THE NATURE OF IT (i.e., is it just a printout from the machines or something the voter has actually marked personally) and THEN, WHAT DO WE DO WITH IT (i.e., is it just a random audit, or do we hand count all these ballots at the precinct level)?

Do you realize there are many jurisdictions that have nothin but electronic ballots?

To get to hand counted ballots...you must first have a ballot to count right?

Ensigns bill corrects this defect in HAVA.

What is the NATURE of the ballot? Is it one the voter marks or is it a receipt from the machine? I could see that the machine could be programmed to later spit out ballots with "different results" than what the voter verified and that substituted ballot could get counted instead. How do you prevent "ballot switching" unless it is in fact marked by the voter? And shouldn't those ballots be printed with a number so that they are sequential and cannot be later substituted with a falsified ballot? Or so that ballots cannot be added in later, after the polls are closed (or stuffed into the box beforehand)? And then, once you have such a voter-verified ballot, how do you ensure that the results as printed out by the machine actually match the true vote count? Unless you were to actually count up the votes on the ballots and match them to the machine printouts, you won't know that they match. And is the audit provision designed to that it occurs RANDOMLY, and at the precinct locations immediately after the election, or is it something done after the fact, that is, at the state/central tabulating location, and after someone could have a chance to manipulate the results so the audit matches the machine count?

We must cut to the chase NOW and get rid of the e-voting machines altogether.

I will not support this bill.

It is one more gift to the corporations. More business for them at the taxpayers' expense. And gets us no closer to accurate verified vote-counting than we already are. It might make some voters feel more confident, but it is a false confidence.

Step 3 in Andy's "Triage" idea will never happen. We gave you your paper ballots. That's enough. Can't you just hear the argument?

What is the NATURE of the ballot?

Paper

Is it one the voter marks or is it a receipt from the machine?

Could be either. In Washington state we have a mix of optical scan ballots and touch screens. Immediately we need the touchscreens producing a ballot that is the ballot of record.

I could see that the machine could be programmed to later spit out ballots with "different results" than what the voter verified and that substituted ballot could get counted instead.

Same thing could happen with a hand counted paper scheme.

How do you prevent "ballot switching" unless it is in fact marked by the voter?

If the voter sees the ballot befor it is deposited into a box as long as it has been verified by the voter...I am ok with the DRE's being a big ballot printer.

And shouldn't those ballots be printed with a number so that they are sequential and cannot be later substituted with a falsified ballot?

No the we get into the possibility of finding out how someone voted by matching up serial numbers with voters.

Or so that ballots cannot be added in later, after the polls are closed (or stuffed into the box beforehand)?

Same thing again can happen in a hand counted paper scheme as well

And then, once you have such a voter-verified ballot, how do you ensure that the results as printed out by the machine actually match the true vote count?

Robust random auditing

Unless you were to actually count up the votes on the ballots and match them to the machine printouts, you won't know that they match.

Your right and as the next thrust we need to address auditing

And is the audit provision designed to that it occurs RANDOMLY, and at the precinct locations immediately after the election, or is it something done after the fact, that is, at the state/central tabulating location, and after someone could have a chance to manipulate the results so the audit matches the machine count?

The random audits would be called by the opposing candidates...not the election official. The candidates know best which ones to audit. Ideally audits will be done the night of the election.

"What is the NATURE of the ballot?

Paper

Is it one the voter marks or is it a receipt from the machine?

Could be either. In Washington state we have a mix of optical scan ballots and touch screens. Immediately we need the touchscreens producing a ballot that is the ballot of record."

I am sorry to disagree but the touchscreen produces a RECEIPT, not a ballot. Since it is a printout, another printout could easily be substituted in its place with the incorrect votes.

"I could see that the machine could be programmed to later spit out ballots with "different results" than what the voter verified and that substituted ballot could get counted instead.

Same thing could happen with a hand counted paper scheme."

How? If the ballot boxes are transparent so that everyone sees the ballots going into the box and no one "slips one in" that doesn't belong there, how can a ballot be switched?" Then, if those ballots are tallied up at the end of the election, and all the votes are counted, where is the opportunity for fraud? We have a precinct-based voting system, which presents an ideal opportunity for hand-counting ballots and votes. Even if we only hand count the key races, i.e., top of the ticket, federal and state races, it shouldn't take that long!

Furthermore, Andy, I do not see your wording regarding the audits, etc. in Ensign's bill. You are interpreting what it actually says.

I'm not trying to be a contrarian; I just don't think we should agree to/push for anything that isn't spelled out in detail and gives us what we want!

I REALLY, FIRMLY believe that there should be a hearing held, such as the one for social security, on TV, at which the experts testify and give their input on this and other bills proposed. I don't think the senators involved should be encouraged to vote for anything until/unless they get the proper education. Clearly, that didn't happen last time and look where we are!

Please read the info at this link which lays out exactly why this bill is so important on a national basis. Do you want another ten or twenty states in the same situation as Georgia or do you want Georgia to be forced to back off?

1. http://ballotintegrity.org/WhyVIVA2005.pdf

remember legislative can always (and usually does) get overturned by courts.

In Georgia no one can force me to do anything but to count the paper right now county by county, to pursue the legal suits around the stolen Diebold equipment and to continue at my little snail's pace making huge progress everyday (Chatham county giving me data as of today). and other cool things... I don't need a slowmoving federal initiative to do things and even when it gets enacted nothing stopping me from challenging it using a variety of Georgia election codes to say it's downright unconstitutional to have a ballot of record that is not also what is counted.. computers may be faster at counting than humans, but once you RING THE BELL for a candidate the day after you better be right, cause it's very hard to UNRING the bell... other countries with far larger paper ballots to count do so in 24 hours, why can't we get better at counting and pass bills that standardize the method and auditors who do the counting.. why make the poor poll workers do it?

jeez.. this is so simple... but Ensign's bill is a huge big bad NO NO NO NO NO NO NO... i mean double no....

Bob Kibrick
Legislative Analyst
VerifiedVoting.org
http://www.verifiedvoting.org

Analysis of S. 17

General comments:

There are a couple of good provisions in this bill (e.g., Sec. 5, Provisional Ballots, and Sec. 7, Election Day Registration), but most of the rest are extremely problematic.

Specific comments:

1. Section 2. Finding and Purposes

Subsection (a) ("Findings") contains several paragraphs of lofty sounding platitudes (including words from Lincoln). It asserts that "the right of all eligible citizens to vote and have their vote counted is the cornerstone of a democratic form of government…” But it says nothing about a right of citizens to have their vote counted in a manner that is accurate and verifiable.

Subsection (b) ("Purposes") include paragraph (3), which calls for the expanding/establishing requirements and standards to provide for the accessibility, accuracy, verifiability, privacy, and security of all voting systems and technology used in Federal elections. Unfortunately, the provisions, which follow in Section 4, fall short of providing either accuracy and verifiability.

2. Section 3. National Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot

This creates a new section (Sec. 321 under HAVA Title III and Sec. 297 under HAVA Title II) that would establish a Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot. The actual format of this ballot and the standards under which it would be distributed and processed are not fully defined in this bill but are left to the EAC to define.

While this section may be well intended (i.e., to provide one more way of ensuring that voters, especially overseas voters, can be assured of at least casting a vote for Federal offices), it contains a terrible loophole in the proposed §321(b)(2), found on page 5,
lines 1 through 8 of this draft, which reads:

"(2) DEADLINE.- An otherwise eligible national Federal write-in absentee ballot shall be counted if postmarked or signed before the close of the polls on election day and received by the appropriate State election official on or before the date which is 10 days after the date of the election or the date provided for receipt of absentee ballots under State law, whichever is later.


I have highlighted the "or" between "postmarked" and "signed". The problem with this deadline is that it provides no mechanism for confirming that a ballot was indeed signed before the close of the polls. What if a voter completes such a ballot after the close of the polls, backdates it, signs it, and pops it in the mail? So long as it arrives within the 10-day window specified in this paragraph, it is to be counted, even if arrives with no postmark or a postmark indicating it was mailed after the close of the polls.

When coupled with the provision to make such Federal write-in absentee ballots (as contained in the proposed §297(b)(1), found on page 7, lines 1 through 3 of this draft), the deadline loophole creates the potential for widespread casting of such ballots after the polls have closed.

3. Section 4 Voter Verified Ballots

Despite its title, this section does little to establish any meaningful requirement for voter verified ballots while at the same time interfering with the rights of States to establish requirements for voter-verified paper ballots. It leaves the ambiguous language of HAVA's manual audit capacity requirement (§301(a)(2)) unchanged, and while it calls upon the EAC to establish uniform and non-discriminatory standards for meeting that requirement , it sets no deadline by which those standards must be established.

Instead of correcting the known deficiencies in the existing language of HAVA §301(a), it tacks on a new paragraph (7) ("Voter Verified Ballots") at the end of that subsection. There it establishes a requirement, effective 1/1/2009, that voting systems must provide voters with "an independent means of voter verification...which allows each voter to verify the ballot before it is cast and counted". It further requires the voting system to provide voters a choice of 4 different verification options: a paper record, audio record, pictorial record, or electronic/accessible record.

Unfortunately, this new paragraph (7) is incredibly deficient in establishing any meaningful requirement for a voter-verified ballot, because:

a) This paragraph does not itself explicitly define what it means for a voter to "verify the ballot". Unlike other pending VVPB legislation (e.g., Ensign's VIVA bill), it does not require that the voter be able to verify "the accuracy of their ballot". While the existing HAVA §301(a)(1)(A)(i) specifies that a voting system must "permit the voter to verify...the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted", that language does not include verification by the voter that the votes selected on the ballot represent the voter's intent. For example, miscalibrated touch screens sometimes register "voter selections" other than what the voter intended.

b) It fails to make any explicit provision for the voter to be able correct any error that the voter discovers on any such a voter verified ballot record. While the existing language of HAVA §301(a)(ii) makes provision for the voter to "change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted", that clause makes no reference to the "voter verified ballot records" that are newly-defined in this paragraph; rather, §301(a)(ii) refers only to the "ballot", which could be construed as the non-voter-verified electronic record inside a DRE voting machine. Thus, if the voting system produces a "voter verified ballot record" (either paper, audio, pictorial, or electronic) that is incorrect, the voter is afforded the opportunity to verify that it is wrong, but then what? Note that while there is a conforming amendment (see page 9 lines 18 through 23) which amends §301(a)(i) to make reference to this newly-added paragraph (7) ("Voter Verified Ballots"), there is no corresponding conforming amendment for §301(a)(ii).

c) This paragraph makes no specification that the voter verified ballot record needs to be permanent. For example, it does not require that the audio or pictorial records be maintained after voters have cast their ballots, nor does it provide any specification of what those records are or how they would be produced. Is a pictorial record a photo of the selected candidate? What would be the pictorial record for a ballot measure?

d) Nor does it specify that the voter verified ballot record becomes a permanent record only after the voter has certified that such a record accurately reflects the voter's intent.

e) It fails to specify that the voter verified ballot record (whatever its format) needs to preserved in any way.

f) It fails to specify that the voter-verified ballot record is itself an official record of the voter's vote, rather than merely a vehicle for assuring the voter that any non-voter-verified electronic record (maintained invisibly inside a DRE voting machine) is correct.

g) It fails to establish that in any discrepancy between a non-voter-verified (and invisible) electronic ballot record and a voter-verified ballot record that the voter-verified ballot record shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast.

h) It fails to establish that the voter-verified ballot records shall be the official records used for purposes of any recount or audit.

In addition, by imposing a requirement that any voting system must provide voters a choice of the 4 different methods of verification, it would effectively prevent after 1/1/2009 any further deployment of currently-designed optically scanned ballot systems (including precinct-count optical scanners and associated ballot marking devices), since those systems do not provide these 4 choices. This would further narrow the range of existing HAVA compliant voting technologies from which States could choose to meet their voting needs, and, over time, would force States to ultimately move to DRE voting machines.

Further, requiring each voting system to provide these 4 different methods of verifying a voter-verified ballot record will add consider expense to any system that meets such a requirement.

In addition, if the voter-verified ballot records are to be used to conduct any type of meaningful audit or recount, elections officials will be forced to deal with four different flavors of such voter-verified ballot records, thereby greatly increasing the cost, complexity, and likelihood for error in any such recount or audit.

With regard to the 1/1/2009 date specified in this paragraph (7), not only do these vague and ill-defined requirements not become effective until that date but any voting systems purchased before that date "in order to meet the requirements of paragraph (3)(B)" are permanently exempted from meeting the "voter-verified ballot" requirements of this paragraph (see page 9, lines 14 through 17):

(7)(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not apply to any voting system purchased before January 1, 2009, in order to meet the requirements of paragraph (3)(B).


The referenced paragraph (3)(B) of HAVA §301(a) reads:

satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least 1 direct recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place.

Note that (3)(B) says jurisdictions must deploy "at least 1" such system to meet its requirement but does not preclude them from deploying more than one. As a result, a jurisdiction might argue that all of the new voting systems it deployed were done so as to comply with HAVA's §301(a)(3)(B) requirement.

Taken together, this essentially means that any voting systems purchased prior to 1/1/2009 will be exempt from the "voter verified ballot" requirements of this paragraph (7), which means that hardly any machines will be required to comply with this requirement. Given the significant amount of new HAVA funding ($2 billion) proposed for FY 2006 in Sec. 16 of this bill (see page 25, line 7), most jurisdictions will have installed their new voting systems well before 1/1/2009, and will thus be exempt from even the vague "voter verified ballot" requirements of this section.

In any case, by creating such a late deadline, this paragraph fails to put in place ANY voter verified ballot requirement in time for the next Presidential election in 2008.

In summary, the "voter-verified ballot" requirements established in Section 4 of this bill do little to provide any meaningful voter-verified ballot requirement on any useful time scale. Longer term, they will impose complex, ill-defined, and costly mandates on the States, potentially interfering with State-level voter verified paper ballot bills that have already been passed into law by a number of States, and further restricting the range of HAVA-compliant choices from which States can choose to meet their voting system needs. Other Federal legislation (pertaining to voter-verified ballots) that is about to be introduced (e.g., Sen. Ensign's Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005 and Rep. Holt's Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005) does not suffer from the numerous deficiencies identified for Sen. Dodd's bill.

Section 5. Requirements for Counting Provisional Ballots

No concerns

Section 6. Minimum Required Voting Systems & Poll Workers in Polling Places

Provisions are well intended but need further refinement. For example, in subsection (b) of the new Section 299 proposed for addition to the new subtitle E of Title II (see page 13, lines 12 through 15), the language calls for:

"(b) DISTRIBUTION. - The standards described in subsection (a) shall provide for a uniform and nondiscriminatory geographic distribution of such systems and workers"

"Geographic distribution" seems to be a poor method for specifying this; it could be read to require a given number of voting systems per square mile, regardless of the population density.

Section 7. Election Day Registration

No comments

Section 8. Integrity of Voter Registration List

Provisions are well intended but inadequate. Would be more effective if the required public notice prior to an election for Federal office listed all names of voter removed from the registration list since the most recent Federal election, regardless of whether those names had previously appeared on any such lists between that prior election and the one about to occur.

Section 9. Early Voting

Provisions are well intended, but might not give sufficient flexibility to the States and local jurisdictions. For example, the requirement for uniform hours of operation for each day of early voting might not provide for optimal accessibility in certain circumstances and locations, e.g., in towns where the schedules of residents are dominated by factory schedules that might vary on different days of the week.

Section 10. Acceleration of Study on Election Day as a Public Holiday

No comments

Section 11. Improvements to Voting Systems

Subsection (a) of this section would amend HAVA §301(a)(1)(B) to remove punch card voting systems and central count voting systems. The net effect would be to prohibit the use of such systems for ballots that are cast in a polling place. (Presumably, such systems could still be used for mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots).

While it is probably a worthwhile goal to phase out the continued use of central count punch card systems for votes cast in the polling place (because such systems fail to provide any protections against over-voting or under-voting), the proposed language would also prohibit the use of precinct-count punch card systems, which might not be advisable.

Large jurisdictions (e.g., Chicago) have made extremely effective use of precinct-count punch card systems, providing the same level of protections against over-voting and under-voting as are provided by precinct-count optical scan systems.

Further analysis is needed as to where precinct-count punch card systems should be banned, as this proposed language would do.

Section 12. Voter Registration

There are some good provisions in this section, but the proposal for voter registration via the Internet raises serious concerns. It would create the potential for wide scale, automated, and anonymous alterations of voter registration lists from any location on the globe. Given the currently unchecked abuses of Internet spammers, the prevalence of viruses that silently infect millions of machines and enlist them to engage in malicious attacks on other systems, and the potential for denial of service attacks on voter registration systems, and you have the potential for widespread voter registration havoc. Many of the same concerns that make Internet voting problematic make an Internet-based voter registration system equally problematic.

Section 13. Voter ID

No comments

Section 14. Impartial Administration

This section mandates that States must allow "uniform and nondiscriminatory access to any polling place for the purposes of observing a Federal election" to various groups, including:
(A) Party challengers
(B) voting rights and civil rights organizations
(C) nonpartisan and domestic observers and international observers

This could have unintended consequences and could pose additional burdens on States and jurisdictions with respect to size requirements of polling places.

A BILL

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent record or hardcopy under title III of such Act, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2004'.

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH PRESERVATION OF A VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER RECORD.

(a) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (1)(A)--

(A) by striking clause (i) and inserting the following new clause:

`(i) permit the voter to verify the accuracy of their ballot (in a private and independent manner), by allowing the voter to review an individual paper version of the voter's ballot before the voter's ballot is cast and counted;';

(B) in clause (ii)--

(i) by inserting `discovered on the individual paper version of the voter's ballot' after `to change the ballot or correct any error'; and

(ii) by striking `and' after the semicolon at the end;

(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and

(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following new clause:

`(iii)(I) preserve the individual paper version of the voter's ballot, after the voter has certified that the same accurately reflects the voter's intent, as the individual permanent paper record, and

`(II) preserve such individual permanent paper record at the polling place in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2)(B)(i); and';

(2) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking `subparagraph (A)(iii)' and inserting `subparagraph (A)(iv)'; and

(3) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraph:

`(2) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The voting system shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each ballot that is cast which provides for voter verification of such record in accordance with paragraph (1)(A) and which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The voting system shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each ballot cast that is either--

`(I) preserved within the polling place in the manner in which all other paper ballots are preserved within such polling place; or

`(II) in the absence of such manner or method, which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving paper ballots in general.

`(ii) Each paper record produced under clause (i) shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent or superior to that of a paper ballot voting system.

`(iii) All electronic records produced by any voting system shall be consistent with the individual permanent paper records produced by such voting system. In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records, the individual permanent paper records shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast.

`(iv) The individual permanent paper records produced under clause (i) shall be used as the official records for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.'.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this section shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

H. R. 2239

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent record or hardcopy under title III of such Act, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 22, 2003

Mr. HOLT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

A BILL

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent record or hardcopy under title III of such Act, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003'.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF TIME PROVIDED FOR STATES TO REQUEST PAYMENTS UNDER TITLE I.

(a) PAYMENTS FOR ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS- Section 101(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15301(a)) is amended by striking `not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act' and inserting `not later than the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November 2003'.

(b) PAYMENTS FOR REPLACEMENT OF PUNCH CARD OR LEVER VOTING MACHINES- Section 102(b)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15301(b)(1)) is amended by striking `not later than the date that is 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act' and inserting `not later than the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November 2003'.

(c) EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 104(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15304(a)) is amended by striking `$650,000,000' and inserting `an aggregate amount of $650,000,000 for fiscal years 2003 and 2004'.

(2) DATE FOR TRANSFER TO ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION OF UNOBLIGATED FUNDS- Section 104(c)(2)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15304(c)(2)(B)) is amended by striking `September 1, 2003' and inserting `January 1, 2004'.

(d) REQUIREMENT TO DEPLOY INTERIM MEASURE IF WAIVER REQUESTED- Section 102(a)(3)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15301(a)(3)(B)) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, except that any State requesting any such waiver shall accept and implement a paper system for use on an interim basis as provided in section 5(b) of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 in time for use in the November 2004 general election.'.

SEC. 3. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM CERTAIN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL- Section 205 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15325) is amended by striking subsection (e).

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to contracts entered into by the Election Assistance Commission on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT RECORD OR HARD COPY.

(a) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:

`(2) VOTER-VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(A) VOTER-VERIFICATION IN GENERAL- The voting system shall produce a voter-verified paper record suitable for a manual audit equivalent or superior to that of a paper ballot box system, as further specified in subparagraph (B).

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record, each individual paper record of which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved within the polling place in the manner in which all other paper ballots are preserved within the polling place on Election Day for later use in any manual audit.

`(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error made by the system before the permanent record is preserved for use in any manual audit.

`(iii) The voter verified paper record produced under subparagraph (A) and this subparagraph shall be available as an official record and shall be the official record used for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is used.

`(C) SOFTWARE AND MODEMS-

`(i) No voting system shall at any time contain or use undisclosed software. Any voting system containing or using software shall disclose the source code of that software to the Commission, and the Commission shall make that source code available for inspection upon request to any citizen.

`(ii) No voting system shall contain any wireless communication device at all.

`(iii) All software and hardware used in any electronic voting system shall be certified by laboratories accredited by the

Commission as meeting the requirements of clauses (i) and (ii).'.

(b) VOTER VERIFICATION OF RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES- Section 301(a)(3) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(3) is amended--

(1) in the heading, by inserting `AND VOTER-VERIFICATION OF RESULTS' after `ACCESSIBILITY';

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking `; and' and inserting the following: `, and such voting system shall provide a mechanism for voter-verification of results which separates the function of vote generation from the function of vote casting in a manner analogous to that described in section 4 with respect to the separation of paper ballot generation and paper ballot verification and preservation, but does not require the use of paper.';

(3) by amending subparagraph (C) to read as follows:

`(C) The equipment deployed in accordance with subparagraph (B) shall meet the voting system standards for disability access and voter-verification of results as outlined in this paragraph in accordance with the deadline set forth in section 5(a), provided that if it does not and an interim paper system is deployed in accordance with section 5(b), disabled voters shall have the option of using the interim paper system with the assistance of an aide of the voter's personal selection or using the voting system otherwise put in place for use by disabled voters at the time in question in accordance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002, as in effect prior to the enactment of this Act, except that the deadline set forth in section 301(a)(3)(C) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(3)(C)) is moved forward from January 1, 2007, to January 1, 2006.'; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(D) Election officials shall be instructed in the rights of the disabled to vote with the assistance of an aide of their selection under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'.

(c) SPECIFIC, DELINEATED REQUIREMENT OF STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF BEST PRACTICES- In addition to any other requirements under the Help America Vote Act of 2002, the Election Assistance Commission shall study, test, and develop best practices to enhance accessibility and voter-verification mechanisms for disabled voters.

SEC. 5. CHANGE IN DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS.

(a) IN GENERAL- Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(d)) is amended by striking `on and after January 1, 2006' and inserting `in time for elections for Federal office beginning with the regularly scheduled general election to be held in November 2004'.

(b) INTERIM PAPER SYSTEM- Each State and jurisdiction that certifies in the manner described in section 102(a)(3)(B) that it shall be unable to comply with the requirements of section 301 in time for the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office to be held in November 2004 shall receive a paper voting system, based on paper systems in use in the jurisdiction, if any, at the expense of the Commission that shall be deemed compliant with section 301 by the Commission for use in the November 2004 general elections.

SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR FEDERAL CERTIFICATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SECURITY OF VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS.

Section 303(a)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15483(a)(3)) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, as certified by the Commission.'.

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY RECOUNTS.

The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records of each election for Federal office (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office) in .5 percent of the jurisdictions in each State and .5 percent of the overseas jurisdictions in which voter-verified records are preserved in accordance with this section immediately following each general election for Federal office, and shall promptly publish the results of those recounts. The treatment of the results of the recount shall be governed by applicable Federal, State, or local law, except that any individual who is a citizen of the jurisdiction involved may file an appeal with the Commission if the individual believes that such law does not provide a fair remedy.

SEC. 8. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Except as provided in section 3(b), the amendments made by this Act shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.2239:

The companion is going to be introduced by Cong. Gravell of Nevada and will be limited to the language in the Ensign Bill. Cong. Holt is introducing a new bill which is MUCH better than last year's, though it still has a lot of problems on the auditing side. It isn't quite finalized yet, but I've read a nearly final draft of it.

The thing is that the Ensign Bill and its House companion have a strong chance of getting passed rapidly and are well done. Verified Voting had input as to the wording and Congressman Holt's key aide believes it's quite good. Once it's passed, we can push other bills to get the votes counted and audited transparently. But if we take our eye off this ball, the states WILL purchase paperless DRE's and a bill that doesn't require paper WILL pass if anything does.

That's the choice.

my bad on the companion bill.

Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005 (Introduced in House)

HR 278 IH

109th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 278

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require voting systems to produce a verifiable paper record of each vote cast and to ensure the security of electronic data, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 6, 2005

Mr. KING of Iowa introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

A BILL

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require voting systems to produce a verifiable paper record of each vote cast and to ensure the security of electronic data, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005'.

SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS.

(a) Production of Permanent, Individually Verifiable Paper Record of Each Vote Cast- Section 301(a)(2)(B) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)(B)) is amended--

(1) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and

(2) by striking clauses (i) and (ii) and inserting the following:

`(i) After the voter enters a vote on the voting system, the system shall provide the voter with an auditable paper record showing how the vote will be recorded by the system, and the voter shall use such record to verify that the vote shown is the vote the voter intends to cast.

`(ii) If the voter does not verify that the vote shown on a record provided under clause (i) is the vote the voter intends to cast, the system shall provide the voter with the opportunity to change the ballot and correct any error in the vote, and shall provide the voter with a new auditable paper record under such clause that reflects the change or correction made by the voter.

`(iii) Once a voter verifies that the vote shown on a paper record provided under clause (i) is the vote the voter intends to cast (whether verified as originally entered or as changed and corrected as described in clause (ii)), the vote shall be final and the record shall serve as a permanent paper record of the vote.'.

(b) Prohibiting Removal of Paper Record From Polling Place; Clarifying Purposes for Which Record May Be Used- Clause (iv) of section 301(a)(2)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)(B)), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, and for such other official purposes as may be provided under State law, and may be removed from the polling place by and otherwise made available to an appropriate election official for such purposes, but the record (including any duplicate of the record or any photographic image of the record) may not be removed from the polling place by any other person or for any other purpose.'.

(c) Requiring Voluntary Voting System Guidelines to Include Guidelines to Ensure Security of Electronic Data- Section 221(b)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15361(b)(1)) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, including guidelines to ensure the security of any data which is transmitted or received electronically by voting systems'.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this Act shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

I think Ensign's bill is better than this one and this one wasn't introduced by Gravell. I await the next House version, but keep in mind they all go to the same committee anyway -- Ney's.

I am anxious to read the rest of this thread. I had to actually step away from my PC for a while, right around the time of rigel99's post, but I can't see anything wrong with your logic.

I hope we can have unanimity on this one!

Who is that?

Thanks to you posting this link on another thread.

<http://www.wheresthepaper.org/whattodo.html>

Senator John Ensign of Nevada has introduced S2437, the Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2004, which requires a voter-verified paper audit trail. We urge passage of this bill. Please telephone your two US Senators, 1-800-839-5276, and ask them to co-sponsor S2437.



Interesting site, Bill. Thanks for posting.

I did start to search out bills on these sites.

<http://thomas.loc.gov/>

<http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/g_three_sections_with_teasers/legislative_home.htm>

"All electronic records produced by any voting system shall be consistent with the individual permanent paper records produced by such voting system. In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records, the individual permanent paper records shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast."

This could be translated to mean that the voter verified ballot matches the paper printout of the votes by the machines. How will you know if that printout indeed accurately reflects the true vote count unless you have the capability of counting the votes as cast on the ballots and then matching them to the printout? How will you even be able to identify "any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records" if you don't, in fact, hand count and tally the individual voter ballots?

you said "This could be translated to mean that the voter verified ballot matches the paper printout of the votes by the machines. " There is only 1 ballot. The one verified by the voter...you me whomever. What is important here, is, the VOTER VERIFIED that his/her PAPER BALLOT matched what they circled on an optical scan ballot or a ballot printed from a touchscreen and Ensigns bill goes further and paper trumps the machine "inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records, the individual permanent paper records shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast."(From Ensign's Bill).

You also say "How will you even be able to identify any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records?"

By hand counting the paper ballots....Because there will be a ballot to count.

I posted this question on another thread but now don't remember where--Whatever happened with the election server you were checking out??

is with Arnebeck et'al. Since I was working for them. They have plans for it...what i am not sure. But they are going to use it from what I have been told.

Please listen to Andy (and Joan and others with National Ballot Integrity Project.) They have been working on these issues for years, and are NOT naive about this.

1) Andy is right, this is triage. We have to do SOMETHING before any more counties buy more paperLESS DREs under HAVA. Many counties, including my own, are moving quickly toward grabbing pretty much any system that they think is HAVA-compliant. Once these paperless machines are purchased we are probably looking at YEARS if not DECADES before they ever will be replaced. And it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get them retrofitted to produce paper ballots.

2) Once these paperless machines are bought and put in place, we are also going to be stuck with the faulty Diebold or other tabulating software that goes along with them anyway, probably for a long time as per #1, and NO PAPER at all!

3) Given the current political climate (GOP controls everything) any bill without GOP sponsorship and support is virtually doomed. VIVA, if handled right, can be the Republicans' "idea" and might actually have a real chance of getting passed in the foreseeable future.

4) Once VIVA is passed, we can always go back and ask for additional amendment, such as what to do with the Voter Verified Paper Ballots as in mandatory sample audits, recounts, etc. But if we get something that allows bad systems to be slipped in, we may be stuck with them, again for many years.

5) Since voting is still a state right at this time, I think that states would be free to pass standards IN EXCESS of what VIVA would require.

6) The VIVA bill isn't even written fully yet. Instead of fighting on here like a bunch of cats before it is even written, why don't we give input and then let those who have the background and lobbying clout do their job?

7) As for 100% paper... I am a pollworker myself for over 15 years. While I personally might stay as long as it takes to count paper, I know how hard it is to get people to stay to the end and finish the job correctly now, even as it is (we still have lever machines). 100% paper would never fly, especially in elections where you have dozens of minor offices, and questions, to count. And I am not sure what you mean by "citizen" counted, transported, and secured. I'm a citizen; we DO count and transport everything in my county, but I can tell you up front there is NO way I will be "securing" any ballots or election materials myself unless it is at the County Courthouse or other approved public facility. I will NOT accept that responsibility otherwise, nor should anyone else have to who is a private citizen.

intending to purchase at least one DRE machine for each precinct by July in order to comply with HAVA, I whole-heartedly agree.

and listening to Randi Rhodes hoping to hear ANDY call her about this!!!!!! :)

not just the very close ones. Otherwise the machine counts will stand unaudited - so all they have to do is steal it in such a way that they insure that it is not within the 0.5% (or whatever) that triggers a recount.

they cost as much as $2000.. will Andy, or Ensign pay for the audits.. Ensign's bill is a waste of time, Please DUers read thru the bill and see that it keeps the computer record as the counted record and that is no good at all, if this bill were passed as it stands, in GA it would not matter.. because in GA we already have printed paper (the diebold tapes) and the issue we cannot trust that paper either... the software is what needs to be challenged, the computers are what we need to say NO WAY to, but hey, if you guys want to cowtow to senators have at it, your bill will get buried in committee anyway, so I don't waste much time worrying about legislative efforts anymore.


the only way to go forward is to get FBI involved (as conyers very courageously has) and file lawsuits which is what we are doing in GA... anything else is just wasted breath and effort...

we have mandated that a random number of precints in EACH county be audited post election by the SBoE. This is done at the expense of the state/county. The exact percentage of precints is still being worked out.

Our bill also requires paper ballots for DREs, source code reviewed by the state, criminal penalties for uncertified code and/or failure to inform us of bugs, and a code of ethics for election officials in their dealings with vendors.

The FBI may launch an investigation, but I will not hold my breath. I am putting more stock in the GAO investigation.

If you don't like the bill, don't support it.

David Allen
www.blackboxvoting.com
www.thoughtcrimes.org

First of all, any legislation requiring audits at the state level would require the state to pay for audits. In NY, where we have lever machines, they automatically recount all the votes within 15 days after the election. Of course they are just rereading totals off the machines but no one other than the taxpayers has to pay for this.

If we have a law requiring random audits of paper ballots, which seems likely at this point, the state would pay for them as well.

Also, if you're getting tapes from the machines in GA, how do you know they are even correct? They aren't voter-verified, are they? Just printouts of what's been recorded in memory, right? Wouldn't you rather have a ballot that each voter has verified to be his/her true intent? That's what Ensign's bill mandates along with the stipulation that the paper be the vote of record.

So why is this valuable albeit incremental step such a problem for you?

Do you recall posts concerning the national group forming, United for Secure Elections, I believe it's called? This group was working with VotersUnite and National Ballot Integrity Project and Open Voting Consortium. Is this the same group or not?

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=300059

Also, I'd like to know, will this proposal call for counting up all votes for each candidate at the precinct level to ensure that the ballots cannot be changed after they get to the central tabulators and counting by hand to make sure that the votes match the ballots? I wouldn't like to see the "sticker trick" pulled again.

many of its members support this action.

I don't see how "audit capability" solves the problem!

We need to be able to count the ballots, and count the actual VOTES, at the precinct level, IMMEDIATELY after the election, to ensure that the "machine counts" match the actual results! The machine counts for the votes can still be switched and no one will know unless the ballots are reconciled to the tapes/printouts produced by each machine! Even if the voter verifies their ballot, how do we know, for sure, that the machine is accurately recording those votes, unless we inspect/count each vote on the ballot and reconcile it to the printout/tape AND to the pollbooks?

and I don't think anyone cares as much as I do. But the first step is getting a "paper ballot" to count. I would not stake my reputation on this if I was not completely comfortable with this bill. But Monday I will be in DC fighting for more. But right now...we need this bill.

Carol we have to take baby steps on this.

Andy

I'd hate to see something incomplete get signed even if it improves part of the process.

on the way to the hospital I have a car wreck. I am bleeding profusely...just so happens My Plastic surgeon is in the emergency room...Does he A. Stop the bleeding or B. does he proceed with the plastic surgery?

We need to codify voter verified paper ballots. Without that codified by law...you dreams of counting paper ballots will never happen. Gotta have something to count first.

Andy

Why don't we just demand what we want in no uncertain terms? If what we demand is reasonable, that is, backed up by documentation about why machines can't be trusted and we need to hand count, what's wrong with stipulating all of it and going in for the real cure? In some cases, the plastic surgery would proceed simultaneously with treating the accident injuries...saves time and prevents having to pay for the surgery suite, anesthetics, and bed twice. An "all in one" approach is expeditious and prevents the need for "repeated visits".

IMPEACH BUSH t-shirt, and the surgeon is on the board of the Republican Party? You'd be dang happy to get the bleeding stopped.

I want paper paper paper too. I want to kick every tabulating mechanism out of the precinct, except maybe a Walgreen's calculator (MAYBE).

Carol, did you read the comments of the R Senators on January 6th, re the challenge to Ohio's electors?


As Mark Weisbrot wrote in an article published by the Knight Ridder newspaper chain, Republican lawmakers responded to Senator Boxer, and to Representative Tubbs-Jones and her colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus, "with howls of derision."<31> Some engaged in ad hominem tactics, labeling the objections "base" and "outrageous" (David Hobson, R-Ohio), and calling the objectors "aspiring fantasy authors" of "wild conspiracy theories," whose behaviour exemplified "their party's primary strategy to obstruct, to divide, to destroy" (Deborah Pryce, R-Ohio). Others denounced the debate itself as "a travesty" (Senator Rick Santorum, R-Pennsylvania), a "squandering time" by people "who persist in beating a dead horse" (Senator George Voinovich, R-Ohio); or, more gravely, as an exercise that "in the midst of a global war on terrorism <...> clearly emboldens those who would in fact undermine the prospect of democracy" (David Dreier (R-California), and "an assault against the institutions of our representative democracy" by the "X-Files wing" of the Democratic Party (Tom DeLay, R-Texas).

for next week (as a concerned citizen), and urge them to support this important bill. I spoke with Susan and let her know of my plans.

Very Very Much.

Andy

question whether they (repubs) should back it. I am not going in as a CASE member but just a concerned citizen.

because we all are, or should be, about fair elections.

remain Non-partisan.

No way.

Alexander, Lamar - (R - TN) Class II
302 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4944
http://www.alexander.senate.gov

Allard, Wayne - (R - CO) Class II
525 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5941
Web Form: http://www.allard.senate.gov/contactme

Allen, George - (R - VA) Class I
204 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4024
Web Form: http://www.allen.senate.gov/index.cfm?c=email

Baucus, Max - (D - MT) Class II
511 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2651
Web Form: http://www.baucus.senate.gov/emailmax.html

Bayh, Evan - (D - IN) Class III
463 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5623
Web Form: http://www.bayh.senate.gov/WebMail1.htm

Bennett, Robert - (R - UT) Class III
431 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5444
Web Form: http://www.bennett.senate.gov/contact/emailmain.html

Bingaman, Jeff - (D - NM) Class I
703 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5521
E-mail: senator_bingaman@bingaman.senate.gov"> senator_bingaman@bingaman.senate.gov

Bond, Christopher - (R - MO) Class III
274 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5721
Web Form: http://www.bond.senate.gov/contact/contactme.cfm

Brownback, Sam - (R - KS) Class III
303 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6521
Web Form: http://www.brownback.senate.gov/CMEmailMe.htm


Burr, Richard - (R - NC) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3154

Chafee, Lincoln - (R - RI) Class I
141A RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2921
Web Form: http://www.chafee.senate.gov/webform.htm

Coburn, Tom - (R - OK) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5754

Cochran, Thad - (R - MS) Class II
113 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5054
Web Form: http://www.cochran.senate.gov/contact.htm

Coleman, Norm - (R - MN) Class II
320 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5641
Web Form: http://www.coleman.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Contact.ContactForm

Collins, Susan - (R - ME) Class II
172 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2523
Web Form: http://www.collins.senate.gov/low/contactemail.htm

Cornyn, John - (R - TX) Class II
517 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2934
Web Form: http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/contact/index.html

Craig, Larry - (R - ID) Class II
520 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2752
Web Form: http://www.craig.senate.gov/webform.html

Crapo, Michael - (R - ID) Class III
239 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6142
Web Form: http://www.crapo.senate.gov

Dayton, Mark - (D - MN) Class I
346 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3244
Web Form: http://www.dayton.senate.gov/contact/email.cfm

DeMint, Jim - (R - SC) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6121

Dole, Elizabeth - (R - NC) Class II
120 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6342
Web Form: http://www.dole.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContactInformation.ContactForm

Domenici, Pete - (R - NM) Class II
328 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6621
Web Form: http://www.domenici.senate.gov/resources/contactform.cfm

Enzi, Michael - (R - WY) Class II
379A RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3424
Web Form: http://www.enzi.senate.gov/email.htm

Graham, Lindsey - (R - SC) Class II
290 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5972
Web Form: http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/index.cfm?mode=contact

Grassley, Chuck - (R - IA) Class III
135 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3744
Web Form: http://www.grassley.senate.gov/webform.htm

Gregg, Judd - (R - NH) Class III
393 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3324
E-mail: mailbox@gregg.senate.gov"> mailbox@gregg.senate.gov

Hagel, Chuck - (R - NE) Class II
248 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4224
Web Form: http://www.hagel.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Offices.Contact

Harkin, Tom - (D - IA) Class II
731 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3254
Web Form: http://www.harkin.senate.gov/contact/contact.cfm

Hatch, Orrin - (R - UT) Class I
104 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5251
Web Form: http://www.hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Offices.Contact

Hutchison, Kay - (R - TX) Class I
284 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5922
Web Form: http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/e-mail.htm

Inhofe, James - (R - OK) Class II
453 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4721
Web Form: http://www.inhofe.senate.gov/contactus.htm

Isakson, Johnny - (R - GA) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3643

Jeffords, James - (I - VT) Class I
413 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5141
Web Form: http://www.jeffords.senate.gov/contact-form.html

Kyl, Jon - (R - AZ) Class I
730 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4521
Web Form: http://www.kyl.senate.gov/contact.cfm

Landrieu, Mary - (D - LA) Class II
724 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5824
Web Form: http://www.landrieu.senate.gov/contact/index.cfm

Leahy, Patrick - (D - VT) Class III
433 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4242
E-mail: senator_leahy@leahy.senate.gov"> senator_leahy@leahy.senate.gov

Levin, Carl - (D - MI) Class II
269 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6221
Web Form: http://www.levin.senate.gov/contact/index.cfm

Lott, Trent - (R - MS) Class I
487 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6253
E-mail: senatorlott@lott.senate.gov"> senatorlott@lott.senate.gov

Lugar, Richard - (R - IN) Class I
306 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4814
E-mail: senator_lugar@lugar.senate.gov"> senator_lugar@lugar.senate.gov

Martinez, Mel - (R - FL) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3041

McCain, John - (R - AZ) Class III
241 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2235
Web Form: http://www.mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Contact.Home

Murkowski, Lisa - (R - AK) Class III
322 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6665
Web Form: http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/contact.html

Nelson, Ben - (D - NE) Class I
720 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6551
Web Form: http://www.bennelson.senate.gov/email.html

Reed, Jack - (D - RI) Class II
728 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4642
Web Form: http://www.reed.senate.gov/form-opinion.htm

Roberts, Pat - (R - KS) Class II
109 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4774
Web Form: http://www.roberts.senate.gov/e-mail_pat.html

Salazar, Ken - (D - CO) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5852
Web Form: http://www.salazar.senate.gov/contactus.cfm

Santorum, Rick - (R - PA) Class I
511 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6324
Web Form: http://www.santorum.senate.gov/emailrjs.html

Sessions, Jeff - (R - AL) Class II
335 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4124
Web Form: http://www.sessions.senate.gov/contact.htm#form

Shelby, Richard - (R - AL) Class III
110 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5744
E-mail: senator@shelby.senate.gov"> senator@shelby.senate.gov

Smith, Gordon - (R - OR) Class II
404 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3753
Web Form: http://www.gsmith.senate.gov/webform.htm

Snowe, Olympia - (R - ME) Class I
154 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5344
E-mail: olympia@snowe.senate.gov"> olympia@snowe.senate.gov

Specter, Arlen - (R - PA) Class III
711 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4254
E-mail: arlen_specter@specter.senate.gov"> arlen_specter@specter.senate.gov

Stevens, Ted - (R - AK) Class II
522 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-3004
Web Form: http://www.stevens.senate.gov/contact_form.cfm

Sununu, John - (R - NH) Class II
111 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2841
Web Form: http://www.sununu.senate.gov/webform.html

Talent, James - (R - MO) Class I
493 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6154
Web Form: http://www.talent.senate.gov/Contact/default.cfm?pagemode=1

Thomas, Craig - (R - WY) Class I
307 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-6441
Web Form: http://www.thomas.senate.gov/html/contact.html

Vitter, David - (R - LA) Class III
UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-4623
Web Form: http://www.vitter.senate.gov/contact.cfm

Warner, John - (R - VA) Class II
225 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-2023
Web Form: http://www.warner.senate.gov/contact/contactme.cfm

Wyden, Ron - (D - OR) Class III
516 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510
(202) 224-5244
Web Form: http://www.wyden.senate.gov/contact.html

Without a paper ballot this bill will get very little support and solve nothing. Let it die the death it deserves and wait for PAPER.

they are complying with HAVA.

Once they are bought, we will be STUCK with them for a long time, years or maybe decades.

NOBODY is going to throw out brand-new, expensive voting machines in favor of 100% hand counted paper. I am a pollworker, and I know BOEs. It is JUST NOT going to happen. Sorry.

This bill has a good chance of passing and AT LEAST we will have mandatory voter-verified paper ballots coming out of the machines. That is at least a start, upon which we can build.

Remember the old song...

"You can't always get what you want... but if you try sometimes, you JUST MIGHT GET WHAT YOU NEED!"

This, nor any bill discussed here so far will address the problem of fraud. Instead, fraud is allowed to continue through the opportunities that electronic voting and counting of the ballots leave exposed. You can run with this if you want, but it won't solve anything whatsoever. You also won't get any support for it.

breaking it down into little steps that are do-able and then you do one step at a time.

What if the Continental Congress had said, "oh we'd better wait, we can't make a Declaration of Independence because we don't yet have a Constitution? " Guess we'd be still singing God Save the Queen today.

One DO-ABLE step at a time.

stop the bleeding and save his life? That is what we are doing here. We need a paper ballot, the bill gives us one.

It's not perfection and I have never said it is. But at least it stops the bleeding and is a good foundation to build from.

This bill allows ELECTRONICALLY CAST and COUNTING OF THE BALLOT.Sorry Andy, you've gone off the deep end here. Who's side are you on? C'ya!!

I have not gone off the deep end. I have worked this issue for 2 years now. Where have you been? This bill is a good start. Don't endorse it if you want. I plan on supporting it 100%.

I have read the section of HAVA it changes and the changes are sound.

Most systems already use some form of paper ballot and problems are rife because of the secrecy and vulnerable to foul play.

selecting a couple of races, in each state, after each election and requiring a hand recount of those selected states?

I don't know that it's a big deal.

is that hand counting every ballot might be perceived as time consuming, expensive and a step back wards because many have been convinced that electronic voting machines should take over the manual count. (You know, the calculator generations) I don't disagree that a hand count might be best for oversight and for checks and balances. Mistakes and funny games can happen with hand counts, too, though. I just think that, with where we're at with e-voting, despite what some of us know and believe--that it is prone to it's own problems and susceptibilities--that many would perceive a hand count as a drastic change and far-fetched proposition. Just a thought.

will try agian

SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.

(a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
(1) In general.--
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
voting system (including any lever voting system,
optical scanning voting system, or direct recording
electronic system) shall--
(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private
and independent manner) the votes selected by the
voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and
counted;
(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity
(in a private and independent manner) to change
the ballot or correct any error before the ballot
is cast and counted (including the opportunity to
correct the error through the issuance of a
replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise
unable to change the ballot or correct any error);
and
(iii) if the voter selects votes for more than
one candidate for a single office--
(I) notify the voter that the voter
has selected more than one candidate for
a single office on the ballot;
(II) notify the voter before the
ballot is cast and counted of the effect
of casting multiple votes for the
office; and
(III) provide the voter with the
opportunity to correct the ballot before
the ballot is cast and counted.
(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot
voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central
count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots
and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of
subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
(i) establishing a voter education program
specific to that voting system that notifies each
voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for
an office; and
(ii) providing the voter with instructions on
how to correct the ballot before it is cast and
counted (including instructions on how to correct
the error through the issuance of a replacement
ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change
the ballot or correct any error).
(C) The voting system shall ensure that any
notification required under this paragraph preserves the
privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the
ballot.
(2) Audit capacity.--
(A) In general.--The voting system shall produce a
record with an audit capacity for such system.
(B) Manual audit capacity.--
(i) The voting system shall produce a
permanent paper record with a manual audit
capacity for such system.
(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter
with an opportunity to change the ballot or
correct any error before the permanent paper
record is produced.
(iii) The paper record produced under
subparagraph (A) shall be available as an official
record for any recount conducted with respect to
any election in which the system is used.


Here is the new language.

SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.

(a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
(1) In general.--
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
voting system (including any lever voting system,
optical scanning voting system, or direct recording
electronic system) shall--
(i) permit the voter to verify the accuracy of their ballot (in a private and independent manner), by allowing the voter to review an individual paper version of the voter's ballot before the voter's ballot is cast and counted;
(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity
(in a private and independent manner) to change
the ballot or correct any errorto change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot
is cast and counted (including the opportunity to
correct the error through the issuance of a
replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise
unable to change the ballot or correct any error);

(iii)(I) preserve the individual paper version of the voter's ballot, after the voter has certified that the same accurately reflects the voter's intent, as the individual permanent paper record, and

(II) preserve such individual permanent paper record at the polling place in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2)(B)(i); and';

(iv) if the voter selects votes for more than
one candidate for a single office--
(I) notify the voter that the voter
has selected more than one candidate for
a single office on the ballot;
(II) notify the voter before the
ballot is cast and counted of the effect
of casting multiple votes for the
office; and
(III) provide the voter with the
opportunity to correct the ballot before
the ballot is cast and counted.
(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot
voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central
count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots
and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of
subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
(i) establishing a voter education program
specific to that voting system that notifies each
voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for
an office; and
(ii) providing the voter with instructions on
how to correct the ballot before it is cast and
counted (including instructions on how to correct
the error through the issuance of a replacement
ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change
the ballot or correct any error).
(C) The voting system shall ensure that any
notification required under this paragraph preserves the
privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the
ballot.
(2) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(A) IN GENERAL- The voting system shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each ballot that is cast which provides for voter verification of such record in accordance with paragraph (1)(A) and which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).

`(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-

`(i) The voting system shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each ballot cast that is either--

`(I) preserved within the polling place in the manner in which all other paper ballots are preserved within such polling place; or

`(II) in the absence of such manner or method, which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction for preserving paper ballots in general.

`(ii) Each paper record produced under clause (i) shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent or superior to that of a paper ballot voting system.

`(iii) All electronic records produced by any voting system shall be consistent with the individual permanent paper records produced by such voting system. In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records, the individual permanent paper records shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast.

`(iv) The individual permanent paper records produced under clause (i) shall be used as the official records for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.'.

:kick:

Maybe we'll even get a floor debate and C-Span coverage.

:kick:

:kick:

:kick:

i didn't realize i could write to these senators on this even though they aren't from my state. yes i am blonde. i guess i should write up a letter and start sending it.

:kick:

:kick:

:kick:

:kick:

NGU.

:kick:

Why did you respond against a paper record here? http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=308619&mesg_id=308679&page=

Was it simply a question of semantics in my post that you objected to?

Ensigns bill says:

"permit the voter to verify the accuracy of their ballot (in a private and independent manner), by allowing the voter to review an individual paper version of the voter's ballot before the voter's ballot is cast and counted"

and

"In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the individual permanent paper records, the individual permanent paper records shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast."

and

"The individual permanent paper records produced under clause (i) shall be used as the official records for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.'."

But in online posts, we are not so precise. I had the impression you were advocating only hand counted paper ballots, like so many on DU seem to do. That provision you quote about the paper record being the true legal record is a very important one. I will write my representatives.

Thanks for writing your reps.

I am disappointed.

All this talk about a "triage" does not make sense if the real goal is to get rid of electronic voting machines and get back to hand counted paper ballots (hand counted at the precinct).

What this bill does is give the e-voting machine makers more business and another big cost to county governments. It is like one more gift to a group of corporations, one more gift of the taxpayers' money.

If this is done, the next step will be this argument:

We gave you your paper ballots, and you are still not satisfied?

Please, please, please let us stay focused on the goal of getting rid of the voting machines all together.

If hand counting is handled correctly at the precinct, the costs will be minimal and the time involved will be short.

Remember, a typical precinct only has to count 300-600 ballots. Not a big deal. -- especially if we separate the presidential vote from all the other stuff on the ballot. Either by separate ballot papers, like is done in the UK, or by holding a separate election day for the other stuff.

I cannot support this bill.

those ballots in King county...Are complex. With at a minimum 100 splits.

Without paper ballots, you have nothing to count. Right now in Georgia, Maryland and many other jurisdictions there is no papoer ballot to count.

If we don't get a paper provision right this minute we are going to lose the battle and the war.

If we have to have e-voting at all, OF COURSE no one would disagree on the need for a printed ballot to make some of the voters happy, and theoretically permit real recounts to happen.

BUT, you will never get past that point and solve the real problem, if this is allowed to pass.

You know as well as I do once we get this, nothing else will be allowed to happen. And you also know the compilation of those e-votes will not be open to disclosure. And you also know a thousand roadblocks will prevent any reliable recounts. (witness Ohio, in spades!)

Washington State was lucky to get a damned decent recount of the governor race. But look what it took to get it!

As to ballot complexity.... I already said the Presidential vote should be separated from all other races and issues, preferably on a separate date, but at least on a separate piece of paper.

I believe hand-counted paper ballots MUST be the goal, and nothing should get in the way.

How do you count Georgia? Remember Georgia is all touchscreen.

at a State or Federal level.

So now how do we run the election in Georgia within the constraints of current law.

I have not read the bills, just all this talk about them so I could be blowing hot air. But it is IMPERATIVE that we get the right legislation passed.

It seems like the Republican bill is good except for one thing. From Andy's post, the bill says:

All electronic records produced by any voting system will be consistent with the paper records. In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and paper records, the voter verified paper record is considered the true and correct record of the votes cast.

The problem is, there doesn't seem to be anything about how, when, or why the paper records are to be deemed consisent with the rest of the voting system.

Do the paper ballots just sit there, in case there are irregularities?

What kind of inconsistencies would produce a need for a recount?

Unless these questions are clearly answered in the bill, I think it is missing the real guts we need, and it is true inconsisenticies could go unnoticed if there isn't a requirement to check for them.

Some are calling for a hand count of every ballot. I'm not sure that's needed.

I think the bill should contain language stating that a certain PERCENTAGE of all PRECINCTS nationwide are to be RANDOMLY SELECTED for a mandatory hand count verification. There must be a failsafe way to select the precincts randomly so that no one would ever know what they are beforehand.

If a precinct is found to be off, then the county is hand checked. If the county is off then the state, and if a state is off, then the whole nation should be hand verified.

I think there are statistical formulas that can determine a reasonable percentage for hand checking that can give us a very high confidence level without hand counting every ballot, especially if they are voter verified ballots and they are randomly selected.

I think this is the common ground that the two sides of the issue need to find.

It's not enough to just have a paper ballot sitting there, in case they are needed. There needs to be mandatory random spot checks at the precinct level. Then I think (hope) both sides would be happy.

And all the points you mention will be like barbed wire for citizens/parties to litigate through.

Could the Bill be modified with a huge push from us?

Let the machines give a "preliminary" count if people want, but...

Hand Count at the Precinct. (DU needs a Hand Counting emoticon.)

It's not a big deal.

But then the totals off the roll have to be done , if electronically,
with a separate program from the electronic input logfile, to be actually used as a clean standard
otherwise the duplicate tape has to be hand counted to match up to the internal electronic logfile-
If there is only one receipt issued, without a retained duplicate, the voter keeps his receipt, and than there is no duplicate kept as a clean standard backup record.
If you use the same program to total both,it is harder to keep it clean-

this is almost more of a mechanical issue
than you still have the central tabulators, which are a major problem
But we must have paper receipts before the next election

where Andy is coming from ,but quick fixes is what got Bush in.Its time for "We the people" and our elected Dems to fight for paper ballots now. Georgia has to just deal with it,they cannot have machines that can steal our votes any longer. Its the United States of America.

Why contact only these Senators, when the bill will be voted on by all, eventually?

Does this bill do anything to address the matter of secret, proprietary source code, owned and controlled by partisans of the Bush regime, and used to count all our votes (central tabulators) as well as in individual machines? (I know that a real ballot can help this situation--by providing a way to track the votes--but does this bill do anything toward open source code?)

Has this bill been carefully vetted for "poison pills"--that is, for instance, reducing the right of the state or its citizens to choose paper ballots and hand counts?

Why not mention election fraud? I know what you're saying about being polite and courteous, but it seems to me that a citizen expressing suspicions about the election might prod them to want to do something, to allay suspicions, to distance themselves from suspicious elections, and to establish their creds at advocates of good government.

Also, there is the matter of telling the truth. There was an important report today by NINE Ph.D.'s most of them statistics experts, calling for a full investigation of the 2004 election, and saying that the results are in doubt. It is quite an amazing report, confirming all that we have been saying here at DU about election fraud. See

http://uscountvotes.org/ucvAnalysis/US/USCountVotes_Re_Mitofsky-Edison.pdf

Frankly, I want them to know about this. I want them to feel the heat on their necks of coming investigations and exposure.

And, finally, I don't have much faith that the people who took away our right to vote will give it back to us any time soon. BushCons in Congress quite deliberately blocked all verification and auditing measures for 2004.

So I think they will block THIS bill as well--and will likely push the corrupt Dodd bill. It's a big question, but: How do we fight this thing? If they push the Dodd bill, how do we get the Dodd bill killed? And if the Ensign bill fails, do we then have to spend time and energy trying to amend the Dodd bill or getting rid of it? What's our failsafe? What's damage control? Where does the Dodd bill leave us--in regard to where I think the real fight will occur--in the states? (Are Secretaries of State objecting to the Dodd bill?)

Good Points
Peace Patriot

...In letters on the Ensign bill, you could start the letter with the highest goal--paper ballot, hand count, etc.--and say you are supporting this as a lesser solution to provide a paper ballot, but much more is needed.

In the posts and referrenced documents on this thread you'll find some of the answers.

My sense from all this;

The Bill Dodd may put up could do in the long run more to help establish, while not mandate, paper-less voting.

The Bill Ensign put up, while not mandating paper ballots, does not forclose it.

<http://www.ballotintegrity.org/action.html>