And I'm not expecting anything we're gonna like, imagining, instead, them backing "security procedures" as sufficient remedy.
As you know, while the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) evaluates voting equipment, it's the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) along with the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that issues the actual certification.
In this VoteTrustUSA article, the author, AJ Devies, refers to a conversation with Brian Hancock, ITA Secretariat for the EAC.
...I asked Mr. Hancock how Diebold's equipment had been certified in spite of the presence of interpreted code in its software architecture. Mr. Hancock claimed he had no clue how "this" (certification of DREs and op-scanners of past and present generations) got through Independent Testing Authority (ITA) testing.
With regard to the California testing and report, the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) is finishing up a response to the report. The NASED report will be available within the next week and will be posted on the NASED website. Mr. Hancock would not speculate about NASED's position on decertification of the Diebold equipment.
The author went on to ask about violations of the 2002 VVSG accessibility requirements.
I pressed some more about how the ITAs could recommend certification of DREs that fail Section 2.2.7.2 of the 2002 VVSS, particularly 2.2.7.2(f).
For a device with touchscreen or contact-sensitive controls, provide an input method using mechanically operated controls or keys that shall:
1) Be tactilely discernible without activating the controls or keys;
2) Be operatable with one hand and not require tight grasping, pinching, or twisting of the wrist;
3) Require a force less than 5 lbs (22.2 N) to operate; and
4) Provide no key repeat function;
At first Mr. Hancock said I would have to contact the ITAs for an answer to that question. I asked how to go about that since the ITAs do not make their reports available to the public under a FOIA request. He didn't know.
I asked if NASED could provide the ITA reports under a FOIA request. He didn't know.
I asked who could provide the reports if the agencies responsible for testing and certifying the DREs couldn't. He didn't know.
And HAVA accessibility requirements.
I then asked if the ITAs and/or NASED took HAVA 301(a)(1) into consideration when testing DREs or any other devices, such as the AutoMARK. He said, "No testing for disabled access is done by the ITAs." He also said, "Equipment is just certified to the 2002 standards, not HAVA 301(a)(1)."
The article ends
...I asked one more question: "So, the EAC, whose responsibility it is to ensure compliance with the voting standards, has not done their job, and is telling me to vote on equipment that is not compliant with HAVA, and has prohibited interpreted code in it? Isn't it illegal any way you slice it?"
He didn't have an answer.
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1030&Itemid=26
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