Brennan Center report details e-voting vulnerabilities and remedies.

http://brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2006/pressrelease_2006_0627.html


Cross posted from this thread:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=364x1526388

K&R

since it even garnered a mention on Ed Schultz (who I really like, but is really cautious about crying foul).

It's NYU law school stuff. Looks good to me, though I haven't examined their remedies enough to pass judgement yet.

:hi:

...the machines were not loved by the people the machines put in office, then laws which could eliminate the threat of hacking and wireless access would have been in HAVA when HAVA was passed. And simple requirements for real auditing procedures would likewise have been enacted.

The fact that 4 years later no such federal laws have been enacted tells you that the vote stealing bastards are as happy as can be with the culture of corruption their HAVA law has allowed.

We are not dealing with honest people. Why anybody would allow those people any further room to maneuver, or to offer up excuses for any more of their behaviors, tends to be incredible.

Grassy Ass. :hi:

The recently released report by the Brennan Center on protecting elections
in an electronic world cites 120 security issues and what can be done to mitigate them.

Security experts will tell you that computer security is not just about technology,
but also about process and policy.

This is a "must read" article for folks working in elections.

While my largest concerns are just with ensuring accurate ballot programming and
good poll worker procedures, we should look at this report, and ensure that
each state takes advantage of its recommendations.

Here is the Executive Summary (only 20 pages), the task force is a who's who of
electronic voting experts.

THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY:
PROTECTING ELECTIONS
IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BRENNAN CENTER TASK FORCE
ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY,
LAWRENCE NORDEN, CHAIR

http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/Executive%20Summary.pdf

and the more extensive report is here (162 pages)
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/Full%20Report.pdf

This report further drives home the important of a durable, understandable
paper ballot record for the touchscreen machines, not just for optical scan voting.

That is even more reason to push ES&S to get the VVPAT printout upgraded properly this time.
(Currently it prints every single selection by the voter and NOT a ballot summary!)

Additionally, the value of a paper ballot is reduced if people ignore it.
To increase voter verification, we must have signs on the DRE machines to
encourage voters to check the printout.

(We are planning for a sign about 3" X 5"

What's it going to say? How many languages will it be printed in?

How about getting the ballot programmers to also include this on the touch screens?

see previous post:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x436907#436964


Why not just revert to hand counted paper ballots if the report sez
"The report concluded that the three major electronic voting systems in use have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities. But it added that most of these vulnerabilities can be overcome by auditing printed voting records to spot irregularities. "

why bother spending the billions for junk that only has a 5 yr shelf life and isn't dependable anyway and depends on having the paper trail hand counted to determine whether it is working properly

why not just bypass the machinery altogether and handcount. It ain't impossible

Furthermore, beware of making election wares depend on the audit for accurate results if you are pushing for HR550 since HR550 will place this last bastion of protection, THE AUDIT, into private hands and we all know how well the model of privatizing government services works