When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan (spring 2007 article)

U.S. condemns bombing in Pakistan - White House

By Reuters
Friday October 19, 02:45 AM

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States on Thursday condemned a bomb attack that targeted a vehicle carrying former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Karachi after she returned from exile.

"The United States condemns the violent attack in Pakistan and mourns the loss of innocent life there," Gordon Johndroe, White House National Security Council spokesman said.

"Extremists will not be allowed to stop Pakistanis from selecting their representatives through an open and democratic process."

We also have a five year, $750 million dollar plan for winning over the local population in this area, but real concerns have been raised about whether that money can actually be put to good use. We will be very interested to hear your views on the Administration’s strategy for dealing with this very real threat in both the short and long term.

We must also consider the role of U.S. aid in advancing our interests. Since 9/11, we have given Pakistan roughly $10 billion dollars in aid—and likely billions more in covert assistance. Roughly 75% of this aid has gone to reimbursement of counter-terrorism expenses and other security assistance. We clearly have a right to expect more in return for the massive amount of aid we are providing for the fight against terrorism.

We have also reached a critical period for the future of democracy in Pakistan. It is clear that reinforcing our strong commitment to democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law is in the best interests of Pakistan and the United States.

President Musharraf’s term is set to expire this fall, and under Pakistani law the National and Provincial Assemblies must conduct new presidential elections by October, with new legislative elections to follow. The Pakistani Supreme Court may have to rule on whether President Musharraf can stay on in his role as chief of the military, and whether he can legally be re-elected by a lame duck Parliament. Now that Chief Justice Chaudhry has been reinstated to the Court, there appears to be a strong possibility that it will rule against President Musharraf on these questions.

We need to be prepared for this eventuality, and the possibility that President Musharraf may leave or be forced out of office. In fact, although he may be hedging on this now, President Musharraf has said in the past that he will relinquish his military role, and Khurshid Kasuri, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said during his recent visit that President Musharraf was still planning to do so. We must make it clear that we expect President Musharraf to live up to his promise.

It is also critically important that the upcoming elections are free and fair, and we should work to ensure they are conducted transparently and legitimately. This will send a very important message of support to the people of Pakistan, who are increasingly insistent on restoring true democratic rule, and will help to undermine extremists. We must also continue to raise our strong concerns over unexplained disappearance of some 400 people, the arrest of hundreds of political activists from opposition parties, and the recent crackdown on the media.

When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan

Craig Cohen is a fellow in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and deputy chief of staff at CSIS and an adjunct professor at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.
Derek Chollet is a fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Global Economy and Development Center, and an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University.

In the five years since Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf announced his intention to cut ties with the Taliban and join the war on terrorism, U.S. policy toward Pakistan has been one of unstinting support. That approach has brought some genuine gains: more al Qaeda members have been captured and killed in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Yet today, it is worth asking whether U.S. policy has reached its limits and if it is now being guided more by inertia than strategy. Washington’s close alliance with Musharraf may now have run its course….

For all the talk of the United States’ global dominance and despite considerable U.S. support to the Pakistani military, Washington finds itself with relatively little leverage to influence events in Pakistan. During the past five years, the United States has given Pakistan more than $10 billion in assistance, channeled primarily through the Pakistani military. What Pakistan gives in return may be only enough to keep the money coming. After the September 11 attacks, many U.S. policymakers believed that Pakistan was one place where they were justified in saying, “You are either with us or against us.” Nevertheless, despite the billions of dollars spent, the United States has not made the necessary commitment to solidify the relationship for the long term. This is not merely a function of the scale of assistance, but of its type. U.S. engagement with Pakistan is highly militarized and centralized, with very little reaching the vast majority of Pakistanis.

More problematic still, U.S. assistance does not so much reflect a coherent strategy as it does a legacy of the initial, transactional quid pro quo established in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and a familiar menu of what the United States was already organized to provide. U.S. soft power in Pakistan, the ability to influence by attraction and persuasion, is far lower than it could be, considering the historic, economic, and personal bonds that unite the two countries.

Is it possible for the United States to convince Pakistanis that it is interested in a serious, long-term partnership rather than merely a short-term alliance of convenience? Doing so will require a better understanding of Pakistan and an assistance strategy more aligned with the needs of average Pakistanis….A closer look at the numbers for U.S. assistance to Pakistan since the September 11 attacks may spark a broader discussion of long-term objectives. Money is not everything, but it often sends a clearer signal of our priorities than official statements. Elections and transitions offer the opportunity to rethink U.S. interests and policy options. If Washington squanders the chance and allows its approach to Pakistan to be governed by little more than blind faith, both Musharraf and U.S. policy are sure to remain in the line of fire for the foreseeable future.

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Blasts confirm instability, polarization in Pakistan

(CNN) -- Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was nearing the tomb of Pakistan's founding father when blasts struck near her convoy in Karachi, Pakistan, killing at least 124 people.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who led Pakistan to independence and championed equal rights, stood for democracy and human rights.

That Bhutto chose to visit his grave was an important symbolic move, said Akbar Ahmed, former Pakistani ambassador to the United Kingdom.

"The fact that she went to to Mr. Jinnah's mausoleum would send a message to Pakistanis ... that Jinnah remains the symbol of all Pakistan," he said. "The fact that she selects Jinnah reemphasizes that she is taking a mainstream position in Pakistan politics."

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