Is there still a Magician in the house?

http://www.counterpunch.org/smith01122008.html


It was in his December 4th, 2007 press conference, after release of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear weapons programs, that Bush signaled he was prepared to make the leap: "On the one hand, we should exert pressure, and on the other hand, we should provide the Iranians a way forward. Andour hope is that the Iranians will get diplomacy back on track."

Thirty days passed. Just as Nixon had worried that something would derail his opening to China, Bush could see his legacy disappearing. Then on January 3rd, 2008, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, speaking to a small group of Iranian students, signaled back: "I would be the first one to support these relations. Of course we never said the severed relations were forever. But for the time being, it (restoring ties) (would) provide an opportunity for security agents to come and go, as well as for espionage."

But was this reply a yes or a no? Were the Iranians about to pull the rug from under the secret negotiations for the visit? Three days passed. Suddenly the whole project seemed lost because of what appeared to be a serious incident-at-sea between three U.S. warships and five Iranian fast patrol boats. Someone in a senior position in Tehran, opposed to any rapprochement and having control of military sea craft, must have suspected something was about to happen.

And although the U.S. press played up the encounter's hazards--and began to probe deeper into other incidents that might lead them toward the Magician and his illusion of countries-at-odds--the official Iranian version (after denying that the encounter ever occurred) stressed that the meeting was a routine exchange of ship identities, course and intent and that no hostile actions took place.

Nonetheless, some in the U.S. press immediately equated this modern-day encounter to the August 1964 "Gulf of Tonkin" incident which led to a major escalation of U.S. troop units in South Vietnam. Interestingly, word of the encounter leaked first from the White House, but reporters had to go to the Pentagon for the details--most of which were still murky.

Departure day for the Mid-East trip arrived. As Air Force One became airborne, Bush found himself in a quandary similar to Richard Nixon in 1972: then, when the American president landed in Beijing, he still had no assurance he would be able to meet directly with Chairman Mao.

.....

Today the issues for Bush are 4,400 U.S. dead in Afghanistan and Iraq, a looming recession, the price of oil on the verge of skyrocketing, the precipitous decline of the dollar against other currencies, the troubled housing market, global warming, and U.S. Iranian relations. Of these, only on the latter is Bush still "the decider"--or rather co-decider.

* If he didn't go to Tehran, obviously nothing in U.S.-Iranian relations would change, and Bush would miss the last opportunity for a legacy.

* If he went but Khamenei refused to see him, his "grand opening" would be incomplete and thus his historical stature would be forever diminished.

* But should he go, and should he and Khamenei meet, even though nothing substantive occurred, the illusion would dominate.

Is there still a Magician in the house?