New book from former Bush adviser: Iraq was on the table from the outset of the administration

http://www.newsweek.com/id/195668/page/2


Two Bushes, Two Iraq Wars

An insider's view from an advisor who served in both administrations.
By Richard N. Haass | NEWSWEEK

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In contrast to the first President Bush, I would see this president only intermittently: at some relatively large interagency meeting, or when Powell would take me in tow for one of his regular Oval Office sessions. The longest conversation we had was in the conference room on board Air Force One flying back from the Northern Ireland summit a few months later, in April 2003. For more than an hour it was just the three of us—Bush, Powell, and me. What struck me more than anything was how comfortable Bush was with his decision to attack Iraq. Here we were, three weeks into the war, and he appeared totally at peace with what he had decided and how it was unfolding. It was real confidence, not bluster. But I was struck, too, by how unconcerned the president seemed to be with all the complications that I and others had predicted would come his and our way. He had a penchant for the big and dramatic and was not about to allow the doubts of others or the details to sidetrack him.

How did George W. Bush reach this point? I will go to my grave not fully understanding why. There was no meeting or set of meetings at which the pros and cons were debated and a formal decision taken. No, this decision happened. It was cumulative. The issue was on the table from the outset of the administration, but before 9/11, Iraq was simply one of many concerns on an evolving foreign policy agenda. After 9/11, the president and those closest to him wanted to send a message to the world that the United States was willing and able to act decisively. Liberating Afghanistan was a start, but in the end it didn't scratch the itch.

Iraq was fundamentally different. The president wanted to destroy an established nemesis of the United States. And he wanted to change the course of history, transforming not just a country but the region of the world that had produced the lion's share of the world's terrorists and had resisted much of modernity. He may have sought to accomplish what his father did not. The arguments put forward for going to war—noncompliance with U.N. resolutions, possession of weapons of mass destruction—turned out to be essentially window dressing, trotted out to build domestic and international support for a policy that had been forged mostly for other reasons.

Would there have been a second Iraq war had there been no 9/11? Counter-historical questions are impossible to answer confidently. Before 9/11 there had been some activity in the bureaucracy about Iraq, but there is little evidence that it amounted to more than background noise. September 11 transformed the administration into the proverbial hammer looking for a nail. Iraq became that nail.